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Abstract
Since 2009, the Nigerian military has been fighting the insurgent and terror group Boko
Haram in the Northeast region of Nigeria. In 2016, the Islamic State of West Africa
Province (ISWAP) formed as an offshoot of Boko Haram and aligned with the remnants
of ISIS. The Nigerian army has failed to defeat the insurgent groups and has, according to
the research, committed abuses and atrocities, including extrajudicial killings, against the
civilian population. The norms of military effectiveness, the normative theory of military
performance and, the neorealist combat balance theory formed the theoretical basis for
this study. The research questions addressed whether a nation’s military reflected its
society and if the dysfunction in that society affected military performance. This
qualitative study utilized a grounded constructivist approach in gathering data from seven
active duty and retired military senior leadership and academics. Data analysis revealed
that a nation’s military does mirror/reflect the society from which it emanated. The
dysfunction found in society transfers to the military and is causally linked to battlefield
failure and societal abuse. Specifically, this study identified the rabid dysfunction and
corruption found within Nigerian society and linked societal dysfunction to army
dysfunction. In addition, in a nation where tribalism dominates every aspect of life, this
study found the army to be a tribe unto itself, further propagating the violent narrative
against civilians. Positive social change may be possible if civilian and military
leadership understands the dysfunctional social dynamic and its effects on State
institutions, including the military, in a post-colonial African nation.
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Chapter 1:
Introduction to the Study
Since 2009, Nigeria has dealt with the radicalized Islamic sect Boko Haram,
borne from Mallam Lawal’s organization, Shabab Muslim Youth Organization, founded
in 1995. Though the Nigerian military has been fighting Boko Haram since the group
acquired a violent mandate in 2009, it has experienced limited success with offensives
and operations using conventional warfare tactics. As such, Boko Haram continues to be
a potent force. Further, while carrying out conventional warfare doctrine, the military has
committed abuses against the Nigerian population and, along with the terror groups, is
responsible for citizens fleeing to relief and relocation camps. (Amnesty International,
2016b; Human Rights Watch, 2016a).
The Nigerian army has the mandate from the political leadership to defeat Boko
Haram and ISWAP and remove the groups from Nigeria. However, the military has
failed to deny Boko Haram/ISWAP safe haven in Chad, Niger, and Cameroon and has
failed to stop economic and material support from reaching the groups. The Nigerian
military must be viewed positively by the population, not feared as much as the terror
groups. In abusing the people, the government risks moving civilians to support the
insurgency. Boko Haram has capitalized on this reality by claiming that it is fighting
government corruption and population abuse carried out by the military (Human Rights
Watch, 2011).
This disunity within the social and political structure represents the complexity
that is Nigeria. The state governments contradict the federal state and are not unified with
the federal government on many topics (Abdulhamid & Chima, 2016).
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There are also geographical and religious divides. The south (majority Christian)
population lacks concern for those in the North struggling with Boko Haram. For the
most part, the population is unconcerned with a nationalistic-patriotic paradigm. Nigeria
lacks a collective nationalism or a national identity as a nation-state. There is the Muslim
North, the Christian South, and the tribal system that holds sectarian loyalty.
Nationalism in Nigeria is found within local and regional ethnic, religious, and
civic structures, denying a national identity and an avenue to Nigerian patriotism
(Negedu & Atabor, 2015). For instance, the Northern States Elders Forum has accused
Christian President Goodluck Johnathon of allowing Boko Haram to slaughter “good
Muslims” in Northeast Nigeria (Doukhan, 2015). Though Muslims have opened their
doors to the displaced and victimized despite the array of issues in Nigeria, this appears
to be a localized phenomenon in northeastern Nigeria (Cohn, 2016).
The basis for this study lay in determining whether the dysfunction within the
Nigerian population contributes to the issues found in the Nigerian Army that affect
efforts to defeat terror groups. Identifying the issues to success and defining how a
nation-state can fight an in-house insurgency would not only assist Nigeria but any state
dealing with a homegrown insurgent or terrorist organization. In addition, social change
occurs when the military successfully engages the insurgency and protects the civilian
population while doing so.
This chapter includes a background on Nigeria and its social constructs, the
threats that Boko Haram presents, the damage to the Nigerian population, and offerings
from various scholars on how to end the Boko Haram insurgency from a sociological
standpoint. The problem statement specifies the issue of dysfunctional societal influence
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on military performance. Research questions are identified, and the conceptual
framework addresses the complexity of Nigerian society. Additionally, operational terms
and the nature of the study are identified. Assumptions, limitations, and delimitations are
discussed. The significance of this study relates to the destruction of Boko Haram and the
protection of the Nigerian people.
Background
Boko Haram is not the first militancy group Nigeria faced since gaining its
freedom from Great Britain in 1960 (Awortu, 2015). Other groups have included the
Maitatsine Islamic Fundamentalist sect in northeast Nigeria; the Yoruba ethnic Odua
People’s Congress in southwest Nigeria; the Bakassi Boys and Movement for the
Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra, an Igbo ethnic group in southeast Nigeria; and
the Niger Delta militants, which affects offshore commerce (E.A.D.W., 2016).
According to the U.S. Department of State (2017), approximately 40 Middle
Eastern and African terror organizations exist. Boko Haram’s strength has been estimated
to be between 5,000 and 10,000 members, though numbers fluctuate (Warner & Hulme,
2018). Boko Haram had diminished in capacity and effectiveness, but this may be
nothing more than the natural flow in the life cycle of an insurgency (Leach, 2016).
Boko Haram operates as a criminal organization under the veil of Islam. Boko
Haram has used tactics to incite fear, gain power, and notoriety, including kidnapping
schoolgirls and women to be used as slaves, wives for members, and offering many to the
sex trade. Since 2009, the group has been responsible for killing more than 31,000 people
in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The insurgency has led to 2.3 million people
displaced, with 250,000 Nigerians fleeing to neighboring countries (Nichols, 2015). In
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2011, before the national elections, Boko Haram, along with other radical Nigerian
groups, promised to make Nigeria ungovernable by turning the Islamic people against
democracy and proving the government corrupt and inept. This effort, if successful,
would have allowed Boko Haram to establish a Caliphate (Mbah, Nwangwu, & Edeh,
2017). In 2016, Boko Haram affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
However, with the reported death of Abubakar Shekau, a new leader emerged in Abu
Musab al-Barnawi with the blessing of ISIS. Shekau did not die, and the group splintered
into two: the Shekau Boko Haram faction and the Islamic State of West Africa Province
(ISWAP) led by al-Barnawi.
Research has addressed the rise of Boko Haram and the military response;
however, the literature is limited on how a country’s population can influence the
nation’s military. However, though the research is limited, it has offered potential
solutions to the conflicts related to Boko Haram. Barna (2014) proposed a sociologicalbased solution that included ending the social conditions that allowed Boko Haram to
grow and thrive. In Nigeria, these solutions involve ending cultural impunity and human
rights abuses, reforming the judicial system and improving the capacities of law
enforcement, improving intelligence collection and analysis both internally and
externally, addressing the governance deficit, ending corruption, increasing transparency
of political decisions, increasing dialogue across all Nigerian ethnic and religious entities,
and increasing federal and state cooperation (Barna, 2014).
Liolio (2013) also offered a guide in reforming government functions to an ideal
level. If the insurgency is defeated, the underlying causes for its existence are still in
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place, allowing for other groups to take its place. Thus, Liolio provided steps needed to
vanquish corruption in Nigeria and found in figure 1.
Figure 1
Liolio’s Corruption reform proposal.

Note. Redefining the Nigerian Polity Through Reforms. (Liolio, 2013)
Additionally, Transparency International (2016) offered five steps to address
corruption: ending impunity, reforming public administration and finance management,
promoting transparency and access to information, empowering citizens, and closing
international loopholes in access to money laundering. Boko Haram exists due to social
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conditions that include Nigeria’s socioeconomic issues, religious belief system, external
non-state actor influence, constitutional issues, the benefits content of the insurgency, and
ideology (Idahosa, 2015, p. 26).
Unmar (2013) noted that providing employment opportunities and improving
school enrollment and the justice system can address these conditions. A dialogue among
involved parties could also lead to a national reconciliation (pp. 58-60; see also Liolio,
2013, p. 99). However, it would be difficult if not impossible to offer Boko Haram
“soldiers” amnesty for murder, rape, kidnapping, slavery, and torture committed against
an innocent population. The ability to affect diplomacy to resolve political issues is
always favored, but abandoning the rule of law to effect change would set a dangerous
precedent in fighting terrorism. Nigeria is not the only country dealing with Boko Haram,
and it may be difficult for the populations of those countries to allow Boko Haram to
escape justice.
In addition to the precedent that a diplomatic approach could set, reconciliation
between the government and Boko Haram had been tried and failed. In 2012, various
government and non-government organizations sought peace with Boko Haram through
diplomacy, insisting that dialogue was the best way to address insurgency (Ahokegh,
2012, p. 53). However, Boko Haram has a sustained political life, bolstered by its close
affiliation with ISIS and other African terror groups. Research has suggested that
dialogue is not enough to address the terrorist groups and will only create more security
concerns (Ahokegh, 2012, p. 53).
The problem with diplomacy is the religious authority that drives the insurgency.
Conversion to the Salafist belief system is the only goal Boko Haram and ISIS are
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interested in (Mitchell, 2016). Religious leaders target the young for radicalization,
giving them an avenue to attack a system they believe harmed them (Onuoha, 2014).
Youths join Boko Haram because they have limited education, little or no employment
prospects, extreme economic deprivation, and they may come from broken homes; thus,
the outlaw group provides a home, empowerment, camaraderie and belonging, and a
purpose to their life (Lohman, 2010, para. 5).
Youth in Nigeria also join out of ignorance of religious teaching in that violence
is the way of Allah (Agbiboa, n.d.). In political Islam, a way to redeem oneself in the
eyes of Allah is through martyrdom, giving their soul to paradise. Thus, changing the
conditions that allowed Boko Haram to flourish must be addressed by the Nigerian
leaders and people if the insurgency is to be defeated. This study was needed to help
explain the failure in dealing with a terror and insurgent from the standpoint of a nation’s
military fighting an inhouse insurgency.
Problem Statement
In the first half of 2017, Boko Haram carried out 43 attacks and killed more than
200 civilians (Mintel, 2017; Kazeem, 2017). In 2018, 1,200 civilians were killed and
200,000 displaced due to Boko Haram. In June 2018, Boko Haram murdered 84 people in
a double suicide bomb attack at a mosque in Mubi, Adamawa State. Numerous reports
are documented, indicating little abatement in insurgent activity (Searcy, 2019). Attacks
have continued unabated, with ISWAP attacking Nigerian Army installations with
impunity (Searcy, 2019).
The Nigerian Army has not defeated Boko Haram and has abused and killed
innocent civilians (Amnesty International, 2016). The military practices conventional
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warfare tactics, including indiscriminate scorched earth tactics, sweep and detain
operations (including innocents), and the population is both purposely and
indiscriminately harmed or killed (Nossier, 2013, para. 12).
Further, in 2017, the New York Times reported mass rapes of women by Nigerian
soldiers (Searcy, 2017). Existing literature has sought to address through quantitative
means the effects of society and its culture on military performance (Fowler, 2016).
However, though literature concerning the social dysfunction of Nigerian society on
Boko Haram is prevalent, the literature and study of how societal culture can affect
military performance is lacking.
Counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgency is not a conflict over geography but a conflict for the hearts
and minds of the indigenous people. Public support for the Nigerian government and its
counterinsurgency efforts provides for its democratic legitimacy and security. However,
the Nigerian Army does not engage the population for its support; the military confronts
the population and abuses, commits atrocities and deaths, including extra-judicial killings
(Amnesty International, 2016a).
Extensive research has occurred in studying counterinsurgency operations of
outside contravening nation-states and their actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Malaya, and
Algeria (Galula, 1964; Gentile, 2009; Kilcullen, 2010; McMaster, 2009; Paul et al., 2010;
Ricks, 2006, 2010). U.S. Army Field Manual FM3-24 Insurgencies and Countering
Insurgencies was built on historical examples and academic studies.
As a result, population-centric warfare has been installed on the battlefield by the
United States, Britain, Germany, France, and a host of North Atlantic Treaty
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Organization (NATO) countries. However, research focusing on a nation-state dealing
with an insurgency within its borders and the lack of support to the government by the
indigenous population is lacking.
Additionally, the importance of societal structures, cultures, behaviors, and beliefs
and their endemic dysfunction has been minimally addressed. Few studies explore a
nation-state fighting an in-country insurgency. Instead, the bulk of scholarship has
focused on an intervening country carrying out a counterinsurgency operation in a host
country. It is here where societal structures, cultures, behaviors, and beliefs have been
studied but only related to an intervening foreign army.
Nigeria
Though a sense of nationalism and patriotism would automatically enjoin populist
support, Nigerians do not enjoy a nationalist identity or patriotism (Bello, 2013). In
applying counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, the population in which the
insurgency exists is considered the “prize” of war, but the support of the people is crucial
(Gentile, 2009a). It is also essential that counterinsurgents identify the human and
material resources necessary to succeed (Myklebust & Ordeman, 2013, para. 42). If
support for Boko Haram came solely from the Nigerian population, then accepted
population-centric rubrics could be employed.
The Nigerian government and military would not have to win the people over
from supporting the insurgency but would need to educate the people on the importance
of support for government actions and military operations. The military must consider the
population as an asset and the prize in an insurgent war. However, education is not the
only issue as cultural immersion. Due to tribalism, the Nigerian army would have to
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enjoin the population for support. Therefore, this study focused on the Nigerian military
and the effects of society and culture on military performance.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore whether social and cultural
dysfunction might affect military performance. In addition, I hoped to identify the factors
that prevent support for the Nigerian national government from the Nigerian population
in the fight against Boko Haram. Initial research identified that no one group, sect,
government agency, or religious group had worked together to better Nigerian society;
therefore, a distinct and solidified national identity does not exist. Much of the Nigerian
population, specifically the Muslim population, provides little tangible support to Boko
Haram (Poushter, 2015). Any support by Muslims for Boko Haram emanates from the
understanding that the group represents pure Islam and are believed “to be devout
Muslims who uphold true Islam” (Khalil, 2017, para. 3 & 4). Therefore, in a successful
counterinsurgency, the military should enjoin the population in the fight against terror.
This study helped identify a path forward for the Nigerian military to embrace the
population while fighting Boko Haram.
Research Questions
Research Question 1: How, and to what extent, does a nation’s military reflect or
mirror the society from which the military was derived?
Research Question 2: How, and to what extent, can marked societal dysfunction
affect or inhibit military performance in Nigeria?
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Theoretical Framework
This study used several military function theories to explain the performance of
the Nigerian army. Social constructs, such as conflict theory, can explain the rise of Boko
Haram from a nonviolent youth group to a terror group based on political Islam. Muslim
youth strive for balance and homeostasis in a system that cannot provide a pathway to
achieve either. Islam provides a simple, successful life, and those who join experience a
simple set of rules and a simple way of living, giving Allah what is due Allah.
Additionally, this study lay within the rubrics of sociology in that all actions and
counteractions are motivated by individuals’ desire to affect their surroundings.
Individuals act according to their interpretation of the meaning of their world (Segre,
2014); therefore, individuals assign meaning to what is relevant and essential.
As stated, this study is set in the framework of military function theories and
whether a society can affect military culture and performance. Excessive accumulation of
power by one state or coalition elicits the opposition of others, and it is in this context,
the neorealist combat balance theory exists (Waltz, 1988). Neorealism states that if an
army has a large force sufficiently equipped with the latest cutting-edge weaponry and
adequate material to support the army during a conflict, then that force will win the
battle.
Therefore, countries pursue an arms race to achieve superior, technologically
advanced equipment and resources. An example of neorealism occurred during the Cold
War when the United States and the USSR reached a stalemate in force. However, this
theory is most appropriately utilized when opposing militaries participate in conventional
warfare and has little application in asymmetric (insurgent) warfare.
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In addition to the neorealist theory, the normative theory of military performance
dictates that cultural norms influence its tactical behavior, determining military
performance (Fitzsimmons, 2013). An army that is highly trained, educated, and led by a
professional officer corps, trained in mission-based objectives over order-based behavior
will achieve success on the battlefield. These attributes are present in the combat units,
intelligence, logistics, support units, and command.
The norms of military behavior are understood in terms of how members behave
and perceive behavior (National Research Council, 2014). The injunctive norm reflects
group assessment of approved and disapproved conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990). In this
regard, norms signify values or the shared belief system of a group (National Research
Council, 2014). The descriptive norms of military behavior represent the oughtness or
rightness of how a military responds to a situation. Contrary to the injunctive norm, the
descriptive norm does not relegate morals or ethics to how a group acts. The descriptive
norm indicates how a group member conforms to a group, usually through training,
discipline, and leadership, and group dynamics drive this norm. (National Research
Council, 2014).
If an injunctive norm is violated, group members may sanction the individual or
individuals to correct the infraction. However, if a majority in a group violates an
injunctive norm, the minority may simply ignore the offense. The desire to belong is a
strong norm in and of itself. Group membership is valued, and people generally comply
with group norms because compliance implies acceptance of an individual’s group
membership and consequent self-image. Therefore, societal dynamics and group
functions sanctioned by society carry into society’s institutions.
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Nature of the Study
This study is qualitative with anthropological insights used to explain how the
military has not successfully engaged Boko Haram and how the government and
population have not adequately addressed social attitudes resulting in insurgency
successes. Qualitative methodology with a grounded theory approach offered guidance in
producing an end theory, therefore addressing remedies to the causes. The qualitative
approach seeks to consider information collected and assign meaning to it using personal
views, past experiences, and cultural backgrounds to construct and interpret the data
gathered (University College Dublin, n.d.). Thus, qualitative research was utilized to
explore and understand the meaning of individuals or groups and their relationship to a
sociologically based problem (Creswell, 2013). Inductive reasoning offered the best
avenue to address the two-pronged problem of societal dysfunction linked to military
dysfunction.
I incorporated grounded methodology to build a narrative of societal and military
dysfunction. Grounded theory is a qualitative method used to derive a theory about a
phenomenon (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Creswell, 2009; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Walsh
et al., 2015), which is more than just a qualitative method (Walsh et al., 2015). Grounded
theory is justified by providing a rich, detailed, and carefully crafted account of the
subject through research (Martin & Turner, 1986).
Theoretical sampling maximizes the ability to discover variations in concepts and
fill categories in terms of properties and dimensions (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The
grounded approach includes the constant comparison of new data with emerging
categories and themes and looking to different groups to develop theoretical sampling to
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identify information differences (Creswell, 2009). Grounded theory adopts a constant
comparative method in coding for conformity and coherence to ideas and evidence
(Glaser & Strauss 1999).
Throughout the researcher’s coding process, the researcher iterates between the
data and the emerging theory (Charmaz, 2006). It is essential to use each phase of inquiry
to raise the analytic level of the work within the study (Charmaz, 2008). It is not plausible
to postulate a theory as to why the Nigerian military abuses the Nigerian population in
the war against Boko Haram; however, identifying a thesis from a multitude of
possibilities could assist future research in helping the military to defeat Boko Haram and
apply warfighting techniques that protect the population. The grounded approach also
helped discover obstacles in the Nigerian nation-state to identify paths to success in
protecting the population and defeating Boko Haram.
Further, it is essential to study a subjects’ social environment and condition
(Sutton & Austin, 2015). The qualitative grounded approach with a constructivist view
presented the best avenue to discover the disparities of social context relevant to the
Nigerian Army to address the research problem. Constructivism is a theoretical concept
that enables one to comprehend and gain knowledge (Fosnot, 2006).
Constructivism does not require a specific or definitive answer—merely the
ability to obtain unbiased and factual information. The constructivist approach allows the
researcher to understand human experience in an environment and understand that
constructural reality comes from social experiences (Cohen & Manion, 1994; Mertens,
2014). Using a constructivist method in research allows humans to construct knowledge
and meaning from experiential occurrences (Charmaz, 2008).
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Data sampling in grounded theory is far less than any quantitative study. In
general, grounded theory requires a range of 20–50 respondents to reach theoretical
saturation. As will be explained in Chapter 3, this study addressed a relatively small
population studied, the Nigerian Army. To address my interview sample group, I used a
small hyper-homogeneous group of interviewees. Not only did I seek data and theoretical
saturation, but I also sought to reach saturation of knowledge (see Bertaux, 1981).
In this study, a smaller qualitative interview population was acceptable, primarily
because the researcher focused on a strict homogeneous group. I chose interviewees
based on stringent parameters, including senior military leadership and military
academics representing a small population with a small theoretical focus. Therefore, the
interview group was small based on the ratio of the study group versus the interview
group. The point of diminishing returns can occur quickly, which means that as the study
proceeds, increasing data accumulation does not lead to additional information (Ritchie et
al., 2013). Finding one occurrence of a data piece, or code, is enough to become part of
the analysis framework (Mason, 2010).
If this were to be a quantitative study, a large cross-section of U.S. senior
leadership could be surveyed on their military views, field operations, interaction with the
public, and counterinsurgency operations. However, a quantitative study could not offer
detailed insights into a path to identify if society and its culture affect military
performance.
Additionally, trying to reach Muslim Nigerians affected by the military for a
quantitative survey would be difficult as the northeast region does not have power,
telecommunications, and the internet. Therefore, a qualitative study offered an
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opportunity to understand the nuances in denial of support (the population) by seeking a
small sample of highly educated, socially involved scholars and military experts who live
and study the issues.
Data collection addressed social and cultural functioning in military behavior
through interviews with senior military officers and academics. The senior military
commanders and scholars interviewed understand the foundations of civilian influence on
military behavior. The U.S. military and the Nigerian military are disparate; however,
strategy, military performance, training, social performance, conduct, battlefield
expectations, and behavior are universally accepted through military best practices, and
proper conduct is the prerogative of various international organizations such as the UN,
the Red Cross, and The Hague. I will further discuss the nature of the study in Chapter 2.
Operational Definitions
Ahlul Sunnawa Jama Ahhijra: Founded by Abubakar Lawan in 1995 and is
believed to be the early precursor to Boko Haram. This group was non-violent and began
as a youth group for disenchanted and disenfranchised youth (Ori, 2013).
Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb: Located in Algeria, and has committed to
attacking European and American targets. Originated from the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat that affiliated with al-Qa’ida in 2006 (Steinberg & Werenfels,
2007).
Apostate: About the Islamic term as used by ISIS. A Muslim who does not follow
the strict form of Islam as practiced by ISIS and al-Qa’ida, or a Westernized Muslim.
Initially, part of Catholic doctrine recognizing a cleric who had left a religious order or a
Catholic who abandoned the religion for a reformed theology (Mallet & Toussaint, 2012).
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Asymmetric warfare: Describes warfare between two fighters who differ in
military capability, funding, tactics, and strategy. Terrorism, guerrilla warfare,
insurgency, and irregular warfare are descriptions of asymmetric warfare rubrics used by
small states and non-state actors (Tomes, 2004).
Bakassi Boys and Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of
Biafra: Two separate organizations with the same goal. The Bakassi Boys advocated
anti-crime vigilantism in the Biafra state. They roamed the streets carrying out anti-crime
attacks using machetes. They were so successful and popular that cities within Biafra
invited them to police their towns. However, accused of extra-judicial killings,
intimidation on behalf of the state, and extortion leading to the crimes they sought to end,
they were disbanded only to reemerge in 2021. (Oronsaye & Igbafe, 2012; (Njoku, &
Nzeagwu, 2021).
Boko Haram (“Jama” atu Ahlissunnah lidda’ awati Wal Jihad’): Known as the
Muhajir Yousuf ayah sect, Nigerian Taliban, and The Group of Al-Sunna for preaching
and Jihad. The group represents an ultra-radical sect based in Nigeria and was considered
too violent for ISIS (Siollun, 2016).
Counterinsurgency: Incorporates the strategy, techniques, military, psychological,
financial, social tactics, politics, and intelligence practices that governments utilize to
combat an insurgency. Like the insurgency, the counterinsurgent must continually adapt
to the changing social and battlefield requirements and threats. (U.S. Army, 2014).
Crimes against humanity: Defined as crimes inflicted on victims based on their
group membership rather than individual characteristics—crimes committed against
fellow nationals and foreigners. These are international crimes that override state
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sovereignty and are committed by politically organized groups acting under policy. These
crimes include only the most brutal and abominable acts of violence and persecution
(Luban, 2004).
Ex parte Quirin: A case before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1942 and during World
War II that upheld the jurisdiction of a U.S. military tribunal within the trial of eight
German saboteurs in the United States. Quirin set a precedent for trial by military
commission of any unlawful combatant against the United States on or off the battlefield
(Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S., 1942).
Fedayeen Saddam: A paramilitary group loyal to Saddam Hussein estimated to be
30,000 to 40,000 strong. The Fedayeen Saddam took up the fight after Iraq fell using
unconventional tactics and guerilla warfare (Otterman, 2005).
Foreign internal defense: A term utilized to describe the approach in which an
interdicting military provides offensive and defensive operations in a host country to
defeat an aggressor such as an insurgency (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).
Globalization: Globalization refers to the free movement, interaction, and
integration of information, goods, and people between international boundaries. It is the
procedure or action of global integration of a country’s social world view relating to
ideas, products, and cultural exchange (Al-Rodhan, 2006). In terrorism, globalization
refers to the movement of ideas, strategies, and people between terror groups, the
exportation, and importation of terrorist activities to all corners of the globe. In the
modern context, it is the global dissemination and assimilation of radical Muslim
terrorists into a common cause (Lutz & Lutz, 2015).
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Guerrilla warfare: Irregular warfare using unconventional tactics by small groups
of fighters who fight against a far larger force, usually government military forces (Van
Creveld, 2000, p. 357).
Hausa-Fulani: Refers to the Hausa and Fulani tribes of western Africa. These two
groups are referred to as Hausa-Fulani after the 1804 Fulani war. These two ethnic
groups make up 29% of Nigeria’s population and are associated with cattle as their main
economic commodity. The Igbo and Yoruba tribes represent the majority within the
Nigerian tribal system (“Hausa and Fulani people,” n.d.).
Hors de combat: According to the International Red Cross, hors de combat
prohibits “attacking persons who are recognized as hors de combat. hors de combat is:
(a) anyone who is in the power of an adverse party; (b) anyone who is defenseless
because of unconsciousness, shipwreck, wounds, or sickness; or (c) anyone who clearly
expresses an intention to surrender; provided they abstain from any hostile act and does
not attempt to escape” (ICRC, n.d.-g; IHL Database. (n.d.)
Infidel: One who rejects the truth of Islam, Allah as their God, and Mohammed as
his prophet. ISIS uses Kafir to describe those who do not conform to the Salafist belief
system (Fanani et al., 2020).
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL): The Islamic State of Iraq and alSham, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Identified as Dawlat al-Islamiyah
f’al-Iraq wa al-Sham or the moniker Da’ish (Daesh). The Islamic State is a Sunni Salafist
insurgency and terror organization founded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Petranick, 2016).
Jamā’atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da’wati wal-Jihād: “People committed to the
propagation of the prophet’s teachings and Jihad,” which is Boko Haram’s Islamic name.
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Mohammed Yusuf chose this name to replace Ahul Suwanna Jama Ahhijra, the name
chosen by Abubakar Luwan. Boko Haram is the name given to the group by Nigerians
(UN, 2016).
Jamāʿatu Anṣāril Muslimīna fī Bilādis Sūdān: Founded in 2012 and known as
Ansaru; a militant Islamist splinter group of Boko Haram. Their leader is Abu Usmatul
al-Ansari, who split the group away because of ideological differences in the
interpretation of Islamic law. They also disapproved of Shekau’s targeting of the Islamic
population. Unlike Boko Haram, Ansaru targets Western interests in Nigeria who directly
or indirectly support the government or military forces (Zenn, 2013).
Jus ad bellum: Applies to the conditions under which states may resort to war or
the use of armed force in general. The prohibition against the use of force amongst States
and the exceptions to it (the UN authorization for the use of force or self-defense) appears
in the UN Charter of 1945 and represent the core ingredients of jus ad bellum
(International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], 2015).
Jus in bello: A UN mandate that regulates the conduct of nation-states engaged in
an armed conflict. International Humanitarian Law is applied with jus in bello; it seeks to
minimize suffering in armed conflicts, mainly civilians, by protecting innocents from
armed conflict to the greatest extent possible. It is the responsibility of the nation-state to
ensure jus in bello (ICRC, 2015).
Maitatsine Islamic Fundamentalist Sect: Founded by cleric Mohammed
“Maitatsine” Mara in 1945 Nigeria. Banished by the British, he returned in 1960 after
independence. He was a Koranic scholar but rejected Mohammed and claimed himself to
be the annạbi, or prophet. The group Yan Tatsine consisted of Maitatsine’s followers who
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participated in the Yan Tasting riots over five years from 1980, in which 10,000 people
died. One of the first radical groups in Nigeria (Adesoji, 2011).
Modernization: Modernization is how society progresses through transition,
improving itself and people’s lives. Advanced societies modernize and progress as
technology and society dictate. In third world and developing countries, modernization
occurs through outside forces seeking influence in the state (Przeworski & Limongi,
1997).
Movement for the actualization of the sovereign State of Biafra: Associated with
Igbo nationalism and is a secessionist movement in Nigeria’s Biafra state. They seek to
make Biafra an independent country separate from Nigeria. They are considered an
extremist group by the Nigerian government (Oronsaye & Igbafe, 2012).
Movement for Oneness and Jihad: Founded in 2011 by Hamad al-Khairy and
Ahmed el-Tilemsi as a splinter group of al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb.
Responsible for much of the violence in Mali. In 2013, the group merged with the
Masked Men Brigade to form Al-Murabitoun (“The Sentinels”). In 2015, the group
realigned with al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb but in 2016 pledged
allegiance to ISIS (START, 2015).
Occam’s razor: Nature is simple, human action, and interaction is considered
simple in underlying motivations and intentions. Human motivation can be attributed to
seven theories, including self-actualization, self-determination, and the incentive theory
(Whitbourne, 2011). Therefore, in sociology, simple motives generally explain results.
The drive reduction theory states that humans reduce complexity to the simple to solve
issues to balance homeostasis (Whitbourne, 2011). Complex interactions become simple
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interactions as humans distill the complex to the simple to discover a workable solution
that can best explain a functional and dysfunctional society, as society evolves from the
human condition; therefore, the simplest solution or explanation is generally the most
advantageous (Bishop & Shech, n.d.).
Odua People’s Congress (Oodua Liberation Movement): Founded in 1997 as a
militant sociocultural-economic organization to protect the Yoruba people. It clashed
with the Nigerian government repeatedly over separatist demands. The Yoruba are some
25 million strong in Nigeria and conflict with the Hausa tribe (Oronsaye & Igbafe, 2012).
Population-centric asymmetric warfare: Conventional warfare or total war
involved the destruction of the enemy and their surroundings. World War II was the last
real conventional war. Asymmetric warfare is counterinsurgency and counterterrorism,
and population-centric refers to the people involved within the conflict zone. No longer is
geography the primary motivator for war, but it is the hearts and minds of the people or
population control and support. The object is to win allegiance and loyalty to the host
government and intervening troops and deny the insurgents support (Gentile, 2009a).
Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization: Founded in 1995 by Mallam Leval.
Thought to represent the foundation from which Boko Haram emanated. Lawal founded
this group to indoctrinate Nigerian youth into radical Islam and revolt against Western
influence using peaceful means (Onuoha, 2014).
Transnational: Transnational refers to the spreading of or dissemination across
international borders. In terrorism, ISIS and al-Qa’ida have taken to this model to recruit
via social media, assimilate existing terror groups, expand their sphere of influence,
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increase funding and arms purchases. In this way, the terror groups have acted as
multinational conglomerates (Brown, 2017).
Wilayat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah: Wilayat is translated to mean “province.” Therefore,
Wilayat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah is the West African Province of ISIS. For example, Wilyat al
Yemen is the Islamic State’s Province in Yemen (Rahmani & Tanco, 2016).
Assumptions
I assumed that the specified individuals would participate in the interview
process. Additionally, I believed the participants would provide insight into social and
cultural effects on military performance. I also assumed that those interviewed would
answer with complete honesty and integrity. This requirement goes to the honor and
integrity of military officers. Therefore, the study depended on the honesty and integrity
of the interviewees. Furthermore, I assumed that this research could provide a pathway
for the Nigerian Army to recognize the negative issues associated with its military
performance and move to correct deficiencies. In identifying the dysfunction within the
Nigerian military, I hoped this study might provide a pathway to elicit ideas allowing the
military to enhance performance and defeat the insurgency.
Scope of Delimitations
The scope of the study focused on Nigeria’s social constructs and their effect on
the military. I interviewed senior military officers and military scholars who have a deep
knowledge of leadership and societal influences on military performance. Participants
were invited to participate in an interview for approximately 45 minutes to an hour,
intimating their professional understanding of how military culture is affected by society
and its civilian culture.
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The interview questions were structured to identify and explore civilian
influence’s social and cultural influences in army culture. The limited boundaries
included military performance and societal contributions to the dysfunction and
divergence within the Nigerian culture. This study could also contribute to addressing
military functioning across nations in general. The most relevant countries are in subSaharan Africa—colonial nations that have exhibited a tumultuous history of governance.
Limitations
Certain limitations affected this study. I limited the data collection to a specific
and focused group of military and civilian individuals who had particular knowledge on
how a population, its societal structures, and sociological realities and culture might
affect military performance. Therefore, interviewees were chosen from within a specific
parameter. Senior military officers participated from both the active duty and retired
ranks. In addition, scholars with a Ph.D. and military service record participated in the
interviews. These individuals carried advanced degrees in political science and history.
Scholars with a Ph.D. in History study military doctrine, function, theory, application,
and outcomes within the military educational complex, and have taught at Fort
Leavenworth, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the War College at
Carlisle Barracks, and the U.S. military academies.
Significance of the Study
Despite examples of counterinsurgency operations carried out by NATO countries
and the United States, in light of new military doctrine and the advancements in counterinsurgent philosophy and applications, the Nigerian military has not defeated the terrorist
and insurgent movement. The significance of this study lay in identifying the reasons
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why the Nigerian army cannot end an insurgency. Additionally, the army has, according
to various humanitarian organizations, including the Red Cross, been accused of human
rights violations against the Nigerian civilian population. In identifying the root causes
for abuses, I hoped that actions could take place within the military to advocate for
change resulting in the army protecting and advocating for the population.
I hoped that this research would help guide the Nigerian military to make
substantive changes to its internal belief system and doctrine, understanding that society
affects the army in military performance, recruitment, training, and leadership. This study
could assist in changing the paradigm of an ineffective fighting force that abuses civilians
to a successful battlefield force that protects civilians. This reality would result in
organizational credibility and strategic effectiveness, thereby affecting social change.
This change, if effected, would provide for positive social change in varying degrees
across Nigeria and its institutions.
National support for counterinsurgency operations flows from the people. Social,
economic, political, and religious impediments affect the government’s efforts to
successfully confront and defeat Boko Haram. Though prior research had addressed these
topics, they have not been discussed in an inclusive qualitative manner focused on the
machinations of counterinsurgency. Despite dysfunction, Nigeria as a state is one of the
more successful post-colonialization experiments in Africa. Suppose Boko Haram (and
ISWAP) are successful in destabilizing Nigeria. In that case, additional African countries
could be in peril, if not from Boko Haram, then from associated radical political or
religious groups. In addition, the fight against the ISWAP may present a future existential
threat to the United States. Should Nigeria fail, should the insurgents establish a
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Caliphate in Nigeria, it would provide safe harbor and a training base for terrorists
providing a global reach.
Summary
In Chapter 1, I explained the theories used to address the issues in Nigeria. In
addition, it was essential to understand the military norms of operation, as military norms
are connected to societal functioning. Therefore, the focus in this study included the
realities of social dysfunction and the affected culture of the Nigerian military. This focus
included leadership, doctrine, training, the moral and ethical belief system, and applying
military culture and doctrine against Boko Haram and the Nigerian people, both of which
could present as aberrations of social (military) cultural behavior.
Chapter 2 discusses the history and structure of Nigeria and its society, Boko
Haram, and the Nigerian military. Understanding the contributory social, political, and
military factors are essential to recognize endemic issues within the population. Chapter 2
also includes the explanations of the law of war, just war theory, humanitarian law, and
the international rules of warfare, including conduct and expectation for a military force
within a civilian population. The literature review studies Nigerian societal dysfunction
and the continued military dysfunction in fighting Boko Haram. It is here where the
research problem is exemplified.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
I examined the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and how the army has not
defeated the insurgency. To understand Nigeria’s problems, the country’s diverse and
complicated societal structures that stem from colonial imperialism. This includes
tribalism that prevents a nationalist identity, unity, and patriotism (Okogu, & Umudjere,
2016). The literature review provides the nuances in revealing societal truths in a
landscape of dysfunction.
The literature on military affairs and counterinsurgency tends to focus on the rise
of Boko Haram. Chapter 2 examines the history of Boko Haram and its link to radical
Islam. These sections include a deep and thorough description of the present-day
Nigerian conflict, the Nigerian population and social structure, and a description of the
Nigerian military as an organization.
The existing literature is limited on how nation-states address an “in-house”
insurgency, and other available scholarly sources fill in these gaps. It is essential to
understand the foundations, guiding principles, and parameters of counterinsurgency
warfare to understand how wars are conducted in a moral and ethical structure. Because
there is a lack of research around the Nigerian insurgency, other frameworks, including
those from the United States, are necessary to understand this issue. Looking at
insurgency experiences can give context to Boko Haram. This chapter also touches on the
lessons learned by the United States during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars as they
advanced the frameworks for understanding insurgencies.
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The literature review also discusses military power, ability, and capability in a
social and cultural context. A military can exhibit all the signs of a neorealist force with
access to funding, the latest weaponry and doctrine, and material support. Still, if the
soldier is the weak link in the chain, then military power becomes a false narrative. The
chapter also discusses a variety of ethical issues that are faced when an insurgency
occurs. Just war theory sets parameters in which a nation-state can legally enter warfare.
Yet despite the best efforts of commanders in enforcing rules of engagement,
discipline, and providing a moral compass, soldiers can stray from the correct moral and
ethical path. Nigerian military leadership has struggled meeting Boko Haram on the
battlefield and has repeatedly refuted reports of population abuse (Adeakin, 2016).
Chapter 2 Structure
Chapter 2 is structured as follows. First is a discussion of the literature search
strategy and the theoretical framework used for this study. I identify the keywords used
within this research study. Related to the theoretical framework, I explore the social and
cultural influences on military performance, military norms, and the dual-process theory
as applied to battlefield control. I discuss Nigeria’s social components, including
tribalism and the Nigerian military and its actions in the field. It is this discussion that
provides a cataloging of societal and cultural dysfunction.
I explain the beginnings of Boko Haram and its founding from a peaceful youth
organization to the terrorist group linked to the Salafist Islamic religion. I also go indepth on international law and conflict, the rules of war, responsibility to protect, and the
just war theory that pertains to the Nigerian conflict, along with humanitarian law. This
information allows the reader to understand how Nigeria relates to the international
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community on military force. Finally, I address the social change advocated by this
research study.
Literature Strategy
I began the literature review process by outlining significant study points within
the scholarship, including social structures and war. This effort built a foundation for
building a pyramid, increasingly narrowing and defining the focus until the subjects had
been exhausted in information. This action mirrored the strategies offered by Bui (2014),
who suggested that an initial wide-ranging approach would culminate in a narrowing of
themes and phrases to obtain specific references. Additionally, Booth et al. (2016) helped
to identify the relevancy and reliability of the research by identifying relevant research
information, reliable sources, performing analysis, and the process of reporting and
writing results.
I utilized digital databases including Google Scholar, JSTOR, Research Gate,
Project MUSE, EBSCO, ERIC (ProQuest), Sage Publications, and WorldCat. I used the
Walden University Library, the library at the University of Nebraska-Omaha, and
Creighton University to acquire microfiche files and periodicals and acquire the
necessary books to complete the study. Government sources included the Department of
Defense, U.S. Army, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the UN, and the Nigerian
Constitution database. Accessing Amnesty International, the International Red Cross, and
Human Rights Watch provided information on ground conditions and realities in Nigeria,
supported by reports from the U.S. Department of State, who utilized both Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch as vetted institutions to provide information
included in U.S. Department of Defense and State Department reports on Nigeria. The
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U.S. military, Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard, and Marines provide its doctrinal
manuals online and published through Amazon.com and national booksellers.
Keywords were essential to the literature review, and I used the following
keywords. African genocide, African insurgencies, African terrorism, African tribalism,
Ahlul Sunnawa Jama Ahhijra, Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, apostate, asymmetric
warfare, Auftragstaktik, Bakassi Boys and Movement for the Actualization of the
Sovereign State of Biafra, Berliner Methodentreffen Qualitative Forschung
Boko Haram, counterinsurgency, crimes against humanity, ethics in war,
Executive Outcomes, Fedayeen Saddam, foreign internal defense, foreign external defense,
Geneva Conventions, Geneva Protocols, guerrilla warfare, Hausa-Fulani, infidel,
International Humanitarian Law, Islam, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS),
Jamā’atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da’wati wal-Jihād, Jamāʿatu Anṣāril Muslimīna fī Bilādis
Sūdān, Law of War, modernization theory, Maitatsine Islamic Fundamentalist Sect, Mao
Zedong, morals in war, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra,
Movement for Oneness and Jihad, NeoRealist Combat Balance Theory, Nigerian Army
abuses, Nigerian corruption, Nigerian graft, Nigerian military, Normative Theory of
Military Performance, Occam’s Razor as a social concept, Odua People’s Congress,
population-centric warfare, radical Islam, Salafist, Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization,
Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection International, transnationalism,
US Army Field Manual FM3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, and Wilayat
Gharb Ifrīqīyyah.
The search for these keywords provided additional secondary keywords, which
narrowed the search for information. Keywords identified books and journal articles,
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which led to a string of different literature sources, building and expounding each other.
Once I realized that each topic was thoroughly addressed by not accumulating new
information and that topics, codes, themes, and subjects had become redundant, I
considered the topic saturated (see Strauss & Corbin, 1998).
Theoretical Framework
The issues surrounding Nigeria’s insurgency are vast and complicated. No one
theory could address dysfunction in Nigeria because the country suffers from sociologic
disunity (Gbinije, 2015). Viewing a problem through more than one theoretical lens is
essential to understand the full scope of the problem (Holton, 2009). Social function
theories are applied to view society from differing points of a theoretical lens. Still, it
would be conducive to design an alternative approach to explain the dysfunction in
Nigeria and other post-colonial entities, but that is beyond this project’s scope.
The theoretical lens for this study rests with the norms of military behavior, the
normative theory of military performance, and the neorealist combat balance theory. It is
essential to understand the dysfunction Nigerian society represents to understand how the
military might perform. The focus of this study was whether society could influence or
affect military performance. Therefore, in this section, I explain various military theories
regarding military performance. A link may be made (in conjunction with interview
answers and their application to the research questions) between society and military
function.
Social Control
Social control helps understand the dysfunction found in Nigeria. There are three
modes of social control: personal, parochial, and public. Personal social control depends
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on the person to conform to societal norms as the neighborhood lacks control (Bursik &
Grasmick, 1993). In northeast Nigeria, low income and high unemployment imbue
mistrust and lack of communication among the community, leading young people to join
radical Islam groups.
Parochial social control states that the neighborhood engages with certain aspects
of social control but may not include youth engagement (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993).
Public social control offers total community engagement as the community and
neighborhoods work as a group or found an organization to improve on and protect the
community (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). This represents the village philosophy and idea
of community involvement, engagement, and success. Community members are involved
in schools, youth programs, community centers, additional community social structures
and work to ensure youth success.
Social control exists in Nigeria, but only to the extent the tribe is involved.
Historically, religion has a moral influence on the community, contributing to a locus of
control-oriented toward a socially accepted morality. In context, this reality empowered
individuals to have a degree of control over themselves within their society (Kirby, et al.,
2000).
Further, society operates on shared values and a shared moral authority—a society
that emphasizes order, stability, consensus, and equilibrium, or the homeostasis of the
organism, will view societal problems as either deviance or a problem of social
disorganization (University of Minnesota, 2019, chap. 7.1, 7.2). Institutions to which the
individual belongs dictate “normal” sociologic function or deviancy. Thus, if society does
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not match what is expected, there is pressure to conform and reintegrate with society
(Obaro, 2014).
For instance, in a democratic nation, the military is subject to the will of civilian
control. A democratic nation’s founding documents, social and cultural norms, the rule of
law, and international law guide the military to perform in an acceptable moral manner.
The army is also guided by the political-civilian culture established in society. It is the
lawmakers and the people of the nation who hold the military accountable. The military
is subject to accountability and is expected to represent the nation’s values and belief
system.
Societal Traits and the Military
There is little scholarship on how a society can affect military performance.
However, research has noted that society creates or allows for material power, translating
to military power (Rosen, 1995). For instance, military performance in a democratic state
may not be associated with material acquisition and wealth but may be decided on
through a complex mix of culture, education, the rule of law, religion, societal
involvement, political structures, and a national identity; thus, military power is
dependent on military performance (Biddle & Long, 2004). Additionally, a nation’s
military has some freedom to isolate its members from society and install internal
structures to govern their members (Rosen, 1995, p. 29). However, if the military is a
mass, non-professional army with short terms of service, is large relative to society, fights
wars with high casualty rates that force quick recruitment with no training time. If
society’s social structures are divisive, this can decrease the military’s effectiveness
(Rosen, 1995, p. 29). This paradigm is a direct reflection of the situation in Nigeria.
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Research has indicated that society and culture matter to the military, although
Western democratic culture is not conducive or optimal in battle (Fowler, 2016). For
example, Afghanistan and Iraq provided the U.S. military the opportunity to embrace
counterinsurgent warfare. But the establishment of strict rules of engagement protected
civilians to the detriment of American and allied troops (French, 2015). The Taliban took
advantage of this dynamic and showed that it is impossible to simultaneously protect
civilians, achieve force protection, and achieve the physical elimination of insurgents
(Zambernardi, 2010).
Further, though scholars acknowledge culture’s influence in a social or economic
environment, culture is absent in applying concepts of military power (Fowler, 2016).
Leadership must account for culture in operational definitions of military power. Still,
conceptual models are underspecified, exaggerating the effects of those factors
commonly included—personnel quantity, equipment quality, economic development, and
regime type. However, decision-makers cannot accurately assess an enemy states’ martial
capabilities and capacity without accounting for culture (Fowler, 2016). Research has
suggested that the culture found within a mercenary force allowed a small, under-gunned
force to defeat the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone (Fitzsimmons, 2013).
Regardless of societal influences, military power advances and implements state
power in various ways both within and beyond the state’s borders (Paret, 1989). Military
power also confers created political power and its permanency. The nation’s military
organizations benefit from the national resources, which allows the political leaders to
impose the nation’s will on either an existing or potential enemy (Tellis et al., 2000, p.
134). It is the output level of military resources that transposes to military effectiveness.
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However, the efficiency by which those resources are transformed guides military
capability.
Material transformation is not the only parameter to guide military effectiveness
or capability. Military doctrine, leadership, effective organization, the quality of soldiers,
discipline, training, and adjunct support affect military capability (Tellis et al., 2000).
However, if natural resources provide for military resources and corruption diverts those
resources (e.g., in Nigeria’s situation), then military effectiveness is negatively affected
(World Bank Group, n.d.)
The military can accrue the best equipment and construct a successful military
doctrine. Still, it is the human factor that uses the weapons, carries out orders, adds
meaning to tactical and strategic initiatives, and ultimately overcomes the opposing army.
Thus, it is inevitable that a military would suffer the abnorms of civilian society. Soldiers
will commit crimes on and off the battlefield; therefore, it is incumbent on military
leadership to provide and prosecute further training, education, and discipline to mitigate
future negative behavior.
Counterinsurgency can only occur through Weberian state consolidation. The
state and the military work to create a stable, orderly system supported by the population
and then endorsed by legitimate violence (Weber, 1946). However, this is a well-formed
[State] but complex task (Packwood, 2009). When a government is legitimate, the people
understand and share in a level of confidence, accepting societal expectations and their
government (Packwood, 2009). Trust in the government should transfer to trust in the
military. However, the Nigerian people have neither confidence nor trust in the military
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nor the government, as neither offers legitimacy (Ejimabo, 2013; Channels Television,
2021).
Military Norms
In addition to social theories, it is essential to discuss military norms. Norms are
phenomena that influence behavior (Hechter & Opp, 2001), guiding how people should
behave regardless of other values or ethics (National Research Council, 2014). Norms
refer to the “oughtness” of behavior based on the moral belief about what should happen
in a situation. In society, behavioral norms remain informal and are not codified into laws
or statutes. However, norms give strict order to life and human interactions. (Anderson &
Dunning, 2014, p. 1). Behavioral norms prevent life from becoming nasty, brutish, and
dangerous on a wholesale level preventing chaos (Anderson & Dunning, 2014, p. 1).
Descriptive norms refer to people’s typical behavior or how they process reality
(Anderson & Dunning, 2014, p. 2). Injunctive norms serve as standards or a social model
to correct inappropriate behavior.
For instance, the injunctive norm reflects approved and disapproved conduct
identified by the group or what most people think one should do (National Research
Council, 2014). The injunctive norm relies on social pressure in guiding performance,
tied to a collective outcome (Anderson & Dunning, 2014, p. 4). Descriptive norms are
those norms that, regardless of morality, are defined by the group. This normative
behavior allows group members to conform to the group. This normative behavior guides
the expectations of how a group member will behave or act in specific situations and is
tied to what the group is doing (National Research Council, 2014).
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Neither is isolated or set in stone by the rules of normative behavior. For example,
if a group of soldiers decides to ransack and pillage a village, a soldier who refuses to
participate has violated the descriptive norm and has demonstrated the injunctive norm as
prescribed by a lawful well-functioning society. Societal norms and moral values have
superseded the needs and desires of the group (Anderson & Dunning, 2014, p. 4,5).
According to the National Research Council (2014), three mechanisms enforce
norms and effectively influence group behavior. A rational self-interested person will
conform to a standard if the expected sanctions are sufficient. The second mechanism
refers to the internalization of norms, such as self-discipline. This represents the internal
makeup of a person, an individual with high expectations or values and a moral set that is
ingrained and unshakeable. Finally, the mechanism concerns how “norms develop based
on the expectations of how others will act” (National Research Council, 2014, p. 26). The
implication here is conditional conformity is based on realizing that it becomes a selfinterest if all or most participants conform. This represents the individual’s expectation of
what others will do to ensure homeostasis or equilibrium in a situation and within the
group, or all for one, one for all.
The theoretical framework of norms pertains to the neorealist combat balance
theory and the normative theory of military performance used by Fitzsimmons (2013) to
understand how a highly disciplined and trained, but small and under-gunned mercenary
force could defeat a far larger insurgency. The military of any nation develops its own
culture based on the culture and social structure from the society from which it is drawn.
In addition, subsets of culture and norms within the military may exist down to
the platoon level as soldiers create their own supportive and close environment within a
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much larger force. Platoon level associations are symbiotic as each soldier depends on the
other for support, camaraderie, and safety--security in a violent environment.
Dual Process
It is essential to discuss decision-making rubrics in the heat of battle or high-stress
environments. Individuals have two information processing systems: fast and slow,
which work together to formulate judgments and influence behavior. This condition
involves the deliberative reasoning brain and the intuitive and emotional brain, which is
often subconscious.
This is, of course, a simplification of the thinking process, and there is conflict as
to whether individuals have “two different parallel processing architectures, or simply
two different cognitive modes” (National Research Council, 2014, p. 27). Fast thinking
(system 1) influences decisions through the immediacy of a situation. This process arises
from a partly instinctual, partly learned, and often emotional response to stimuli. The
slow process (system 2) is the rational, deliberative thinking process” (National Research
Council, 2014, p. 27). However, the best result may occur when both work in sync to
solve an issue.
It is essential to understand dual process as it affects men and women and their
decision-making in battle. In battle, enlisted soldiers fight and are driven by training and
discipline. However, any number of cognitive impairments, including fear, anger,
information overload, loss of situational awareness, and adrenaline, can play a part in
how soldiers respond to stress stimuli (Kahneman, 2011). This represents the type 1
response.
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Officers provide type 2 control on the battlefield. This reality was understood as
far back as the Napoleonic wars. It came to the forefront in the revolutionary war when
British officers were sniped by the colonials to remove command and control. The British
complained as officers kept the battlefield under control and prevented it from devolving
into debauchery and depravity (Black, 1999). In Europe, the nobles from which the
officer corps emanated agreed that officers were to be protected.
Any number of cognitive impairments may hinder system 2, including fatigue,
personal issues, lack of situational awareness, fear, anger, and information overload.
When these interfere with system 2 thinking, irrational and hurried decisions may
increase and cause chaos. For this reason, the US Army maintains strict rules of
engagement but allows junior officers to make decisions and adjust orders to complete
the mission.
It is system 2, in conjunction with the military norms of behavior, which pulls the
soldier back from harming civilians by shooting them for the loss of a Nigerian soldier in
battle or running through villages setting homes afire and shooting anyone who flees the
flames because they must be guilty (Nossiter, 2013).
Military Culture
Fitzsimmons (2013) noted the neorealist combat balance theory. An army that
fields a large force, sufficiently equipped with the latest quality weaponry, determines the
material combat balance between the two combatants, determining their military
performance. The normative theory of military performance dictates that a military's
cultural norms influence its tactical behavior, determining military performance
(Fitzsimmons, 2013). Although Fitzsimmons studied a private small unit mercenary
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army, the premise is testable when applied to a nation’s army. The cultural norms of the
military, taken and influenced by its society, affect military performance. Not in material,
but the human interaction and actions on the battlefield.
The US Army is a prime example in which these two theories intermesh. The US
army also maintains a culture of forward-thinking, highly trained, and motivated leaders
and field troops. As demonstrated in Iraq after the surge and the implementation of
counterinsurgency theory and tactics, army commanders and troops became agile,
adaptable, competent, and wholly progressive in counterinsurgency tactics.
The US army is culturally trained in the German military principle of
Auftragstaktik, and operations are grounded in mission-based tactics rather than the
obverse in detailed order-based tactics. Field commanders and young officers are allowed
the ability to take the initiative and leeway to make decisions in the field based on a
changing battlefield environment to advance their mission. According to Fitzsimmons
(2013), a “military’s cultural norms influences its tactical behavior,” which in turn
“influences its military performance” (p. 3). This reality may point to conditions within
the Nigerian Army that deny even the most mediocre effort in strategy and operational
performance.
The Nigerian military’s culture and doctrine are grounded in order-based
operations that can deny military performance's normative theory (Onuoha, Nwangwu, &
Ugwueze, 2020). In other words, in being an order-based organization, the Nigerian
military cannot operate in the spirit of Auftragstaktik as the organization does not teach or
train to complete the mission but rather to complete the order. Leaders and their

41

subordinates follow the order and stop activity when the order has been completed, even
if the mission, operational, or strategic objective has not been achieved.
It appears that the Nigerian military is structured to present two faces. One face of
the military performs foreign internal defense missions for UN Peace Keeping Operations
and the Economic Community of West African States. These units are the best Nigeria
has to offer and have performed admirably, winning accolades and awards from the
foreign press and nation-states (Nigerian Army, 2017a; Nigerian Army, 2017b).
The second face the Nigerian army presents is that of internal dysfunction. This
has involved forces who cannot stand in a fight with the insurgents, abuse the population,
kill innocents, and demonstrate poor discipline while attempting a coup d’état discovered
in May 2017 (Kumolo, 2017). In addition, Nigerian Army leadership has consistently
focused allegations of wrongdoing and blamed incidents and atrocities on Boko Haram
and the public when committed by Nigerian military personnel.
The military norms of behavior within the Nigerian Army are so affected by
Nigeria’s societal and cultural dysfunction that abnormalcy is the norm. The truth may be
simple; the Nigerian Army is socially, culturally, materially, and professionally incapable
of defeating a smaller under-gunned, and poorly led insurgent force. However, in the
grand scheme, it may be that the insurgency is the force that is better led and fields
superior firepower.
Nigeria as a Democratic State
Prior to 1960, Nigeria was a colony of Great Britain that provided the country's
economic and security foundation. Nationalism existed in Nigeria, but only as a front
against the British. Still, once Nigerians gained independence in 1960, the people
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abandoned nationalism in favor of tribal affiliation, and nationalism reverted to a local
and regional phenomenon within the tribes (Emeh, Ubaku, & Anyikwa, 2015).
Nigeria is a 21-year-old democracy, a federal republic, and is considered a fragile
state (Fund for Peace, 2018). As with most African countries, colonial powers designated
national borders without deference to cultural or ethnic realities, basing national
boundaries on a rivers course, watershed, colonial convenience, straight lines through
unpopulated areas, agreements between countries (Britain and France concerning
Nigeria), the Congress of Berlin, and through the post-colonial Organization of African
Unity (Herbst, 1989; Jones, 2015).
A sheik of the Shammar tribe can best sum up the reality of colonialisms’
disregard for local cultural divisions; when asked why he smuggled sheep and benzine
into Iraq from Syria, he responded by answering; “Why did you put the Syrian border in
the middle of my sheep? We were here first” (Ricks, 2006, p. 61).
Figure 2 indicates the position of Nigeria relative to the African continent. Benin,
Chad, Niger, and Cameroon border Nigeria. The colonial border system led to cultural,
ethnic, and religious conflicts between a Muslim North and Christian South. In addition,
conflicts exist between the Muslim Fulani, a cattle culture, and the agrarian Christian
South. In addition, conflict exists with the Biafra delta people who desire political and
economic independence (Biafra Free State, n.d.; Okeke, 2015).
Nigeria has over 250 diverse ethnic groups, encompasses 500 languages, and 185
million people spread through 36 states and the Federal Capital State (CIA, 2017).
Nigeria extends over 58,689 square miles. Nigeria has the largest population in Africa
and is also the richest, based on oil and natural gas production, primarily located in
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Benin's Bight in the Delta state region noted in Figure 3 (CIA, 2017). Figure 3 indicates
the position of each Nigerian state and its association with the countries of Chad,
Cameroon, Niger, and Benin. The Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, and Yobe states in the
northeast are where the Boko Haram attacks are concentrated. Negedu and Atabor (2015)
noted that before British colonial rule, the various ethnic tribes operated as separate and
diverse political and religious systems.
Figure 2
Nigeria, located on the Bight of Benin, on the African Continent. (Betts, n.d.)
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The British incorporated separate systems to exploit capital, and to manifest this,
the British employed a divide and rule mentality to maintain British hegemony, create
disunity, create disputes, and encourage ethnic suspicions, thus enforcing tribalism and
conflict. The British used this asymmetric warfare tactic to prevent nationalism and keep
the various tribes and sects separate, seeking providence and hegemony for themselves.
Figure 3
Map of Nigeria with Location of the 36 States.

Note. Most of the Boko Haram activity is in Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Kano, Gombe, and
Jigawa states. (Administrative Map of Nigeria, open-source, n.d.)
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War, in any form, has long been associated with the acquisition of land and
resources. However, the British used a pseudo-population-centric asymmetric warfare
tactic to defeat anti-colonial sentiment (Herbst, 1989). The British actively promoted
internal conflict to control any nationalist intent as the population held grassroots power
but could not unify to challenge colonial rule (Herbst, 1989).
When the British vacated Nigeria, they did not leave a plan or template in place
for the new Nigerian government to follow. The government was left to “devise structural
changes to cope with questions of unity and stability” and to overcome obstacles tied to
introducing an overly complicated version of democracy to a diverse and illiterate
population (Herskovits, 1980, para. 11). The British were kicked out, so the vacating
government did not leave managing civil servants behind to assist in the transition. The
ethnic divides, encouraged by the British, eventually crippled the new federation. As a
result, a civil war broke out in Western Nigeria (Kobo, 2020). This reality followed a
pattern in which every colony in Africa was left to its own machinations.
After the transition, the Nigerian central government was weak, ineffective,
corrupt, and unable to adequately provide even the essential services to the people (Metz,
1991). It did not help that between 1960 through 1999, Nigeria experienced ten coup
d’états led by various military leaders who believed they could do better (Siollun, 2009;
Pulseng, 2016). After Nigeria achieved democracy in 1999 through the fourth republic,
no successful coup d’états have taken place.
There have been four sitting civilian presidents of Nigeria, and the latest,
Muhammadu Buhari, is a former army general and rival of Goodluck Jonathon, president
from 2010 through 2015. Buhari has attempted to address the issues that plague Nigeria

46

and garner support for the war but has not succeeded. In 2015, he gave the military an
order to destroy Boko Haram within three months, but this proved an impossible task
(Chesa, 2015). After his re-election in 2019, he did not address the Boko Haram issue at
all.
Nigeria is heavily grounded in the tribal system and offers a complex ethnic and
cultural diaspora. Internal conflicts between Muslim and Christian, north versus south,
rich-poor, communal violence, tribal isolation, rampant corruption, and Boko Haram are
tearing the country apart. Because of this dysfunction, Boko Haram found a
complementary environment in which to grow.
Western influences which constructed Nigeria worked to create disharmony
during colonial rule. Kant (1784) noted that human beings desire peace and contentment
yet cannot avoid continuous disagreement with each other; this is Kant’s “unsociable
sociability” (p. 4). Echoing Kant, Schneewind (1998) wrote, “We are self-preserving and
quarrelsome beings, but we are also sociable. These two aspects of human nature make
the problem of maintaining social order quite definite: how are quarrelsome but sociallyminded beings like ourselves to live together” (p. 72)?
Nigerians live together through a precarious concoction of adversity, diversity,
distrust, ancient ancestral ties, and tribal affiliations, and yet, as US Ambassador to
Nigeria, William Stuart Symington, once noted; somehow, “whatever happens, Nigerians
have a way of figuring out ways to live together” (Vanguard, n.d. para. 1).
Northern Nigeria is mired in poverty and the lack of opportunity with a
poverty rate of 67%, the Northwest at 71.1%, and the Northeast, the focus region for
Boko Haram, at 72.2% (Ahokegh, 2012). The rampant poverty and lack of opportunity
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in the north allows Boko Haram to recruit Muslim men and children with the promise of
political change, true Islamic enlightenment, and a life purpose.
In 2016, the Nigerian military declared Boko Haram 100% defeated and launched
Operation Accord to address the violent Fulani. The Nigerian army had repeatedly
claimed victory against Boko Haram only to continue insurgent operations (Mora, 2017).
The Fulani remain active against Christians; however, consolidation between the Fulani
and Boko Haram is unlikely as the terror and insurgent group are of Kanuri ethnicity.
However, Boko Haram may influence the Fulani in radical Salafist Islam to cultivate a
Sunni association (McGregor, 2017).
This ethnic reality shifted in Mali as young Fulani, traditional supporters of the
Bamako government in balancing Tuareg and Arab power in Northern Mali, have been
recruited by radical Islamic groups (McGregor, 2017). The issue is complicated, but the
result of this confrontation between the herdsman and the farmer has depleted the already
undermanned Nigerian military to address both the Fulani and Boko Haram.
The Fulani represent a danger aside from Boko Haram. The military’s attitude
towards the Fulani is questionable and suspicious at best. President Buhari is Fulani, and
allegations have been raised that the government condones the military's actions against
Christians in the north (McGregor, 2017). Figure 4 maps the location of the Fulani
through Africa and Nigeria, and it is within the “middle belt” region where the two
religions coexist that violence exists, and tensions run high. Contradictions abound in this
African state. While having no constitutional authority, the Emir of the Kano state
currently influences many Muslims in social, moral, and spiritual matters. The Emir,
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Sanusi Lamido Sanusi II, has carried on his grand uncle’s tradition of “chief government
critic for life” (Perry, 2014, p. 13).
Figure 4
Fulani Diaspora through Africa and Nigeria.

Note. (Quiles, 2019).
The Emir is decidedly anti-corruption and believes that while politicians are
temporary, the traditional leaders of Nigeria are the true leaders, not only in politics but
in societal and cultural affairs (Perry, 2014). The Emir noted that greed and ineptitude
mark the Nigerian government, and when the leadership fails, the state fails (Perry, 2014;
Okoronkwo, 2015). The current president, Buhari, had been ill and had not addressed the
reforms he promised during the election, spending much of his first term in England
undergoing medical treatment.
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The elites and wealthy in Nigerian believe the nation-state is too big to fail, and
this perpetuates their unwillingness to face up to the country’s issues and failures
(Campbell, 2013). In an interview with Femi Kuli, a popular Nigerian musician and
political activist, Femi lamented that “Nothing works, we have no education, no
electricity [water], the roads are bad, and the airport is shit” (Perry, 2014, p. 31).
In every society, it is the political, economic, or social elites who guide society to
prosperity (Smith, 2003a). The elites also attempt to maintain equilibrium in society for
the good of all, but it is good for the wealthy and elites as they hold the power structure.
However, in Nigeria, instead of the elites and affluent defining and molding society,
instead of representing the core investment and producing a functional society, the elites
wall themselves off from the Nigerian society and perpetuate their personal and isolated
Nigeria with Porsche showrooms and Gucci Salons (Perry, 2014).
The state of the Nigerian democracy is tenuous at best. A thwarted coup d’état in
May 2017 is the best evidence that Nigeria faces hurdles for a lasting and vibrant
democracy. Add to the situation widespread corruption, tribalism, violence against
women and children, including genital mutilation, and internal conflicts between tribes
and ethnic groups mean that Nigeria may be hard-pressed to address a continuing
transnational insurgency adequately. The politicians and the wealthy maintain the status
quo to maintain their position and profitability (Dike, 2014). Society in Nigeria is
dysfunctional, and the State as a whole is not at peace with itself.
Tribalism in Nigeria
Nigerian is not a nation-state. It is, at best, a frail nation on the verge of
implosion. The UN Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (n.d.) used the
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definition offered by Davis (1997) that a Nation-state “is one where the great majority are
conscious of a common identity and share the same culture.” Tribalism, among other
dysfunctional issues, denies Nigeria nation-state status. According to Walby (2003),
“nations are much more often projects that are in the process of becoming something
more, than they are actually realized in stable political institutions and command over
territory” (p. 531).
Vail (1991) noted that nationalism was viewed as progressive and laudable in the
modernization paradigm, while tribalism was viewed as retrogressive and divisive.
However, tribalism persists, for ethnic particularism offers safety and security. According
to Mehlika (2013), modernization is required for countries to influence and control their
political, social, and economic development. Christian Southern Nigeria is far more
modernized than the North, a reality not lost on the Nigerian people. Smith (2016) noted
Pierce and explained that Boko Haram rose in the Borno state by taking advantage of
tribalism's political, religious, and cultural separations (p, 565).
In addition, Smith (2016) described the “moral economy of corruption” in Nigeria
as one in which the conduct of politicians and patrons is judged socially based mainly on
how well power and (especially) money are employed for productive social and political
purposes, rather than for purely selﬁsh aggrandizement” (p. 565). Smith (2016) also
noted that the population is nearly inoculated from corruption in that implicitly, “the
moral economy associated with a politics rooted in patron-clientism mitigates class
conﬂict and inhibits more widespread mobilization against corruption” (p. 565).
Nigeria is so corrupt that when Niyi Osundare gave a speech at a Save Nigeria
Group conference, he stated, “we no longer blush at corruption. How did our nerves slide
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into their present state of stupor? How did we plunge into this state of unconsciousness?
Catastrophes that would shake normal societies to their very foundations hit and leave us
unfazed. Tyrants in military uniform whipped us with scorpions; only a few of us
protested (Osundare, 2012, para. 10). According to Osundare, “corruption is the grand
commander of the federal republic” (heading).
A strong sense of nationalism in Nigeria is nonexistent and is tied to the inherent
suitability of the localized tribal system. No single tribe has any stake in embracing and
extending its nationalistic tendencies to accommodate other tribes. In this dynamic,
complexity theory enters the equation as both a consolidator and disruptor of the nationstate, the state (local) and the “concatenation of cultural movements” denies unity
(Kaufmann, 2017, p. 22).
Ogoku and Umudjere (2016) noted that the colonial system strengthened the tribal
system across Africa and brainwashed Africans to believe they were less than full
national and international community members. In addition, Ogoku and Umudjere (2016)
wrote that “Africans are seen as murderers of fellow Africans, dehumanizing Africans,
aiding and abetting against Africa, antagonizing African values and morals due to their
self-acclaimed tribal supremacy” (p. 92). Ogoku and Umudjere (2016) offered that
tribalism mandates the reality of a strong cultural or ethnic identity that separates and
isolates one group from another through locational polity and economic inclusiveness;
that identity drives the tribal-state to the exclusion of all else.
The imperial system from which colonialism sprang introduced inferiority to
Africans, so the tribal system enabled tribal Africans to strive for superiority over other
tribes. Therefore, African nation-building has been stymied by Africans' “mental slavery”
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(Ogoku & Umudjere, 2016). It is true then that tribalism is isolationist and protectionist.
Figure 5 graphs the location and population percentage of the various Nigerian tribes.
The Hausa-Fulani are the largest tribe in Nigeria.
Figure 5
Map of Nigeria Identifying Tribal Dispersion

Note. This map indicates the major tribes in Nigeria. (Lamm, 2014).
Nationalism is present within the tribal system, carrying tribalism into national
politics affecting the Nigerian people and national unity (Bello, n.d.; Tilde, n.d.).
However, the divides in Nigeria have not been addressed in the literature regarding the
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effects of national unity and support for the government in fighting an insurgent and
terrorist entity.
The Nigerian federal government also has issues with the Fulani; like the militants
in Biafra who seek independence, the Fulani commit violence to ensure their motives are
met in expanding their territory to graze cattle.
The Fulani drive their herds south in the post-harvest season to graze on the
cultivated fields. However, for many reasons, including climate change, the Fulani have
found it necessary to keep their stock south all year, destroying the fragile agricultural
environment (McGregor, 2017). The Fulani and the Hausa-Fulani vigilante group Yan
Sakai seek reprisals against whole villages and farmers with machetes and AK-47s.
Violence against the agrarians mirrors the attacks by Boko Haram in both number and
ferocity (McGregor, 2017).
The research demonstrated the Nigerian military, with government approval,
enables the Fulani’s destruction of Christians in the north. This enabling may signal an
institutional problem in that military conducts operations enforcing domestic policy,
allowing sectarian violence and the plausibility of genocide (Murray, 2017; McGregor,
2017). It is illegal in Nigeria for civilians to own guns; however, the Fulani are well
armed with automatic AK-47s and other small arms. The Fulani have access to arms and
ammunition. In contrast, the Nigerian Army in Northeast Nigeria had struggled to equip
their troops with arms and ammunition to fight against Boko Haram (Ross, 2016).
As an emerging but fragile state, Nigeria has not enjoyed the fruits of nationalism
as a means of bringing its disparate peoples together to affirm Nigeria as an advanced
prosperous nation-state. Nigeria is a fragile state, with internal forces of disunity sowing
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the seeds of dissolution (Fund for Peace, 2018). When Nigeria constructed its democracybased constitution in 1999, politicians considered a parliamentary platform for the
government. However, Nigeria adopted the American model of democracy, expecting a
fully functional and operational society committed to democracy (Herskovits, 1980).
Nigeria’s constitution mandates the separation of church and state. Unfortunately,
the primary religious demographic, Christian and Muslim, believe it is their “turn” when
presidential elections are held every four years, which leaves animosity simmering. And
in fact, the presidency was rotated between Christian and Muslim through an informal
system known as zoning. According to Muhumuza (2019), a Christian from the south is
succeeded by a Muslim from the north. This has been widely recognized as the key to
holding the country together. (para. 12).
Occult and Superstitions
Understanding the culture of Nigeria is essential to comprehend military
performance. According to Chuter and Gaub (2016), “African militaries inevitably reflect
the dominant cultural traditions and mores of their societies, as all armies do” (p. 33). The
authors went on to explain that in sub-Saharan Africa, societies, along with their soldiers,
are influenced by the belief in magic and superstitions, so much so that witchcraft and
sorcery are believed to be authentic and prevalent in African societies, with Nigeria no
exception (Waapela, 2016). The belief in the occult and its’ effect on both the population
and military is just one cultural facet not considered in the West.
Waapela (2016) wrote, “The intractable corruption in Nigeria and the docility of
the Nigerian masses to rise and challenge the political elites’ exploitation of their natural
resources is strongly believed to have a spiritual dimension, aside from the many other
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physical and social factors that may be advanced” (p. 1). The Nigerian people are
believed to be “spiritually manipulated by the political elites.” So much so that they are
unable to ask their “political representatives (councilors, assemblypersons, senators, the
president or governor) basic questions that border on governance” (Waapela, 2016, p. 7).
Waapela (2016) continued asking questions of Nigeria; “Why is Nigeria so
endowed with many natural resources, producing up to 2.6 million barrels of crude oil per
day, and having about 82 million hectares of arable land still ranks amongst the poorest
nations of the world? Why are meritocracy, accountability, transparency, competence,
and integrity jettisoned in Nigeria, especially from 1999-date? Why is Nigeria among the
few nations parading the highest number of church and mosque-goers in the world, still
ranks as one of the most corrupt countries” (Waapela, 2016, p. 2)?
Spirituality and belief systems play an important role in Nigeria and can account
for the inability to hold the government and the military accountable. According to
Waapela, “the Nigerian masses have become inexplicably docile when they should kick,
they temporize, when they are to smite, they smile” (p. 7). Waapela (2016) explained that
when political elites use occult practices on the Nigerian masses, they do not show anger
with their deplorable, pauperized state, nor do they frown at the corruption of their
political elites (p. 8).
Western sensibilities have no place when studying Nigeria or any African nation.
One must believe the occult to be very real because Nigerians think it is legitimate as it
guides and controls their lives. Of particular note are the “witches” of Nigeria. Children
known as skolombo or street children. The Christian south, epicenter of witchcraft and
the occult, demonizes homeless children (Ellison, 2018).
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Finally, the lack of professionalism within the Nigerian Army may be a symptom
perpetrated by the fear of a coup d’état. The Nigerian Army, before 1999, represented a
weak organization due to the military ruler constantly stripping the army of funds and
men fearing a new coup d’état. In May 2016, the army rifted as many as 70 Nigerian
officers and senior officers from the service due to “corruption and partisan politics” or,
as the fired officers alleged, “sectional and political considerations” (SaharaReporters,
2016).
In May 2017, the Nigerian Army investigated coup d’état reports as politicians
attempted to influence officers to take control while Muhammadu Buhari was in England
undergoing medical treatment. Army leadership moved quickly to quash any thought of a
coup d’état. Chief of Army Staff, Tukur Buratai, stepped forward and issued a stern
warning to his officers to stay out of politics, which raised the specter of a coup plot
(Hassan, 2017). This belief in retributive or preclusive action, the rifting of officers from
the ranks, which has over five decades weakened the army's core.
In January 2019, 200 officers were compulsorily retired before the presidential
election in February 2019. There were suggestions that this was done to ensure a smooth
political transition and prevent trouble. The military railed against such suggestions and
advised the media to verify information from the appropriate source before rushing to
press to avoid fake news that is not credible and is misleading (Nigerian Voice, 2019).
The Nigerian Military
The Nigerian Army can be traced to the 1863 Glover Hausas, founded by Sir John
Hawley Glover of the Royal Navy (Nigerian Army, n.d.). Various regiments operated in
the separate North and South protectorates. In 1900, the corps became the Royal West
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Frontier Force. In 1914, the British abolished the protectorates, and the Nigerian
regimental system was born. Queen Elizabeth visited Nigeria in 1956, and in her honor,
the Nigerian regiment became the Queens Own Nigerian Regiments. By June 1958, the
Nigerian military forces became independent from Britain, and the Nigerian government
acquired military control and responsibility. (Wyss, 2016).
After independence, the Nigerian Army became subservient to the civil
administration. However, 33-years of military dictatorships depleted the army of training,
professionalism, accountability, and operational effectiveness, and the people’s trust
(International Crisis Group, 2016). The Army was once the region’s most potent, and
Africa counted on Nigeria’s army to be a regional stabilizing force.
Nigeria’s Modern Army
The Nigerian Army appears to follow the praetorian model in civilian-military
relations. Perlmutter (1969) explained that a modern praetorian state is “one in which the
military tends to intervene and potentially could dominate the political system” (p. 383).
Perlmutter noted that the praetorian state may “develop when civilian institutions lack
legitimacy or are in a position to be dominated by the military,” which is true in Nigeria
(p. 383). The political system is weak, with weak and ineffective political parties that are
considered low-level institutions. In Nigeria, tribalism is the political party and political
system, and the National Assembly merely a symbol.
Perlmutter (1969) offered that praetorianism often occurs in nations that are in the
“early and middle stages of modernization and political mobilization” (p. 384). Between
1960 and 1999, Nigeria was an underdeveloped state, so the army was “pushed into
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political action when civilian groups and leaders failed to legitimize themselves
(Perlmutter, 1969, p. 384).
Nigeria lacks a strong, cohesive, articulate, and vibrant middle class which lends
society to ensure a praetorian government. Perlmutter (1969) also noted the conditions
which are present lack the necessary universal symbols that generally bind a society
together (i.e., “I am Igbo and live in a country called Nigeria”).
According to Perlmutter (1969), “the middle classes in most praetorian states are
small, weak, ineffective, divided, and politically impotent” (p. 387). This condition is
present in Nigeria, and its presence is “manifested in the class structure's polarization-the
gap between the few rich and the many poor” (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 387).
Praetorian existence is explained by “low social cohesion, personal desires, and
group aims frequently diverge, and the formal structure of the state is not buttressed by an
informal one; institutions do not develop readily or operate effectively; social control is
ineffective; and channels for communication are few” (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 385). It is
here that Perlmutter mentions dissociation in a societal equation. In addition, “not only
does the underdeveloped society as a whole lack unifying orientations, but its various
sectors tend to be further fragmented and incapable of mounting unified action even for
the narrower benefits of a particular sector” (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 386).
Perlmutter (1969) noted that the “salient characteristic of modern military
organization in developing policies is their professionalism. The professionalism and
institutionalization of the military entail the establishment of military colleges,
specialized training, the formation of a unified professional group, and a national army”
(p. 383). One can argue that Nigeria is a praetorian state merely because the government
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uses the military to enforce local, regional, and national policy, negating the army's social
and cultural impact against civilians. The military eschews any regard for the Nigerian
Constitution when it harms, abuses, or kills innocent civilians and acts poorly on the
battlefield, dispossessing any thought of humanitarian law or the law of war.
Praetorianism
The Nigerian military moved from the ruler-type praetorian model to the
arbitrator-type in 1999 with the establishment of the fourth republic. Perlmutter (1969)
noted that in a state with a low cohesive social structure, the praetorian model is
characterized by fragmented boundaries and relations between civil and military
authority, both seeking political power and relevancy, but the state ultimately retains
civilian control. Additionally, the military is oriented to external threats and internal
challenges. The arbitrator-type military tends to preserve military expertise, is
conservative, and maximizes civilian power (Perlmutter, 1969).
According to Perlmutter (1969), there are distinguishing characteristics of the
arbitrator-type army. The military accepts the existing social order, and once civilian
disputes are settled, the army returns to its barracks or stands down. The army has no
political organization and does not work to maximize army rule; if intervention is
necessary, the army establishes a time limit for military intervention until an alternative
and acceptable government is established. The military is concerned with their
professionalism, sometimes overly concerned, and they operate from behind the scenes as
a pressure group. Still, they have a low level of national consciousness, and they may fear
civilian retribution.
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In addition, professionalism is insisted upon and is codified in army doctrine and
culture; promotions are determined by ability, expertise, and education (Perlmutter,
1969). According to Perlmutter (1969), the praetorian model negates professionalization
principles, and the attributes of a professional army are not “inoculated or observed” (p.
391). Nigerian military officers are promoted many times based on tribal affiliation or the
desire to enrich subordinates as their senior officers have been enriched.
Perlmutter (1969) noted that the army does not have a professional tradition
because of this reality or has deteriorated, conferring the military a low level of national
consciousness and identification. Therefore, the model Nigeria uses to enforce domestic
policy by an army trained to kill and inflict mass damage; first and foremost, lends itself
to the praetorian model. Prior to 1999, the Nigerian army operated as a praetorian rulertype army with numerous coup d'état coup de etat taking place and the army’s command
general taking control.
The liberal model would have civilian authority in complete control of the
military with clearly delineated lines of the civil and the military, continual civil-military
competition accompanied by occasional but tenuous civilian control, and a militaryoriented to coping with external threats and internal challenges to both the state and its
existence simultaneously. In Nigeria, the fear of a coup d’état and independent actions of
military abuse and atrocities negates the liberal model (Tellis, et al., 2000).
The Nigerian Army considers itself the jewel of Africa, and the leaders tout the
training and professionalism brought to the Army after 1999. Although college students
upon graduation are required to perform one year of civil service to the country (Simon,
2011b), the military is all-volunteer. The army is predominantly Muslim, but efforts have
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moved forward to recruit Christians (Godwin, 2016). Enrollment into the military is
coveted as it provides many in Nigeria with a route out of poverty and
disenfranchisement. The age mandate from 18 to 22 years (26 if a tradesman) seems a bit
short-sighted in enlistment and limits recruitment to only the youngest Nigerian male
(Nigerian Army Recruit Portal, 2019). However, the training regimen is quite strenuous
due to Africa’s harsh conditions.
The Nigerian system is comparable to the US Military (only) in that the training is
divided into three phases; Red, White, and Blue and is completed in ten weeks (US
Army, 2017). From basic training, Nigerian soldiers move on to Advanced Individual
Training, training for Military Occupational Specialties or their career assignment
(Timaya, 2017). As with Western armies, during boot camp, the Nigerian training
command instructs in morals and ethics on the battlefield (Timaya, 2017).
The Nigerian National Defence Academy in the Kaduna state trains the officer
corps for the Nigerian Army and is considered the best military academy in Africa. The
Academy is a descendent of the Royal Military Forces Training College, which existed
before decolonization. Cadets enter the program and participate in a five year “Regular
Combatant Course” (Nigerian Defence Academy, 2020)
In addition to the bachelor’s program, the Academy also offers graduate and postgraduate degrees (Nigerian Defence Academy, 2020). The contents of the 5-year program
are not known; it is more likely than not that training mimics British training. This would
indicate that morals and ethics in combat are included as officers are the primary arbiters
and enforcers of discipline and ethical behavior (British Army, 2020; Nigerian Defence
Academy, 2020). According to GlobalSecurity.org, while the Nigerian Army is the
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largest in West Africa, the reality is far from perception. When President Olusegun
Obasanjo, a former military man, was elected in 1999, he feared the Army, so he
proceeded to skeletonize the organization to prevent further coups (“Nigerian Army,”
n.d.).
In 2016, the Army had an estimated 130,000 active-duty soldiers and 32,000
reservists (Sweeny, 2016). In 2019, the numbers reflected 120,000 active duty and 0
reservists (Global Fire Power, 2020). The army is ranked 47th globally, but this is a neorealist number based on strength and material power, not ability or capability (Global Fire
Power, 2020). Although a large and complex organization, the Army is understaffed for
its obligations to the African Union, Economic Community of West African States, UN
Peace Keeping Operations, and in addressing Boko Haram (“Nigerian Army,” n.d.).
Corruption has hampered the force in denying the acquisition of both basic and
advanced weaponry. Transparency International stated that previous and fraudulent arms
deals left the army without vital equipment, is insufficiently trained, and is low in morale
and under-resourced (“Military Graft Undermines Nigeria's Fight,” 2017). Gone are the
days when army officers were referred to as “dirties,” those who had enriched themselves
during military rule, and the “cleans,” those who had not participated in using their office
to enrich themselves (“Nigerian Army,” n.d..). Corruption plagues the army with those
who still seek to enrich themselves. Because of these issues and their actions against
civilians, the US had refused, through late 2018, to sell arms to the Nigerian military
(Nigerian Army, n.d..).
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Military Organization
The Nigerian Army consists of eight divisions, including one amphibious. The
First Division is located at Kaduna, the command division known as the show division, to
give visitors and heads of state a show of what Nigerian military power looks like (“7th
Infantry Division,” 2019). This division does not represent the reality of army life in
Nigeria. In 2013 headquarters established the 7th Infantry Division for the war against
Boko Haram. So poor was the operational capability the General Officer Commanding
was removed four times between 2013-2014 (“7th Infantry Division,” 2019).
In 2014, two mutinous actions occurred by soldiers who refused to fight against
the insurgency. So grievous was the leadership that “junior officers are willing to be
court-martialed, rather than continue to be sabotaged, humiliated, and killed by the
corruption and incompetence of the top military command and federal government” (“7th
Infantry Division,” 2019). It is the 7th ID, which has borne the brunt of attacks by ISWAP
and Boko Haram in the years following. These are the soldiers who flee when ISWAP or
Boko Haram attacks.
In 2017, Military.com ranked the Nigerian Army as the fifth worse military in the
world (Stilwell, 2017). The Nigerian Army could not meet its obligation to protect
civilians from insurgents and terrorists, so the government formed the Civilian Joint Task
Force (CJTF). Metz (2007) noted that “militias arise from a combination of need and
opportunity” (p.15). The militia exists as the “state cannot address the basic needs of a
specific group, particularly security, economic opportunity, and a basis for political
identity” (Metz, 2007, p. 15).
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Ross (2015) wrote that in Northeast Nigeria, the army was underequipped, their
“armored vehicles don’t actually move,” and soldiers are known to “flee from battle with
civilians as they tear off their uniforms.” “Run for your lives,” they were screaming as
they fled, he said. “Boko Haram is coming!” The soldiers tore off their uniforms, put on
civilian clothes, parked their army vehicle under a tree, and fled in a car (Searcy, 2019,
para. 18).
In 2014, Nigeria commissioned the Nigerian Army Special Operations Command
through the assistance and training provided by the US. However, SOF is designed for a
focused and particular military mission skill set (“Nigerian Army Special Operations
Command (NASOC),” 2014). It may be difficult to understand why a specialized unit
was established when regular army units lack leadership, logistical support, competence,
training, and lack food, weapons, and ammunition in the field.
Nigerian Military Budget and Operations
The Nigerian defense budget from years 2000 through 2008 was 3% of
government expenditures. From 2009 through 2014, expenditures rose 7.2% but were still
underfunded compared to the Gross National Product (International Crisis Group, 2016, p
i). Corruption runs rampant through the civilian and military sectors. From 2007 through
2014, Sambo Dasuki, a retired Nigerian Army Colonel and former National Security
Adviser to the President of Nigeria, allegedly diverted 2 billion dollars meant for military
arms, supplies, and ammunition (The ScoopNG, n.d.). This action caused field forces to
run short on ammo, weapons, uniforms, supplies, training, and pay, leading to mutinies
and Boko Haram’s control of the North (The ScoopNG, n.d.).
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President Buhari, disturbed by the reports, wrote: “The findings made so far are
extremely worrying considering that within the same period our troops were in desperate
need of ammo/equipment” (The ScoopNG, 2016, para. 13). The report indicated that the
independent audit showed a “total extra budgetary intervention” for arms, excluding
grants from state governments, amounted to over $5 billion. Of the 513 contracts, 53
were “failed contracts” worth more than 2 billion dollars (The ScoopNG, 2016).
National legislators also divert money from the military budget through the
appropriation process to serve tribal needs, private business dealings, and personal
interests (International Crisis Group, 2016). The military is understaffed; operational
planning is inadequate. Bloated padded payrolls serve ranking officers, and a weak
auditing system contributes to the Nigerian military's morass (International Crisis Group,
2016).
The Nigerian military participates in regional peacekeeping, stretching an already
undermanned force and budget. In addition, the military is dealing with over two dozen
internal security operations, the largest being Boko Haram (International Crisis Group,
2016). Training is woefully inadequate, facilities are insufficient in number, staffing
poor, and the Nigerian Army is mired in conventional warfare doctrine (International
Crisis Group, 2016).
In 2020, the Nigerian Army budget was noted to be 2.1 billion dollars U.S. The
military fielded 129 fixed-wing and rotary aircraft. The army accounted for 258 tanks,
1750 armored personnel carriers, 363 self-propelled and towed artillery, and 38 rocket
launchers. The navy had a ship complement of 75 small patrol vessels (Global Fire
Power, 2020).
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The Nigerian army, the “Jewel of Africa,” is not, as the military is “badly
governed, under-resourced, and virtually adrift in policy and doctrine” (International
Crisis Group, 2016, para. 2). If Nigeria’s armor does not run, if troops lack arms,
ammunition, training, logistical support, food, where does 2.1 billion dollars U.S. go
(International Crisis Group, 2016, para. 2)?
According to the International Crisis Group, “Dubious procurement practices,
fraudulently bloated payrolls, poor financial management and weak auditing systems at
the national security adviser’s office” further degrade the force as funds are diverted at
the headquarters level to private or non-military purposes (International Crisis Group,
2016, para. 4). Reports from the field indicate that soldiers went into battle against Boko
Haram with inadequate weaponry and ammunition, while some soldiers carried no arms
(Ross, 2015).
In 2019, Nigeria ranked the 144th least corrupt country out of 176 countries
assessed. From 1996 through 2018, Nigeria’s corruption rank averaged 121.48, with the
highest rating in 2005 (Trade Economics, 2019). 2019’s mark is slightly better than the
2005 level, indicating corruption mitigation had not worked. As a comparison, Russia
and Ukraine, the most corrupt countries in Europe, carry a rating of 138 and 120
comparatively (Trade Economics, 2019).
The Nigerian military has experienced failure on the battlefield and in attempting
to manage a regional war. As 2020 is upon Nigeria, the army has been fighting Boko
Haram for 11-years with little chance of resolution. The military remains corrupt, and
leadership, logistical support, and appropriate doctrinal applications for soldiers in the
field appear non-existent.
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As far as addressing Boko Haram as a conventional army, Tellis, et al. (2000)
noted through the institutionalist approach; the military, like all organizations, is driven
by institutional well-being. In Nigeria, this translates to officers and senior leaders'
assuring personal and professional well-being; they seek to maintain the status quo by
ensuring their positions in the army are solid and lucrative. Therefore, innovation does
not exist and, if it did, may not be successful. In the end, the leadership would be more
driven with the internal distribution of status and power than with organizational goals. In
this paradigm, new ideas are perceived as threatening (Thompson, 1969). This approach
describes the Nigerian military.
In contrast is the professionalist approach, which views the military as an
organization driven by protecting state security. The professionalist is optimistic and
understands that the organization will innovate successfully and learn, initiating positive
change (Tellis, et al., 2000). The US military, as well as NATO armies, are
professionalist organizations.
The Nigerian Constitution and the Military
The Nigerian constitution offers primary direction to the civilian government on
military use for internal and external issues. The constitution states: “The president shall
be the head of state, the chief executive of the Federation, and commander-in-chief of the
armed forces of the Federation” (Constitute, 2021, p. 59). “The powers of the president as
the commissioner-in-chief of the armed forces of the Federation shall include the power
to determine the operational use of the armed forces of the Federation” (Constitute, 2021,
p. 94). Additionally, the 1999 Constitution in Article 214 (1) ended localized police
forces and installed a national police force: “There shall be a police force for Nigeria,
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which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and … no other police force shall be
established for the Federation or any part thereof” (Ekeh, 2010; Constitute, 2021, p. 92).
The Constitution states the Federation shall, subject to an Act of the National
Assembly made on that behalf, equip and maintain the armed forces adequately to
effectively defend Nigeria from external aggression, maintaining its territorial integrity
and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, or air. The military should suppress
insurrection and restore order and perform such other functions as may be prescribed by
an Act of the National Assembly (Constitute, 2021, p. 93).
Section 3 gives the president the authority to assign the military to confront and
eradicate Boko Haram on Nigerian soil. The Nigerian constitution also stipulates that:
The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a State based on democracy and social justice
principles. Accordingly, it is declared that: Sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria
from whom government through the constitution derives all its powers and authority. The
security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government. The
participation by the people in their government shall be ensured in accordance with the
provisions of this Constitution” (Constitute, 2021, p. 15). Expressly, the protection of the
people from corruption and abuse is noted in section 15(5) in that “The State shall abolish
all corrupt practices and abuse of power” (Constitute, 2021, p. 15). The Constitution also
states, “Every individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person, and
accordingly--No person shall be subject to torture or inhumane or degrading treatment”
(Constitute, 2021, p. 23). In 2015, the Nigerian Assembly passed the Administration of
Criminal Justice Act, which “prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
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of arrestees; however, it failed to prescribe penalties for violators” (U.S. Department of
State, 2017, p. 5).
Based on humanitarian agency claims, recorded video footage, eyewitness
accounts, and reports, and documents provided by the government, the Nigerian Army
and the CJTF have violated multiple tenets of the Nigerian constitution (Amnesty
International, 2014, 2016b; Human Rights Watch, 2016a, 2016b). Within this context of
human rights, the actions by the military become concerning regarding the treatment of
citizens in Northern Nigeria.
Understanding the Nigerian Army
Chuter and Gaub (2016) attempted to explain African armies for the European
Union, whose members have poured funds into Africa to project their expectations and
concepts on the Africans. European Union conceptualizations and desires have little to do
with the realities found in Africa, as independent states use the funds and assets as they
see fit. Ghuter and Gaub (2016) noted that African armies are dissimilar from each other,
let alone from Western armies, as each colonial power formed native armies for their
particular colonial strategies.
The colonial powers built substantial military or paramilitary native forces, led by
white officers and used against the African populations. This may be part of the legacy
and why the Nigerian Army harms and abuses the home population. It was a learned
concept and wholly acceptable while serving under the British.
In general, and according to Chuter and Gaub (2016), “African armies have
evolved mainly by trial and error, and their missions include, in different places, public
order, gendarmerie-style operations, border policing, and even development and
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infrastructure tasks” (p. 12). Armies in Africa have become involved in
counterinsurgency, counterterrorist operations, peacekeeping missions, and control
intelligence gathering and analysis in many countries (Chuter & Gaub, 2016). These
armies carry out these missions even though they are conventionally based and were
established to address asymmetric warfare. The armies of Africa were decidedly built on
the neo-realist theory of power projection using conventional warfare tactics and strategy.
The Nigerian Army operates under resource constraints; poorly maintained
military equipment, inadequate infrastructure, and armament is degrading while soldiers
live and work under challenging conditions. This is not a Nigerian problem but affects all
African national armies (Chuter & Gaub, 2016).
Figure 6 identifies the civilian trust factor for African nations concerning their
armies. Nigeria is ranked near the bottom in trust from the civilian population. In synch
with the civilian view of the military, Nigerians do not approve of military rule. The
people want democracy but may have little understanding of what makes a democracy
work for the benefit of the people.
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Figure 6
Level of Popular Trust Toward the Army and Attitudes to Military Rule.

Note. (Chuter & Gaub, 2016, p. 32).
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Boko Haram
Boko Haram was founded as a decidedly local phenomenon with transnational
radical Islamist influences. Boko Haram’s early form sprang from the Maitatsine, an
Islamic fundamentalist sect who, in the 1980s, recruited children and teens. The roots of
Boko Haram can be traced to 1995 when Abubakar Lawan founded the non-violent
movement Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra (Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization) in
Maiduguri, the capital of the Borno state (Onuoha, 2012).
In 2002, Lawan left Nigeria to study in Saudi Arabia. Mohammed Yusuf took
control and renamed the group Jamā’atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da’wati wal-Jihād (people
committed to propagating the prophet’s teachings and Jihad) (Ekanem, Dada, & Ejue,
2012). Yusuf provided education and jobs to the marginalized youth but increasingly
radicalized the group through the early 2000s (Agbiboa, 2015).
An essential factor to their and other radicalized Islamic groups' growth and
appeal is the spread of globalization. Gansler (2013) defined globalization as the “longterm, largely irreversible phenomenon involving the political, cultural, and economic
merging of geographically dispersed groups and shares the idea that transportation and
communication technologies are pervasive and consequential” (p. 2). Globalization
expanded recruiting economic viability and spreading the radical ideology. It increased
the global national and economic hierarchies, leaving underdeveloped nations struggling
to achieve the same level of financial independence as developed nations.
Globalization within the radical Islamic diaspora became a reality as al-Qa’ida
spread its message throughout the Middle East, Europe, Africa, the Far East, and
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Muslims worldwide. ISIS took the mantle away from al-Qa’ida after the US military
disseminated the group in the early to mid-2000s. Boko Haram affiliated with ISIS
expanding the globalized network of like-minded Jihadi groups. With the affiliation with
ISIS, goals have changed.
ISIS demanded that Boko Haram stop its terror campaign against Muslims and
adopt a focused campaign against Christians, the military, and the democratic
government to establish the African caliphate. Therefore, Boko Haram has become a
transnational terror enterprise and has increased its presence with the advent of
globalization. Table 1 notes the differences between the localized historical insurgency
model and globalization.
In 2009, Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihād, led by Yusuf, conducted
a violent uprising against the Nigerian state. Yusuf was captured and summarily executed
by the Nigerian government, and his followers were imprisoned. However, instead of
dissipating the sect, the group enjoyed a resurgence and adopted a ruthlessly violent
demeanor (Bunker & Dilegge, 2017).
Table 1
Conventional Localized Insurgency Versus Globalization

Power source:

Conventional insurgency
Specific overthrow of local
government
Support from the local population

Center of Gravity:

Local population

Organizational
structure:

Hierarchical, tribal, or group

Insurgent primary
tactic:

Guerilla warfare, terrorism

Insurgent goals:

Global insurgency
Complex, thematic, overthrow of
global order
Global support from like-minded
individuals
International influence on
communications, funding,
recruiting, travel, and leadership
Networked, connected,
interknitted, flatter organization
leadership: many capable leaders
Hybrid warfare, international
terrorism and support
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Insurgent motivation:

Deprivation, disenfranchisement

A strong grievance, a change to
world order

Note. Ellington, 2013, p. 85.
In 2010, Boko Haram’s leader Abubakar Shekau attacked the state prison in
Bauchi and freed 105 followers and 600 additional prisoners (“‘Boko Haram Attack’
Frees Hundreds of Prisoners,” 2010). Boko Haram refined its skills and training through
a close association with al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. In March 2015,
Shekau announced the groups' affiliation with ISIS/ISIL.
Shekau changed the group’s name to Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya (Islamic State of
West Africa). Better known as Boko Haram, which means, depending on the translation,
“Westernization is sacrilege, Western education is a sin,” or “Westernization is
forbidden” (Murphy, 2014; Tilde, n.d.). In addition, Shekau reached out to al-Qa’ida in
the Islamic Maghreb to enhance Salafist affiliation.
In late 2016, reports emerged that Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s leader, was
killed in an air attack. However, in 2017, the Nigerian government confirmed that Shekau
was still alive and possibly hiding in Nigeria’s Sambisa Forest (Gaffey, 2017). Newly
affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), ISIS dictated that Abu Musab alBarnawi, son of the late Mohammed Yusuf, assume control to realign the group with the
ISIS ideology of fundamentalist Islam (Zenn, 2018).
Abu Sa’ad, Abubakar Shekau’s second in command before his death in 2013,
preached to followers, primarily teenagers, that victory lay in martyrdom, that killing the
apostate and infidel was the only true way of redemption before Allah. Martyrdom was
the goal, not a life on earth, and to serve Allah, is to become a martyr for his cause
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(Perry, 2014). Perry (2014) interviewed a Nigerian general who stated that he had never
seen anything like it, that Boko Haram fighters walked into the barrage of return gunfire,
casual, committed, and unconcerned for their safety; they “simply walk into death” (p. 3).
Boko Haram is an insurgency that focuses on terrorizing the population. They
employ terrorist actions by carrying out suicide attacks, detonating car bombs, and
terrorizing the people of four nations. Mass kidnappings are prevalent, entire villages
have been eradicated, and the stated goal is to destabilize the Nigerian government
(Suleiman & Karim, 2015).
Boko Haram emerged because of poor governance, economic hardship,
inequality, and corruption (Suleiman & Karim, 2015). A Nigerian Bishop stated that
Boko Haram existed as a resistance movement about corrupt rule rather than an Islamist
political movement (Suleiman & Karim, 2015). The literature indicates that while these
beliefs are partly true, Boko Haram exists as a force for political Islam. Political Islam
combines polity and religion to create a dynamic that captures the imagination and
respect of the “true Muslim” and drives the people to support and become active in the
insurgency. Yet, Boko Haram attracts its membership because of poverty, economic
marginalization, social and regional inequality, and inadequate national governance
(Briscoe & van Ginkel, 2013).
The Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Lands (Jamāʿatu Anṣāril
Muslimīna fī Bilādis Sūdān), better known as Ansaru, or al-Qa’ida in the Lands Beyond
the Sahel, operated as a splinter group from Boko Haram and operated in the Kano state,
the homeland of the Hausa-Fulani people. Ansaru coordinated its operations with al-
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Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
(Ronen, 2014).
Unlike Boko Haram, Ansaru did not target Muslim innocents but “fight” against
mainstream Islam and representative Western values. Ansaru’s mandate included
defending the interests of Islam and Muslims in Africa and is not confined to Nigeria
(Ronen, 2014). Ansaru’s activities occurred in Northern Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and
Cameroon. Although Ansaru has become somewhat dormant, members spread
propaganda and may evolve into a third Boko Haram faction or join ISWAP.
Boko Haram refers to the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, a doctrinal study provided by Allah to
“rectify the mistaken beliefs, misunderstandings, and misconceptions Muslim have
accumulated for over 200 years” (Richardson, 2014). The writings held within the Kitāb
al-Tawḥīd present the “purity” of Islam and justifies their terrorism on both apostates and
infidels.
Chibok
In 2014, the Chibok schoolgirl's abduction by Boko Haram awoke the world to
the problem of the terrorist group. Boko Haram soldiers attacked the Chibok Girls
School, killing 30 instructors and staff; the radical group abducted 276 girls ranging from
16 to 18. Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram leader, stated that the girls were kidnapped
to be wives for his men, sex slaves, and sold on the black market. (Dorell, 2014).
The world community came to the aid of Nigeria with the hashtag campaign
#BringBackOurGirls. Michelle Obama stated that “In these girls, Barrack and I see our
daughters” and joined the campaign (Perry, 2014, p. 14). The social media campaign did
nothing to help the girls and appeared to be nothing more than a feel-good response, but
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it did raise the global profile of Boko Haram, the effect they had long desired (Perry,
2014). On Boko Haram and the Chibok girls, Femi, a Nigerian celebrity, asked, “Where
is the military? They have the highest budget; where is the money” (Perry, 2014, p. 31)?
In the guise of Chibok, on February 19, 2018, Boko Haram attacked the girl’s
school at Dapchi, in Northern Nigeria, Boko Haram’s fertile hunting ground. The group
kidnapped as many as 100 girls, and there was evidence the Nigerian Army failed to
prevent the attack. “The Nigerian authorities have failed in their duty to protect civilians,
just as they did in Chibok four years ago. Despite being repeatedly told that Boko Haram
fighters were heading to Dapchi, it appears that the police and military did nothing to
avert the abduction” (Amnesty International, 2018, para. 8). Counterinsurgency tactics
would have included the placing of soldiers in or around Dapchi to protect civilians.
Isolate and protect the population is a first-tier requirement in counterinsurgency.
In 2021, a spate of kidnappings occurred; 317 girls were kidnapped from the
Government Girls Secondary School in the town of Jangebe, in the northern state of
Zamfara (Maclean, 2021). The terror group kidnapped 40 boys and adult teachers from a
boy’s school in the Niger State, with one child killed. In December 2020, the Katsina
State saw 300 boys kidnapped. According to the New York Times, kidnap-for-ransom has
become a cottage industry (Maclean, 2021).
Figure 7 provides context in understanding the region in which Boko Haram
operates and the relative locations of Chibok and Dapchi. Nigerians do not take to bad
news, and owing to the culture, many in Nigeria refused to believe the girls’ schools had
been attacked. Defeating the insurgency is crucial as Nigerians suffer at the hands of the
terror organization. Two of the most horrific acts carried out by Boko Haram included the
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2015 attack on Baga, Doron Baga, and 16 surrounding villages in the Borno state. This
after the military attacked Baga in 2013, burning the village to root out Boko Haram
sympathizers. It was estimated that 2,000 people were killed in the Baga region, primarily
women and children (Amnesty International, 2015; Segun, 2015, Deblasio, 2015).
Figure 6
Location of Chibok and Dapchi

Note. Abuja is the capital of Nigeria (BBC News, 2018c).
Figure 8 is a 2017 map of Northern Africa and the sub-Saharan showing the
influence of multiple terror groups. The routes of human and contraband trafficking are
noted, indicating that these groups are working with each other. This map does not show
that Boko Haram is active in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Al-Shabab is active in
Somalia, with al-Qa’ida active in Mali, Algeria, and Libya. However, since 2013, these
groups have expanded, and ISIS has made incursions into these regions.
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Figure 7
Map of Africa’s Militant Islamist Groups.

Note. 2017 map of Africa that notes the various locations of terror groups and the routes
for the drug trade which fuels terror. (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2020)
Figure 9 maps the operational area of Boko Haram inside Nigeria. The majority of
attacks have occurred around the Borno state capital of Maiduguri. Boko Haram operates
in this area as it offers a quick escape to Cameroon, Chand, and Niger for a safe haven.
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The region is vast and ungoverned, and conventional warfare tactics are moot in
protecting civilians and defeating the insurgency.
Figure 8
Boko Haram Activity in Nigeria

Note. From The brutal toll of Boko Haram’s attacks on civilians (Ali, 2017).
The documented events prior to 2016 represent Boko Haram as led by Abubakar
Shekau. As noted previously, on August 19, 2016, Shekau and his senior leadership were
identified as being killed in an airstrike by the Nigerian Air Force. As a result, ISIS
elevated Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Yusuf’s son, to the leadership post. Shekau (reported
alive) denied Barnawi’s appointment and Shekau refuted ISIS although he did not rescind
his bayat (oath of allegiance to a leader) to al-Baghdadi (Kelly, 2019a). Shekau’s ruthless
brutality, his definition of apostasy, the targeting of Muslims, and the enforcement of his
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version of Takfir led to the change (Takfir is the controversial practice of one Muslim
declaring another a non-believer, or Kafir) (Kelly, 2019a).
Boko Haram then split into two factions. Shekau led his loyalists while Barnawi
led the new faction Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). However, in early
2019, and apparently due to internal strife, ISIS appointed Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar alBarnawi as governor of ISWAP. There is a marked operational difference between the
two groups. ISWAP targets Nigerian government installations and the army. Shekau’s
faction attack soft targets within the civilian population. It is ISWAP who is the larger
and more active faction (Kelly, 2019a).
On December 6, 2018, and January 14, 2019, respectively, attacks were carried
out in Rann, 175 km (110 miles) northeast of the Borno state capital, Maiduguri. As the
attacks began on the internal displaced persons camp, army forces in both instances fled.
At the same time, the attackers set fire to shelters and a United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF) clinic erected to assist and house people made homeless by the conflict (Kelly,
2019a). Seventeen civilian casualties were documented, while 10,000 civilians fled
(Kelly, 2019a). The attack was attributed to ISWAP; however, it turned out the Shekau
faction was responsible.
Both factions are referred to as Boko Haram, and the media has difficulty
differentiating which actions taken by the insurgents are attributable to which group.
However, ISWAP, using the preferred ISWA identifier, attacks only hard targets. ISWA
represents an existential threat to the existence of Nigeria. Boko Haram is working to
create its Caliphate in northeastern Nigeria. However, it is unlikely the two factions
would merge as ideological differences differ significantly.
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According to Omar Mahmood, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security
Studies in Addis Ababa, “There are ideological divides with Shekau that remain
unbridged, especially regarding the determination of who is and is not a civilian” (Kelly,
2019b).
Figure 9
Progression and Split of Boko Haram in 2016

ORIGINAL GROUP
Abubakar Shekau
Jama’at ahl al-sunna liDa’wahwa-l-qital wal-Jihad
(JAD)
Boko Haram
Pledged Allegiance to ISIS
leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi

Abubakar Shekau
Faction of
BOKO HARAM
(Shunned by ISIS)

Abu Mus’ab AlBarnawi Faction
Islamic State West
Africa Province
(ISWAP)
(Approved by ISIS)

Note. Based on Kelly (2019b).
In 2019, the attacks on Rann and Baga demonstrated the differences between the
two groups. Shekau destroyed Rann and ran civilians down, killing them, while ISWA
allowed people to leave Baga unharmed (Kelly, 2019b). Boko Haram attacks soft targets,
civilian targets, while ISWA focuses its efforts against the Nigerian Army, protected
national government institutions and local government offices.
ISWA shuns attacks against the population as they try and cultivate support,
something Boko Haram was never concerned with achieving. ISWA’s attacks are

83

pinpointed to military and government installations and not within the disseminated
population. Figure 11 represents attacks carried out by both the Shekau faction and
ISWA. The Shekau faction has been most active from 2016 through 2019. However,
ISWA’s attacks are pinpointed to military and government installations and not within
the disseminated population.
Figure 10
Attacks Carried Out by ISWA and Boko Haram Shekau Faction 2016–2019

Note. Attacks carried out by both ISWA (dark grey) and the Boko Haram Shekau
faction (Orange) from 2016 through 2019. From (Acled, 2019).
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Attacks have been increasing from the Northeast zone to the south and the west.
The United Kingdom has warned against traveling to Nigeria as terrorism has hit “public
places where crowds gather have been targeted, including places of worship, markets,
shopping malls, hotels, bars, restaurants, football viewing centres, displacement camps,
transport terminals, government buildings, security, and educational institutions”
(GOV.UK, 2021).
Radical Islam
Sunni and Shia are two main sects in Islam. Sunni makes up between 80% and
85% of the Muslim diaspora. Both sects have radicalized members and organizations and
Iman’s who preach violence against the West. The Shia make up 10% to 16% of the
Muslim population (Pew Research Center, 2009).
Khalil (2017) estimated that 10% -15% of the Muslim population are extremists
and Islamic conservatives (potential extremists) consist of about 30% of the Muslim
population who live in Muslim-dominated countries. The remaining 50% of the Muslim
population are spread among different cultures and civilizations and lie within the global
community, rather than the Islamic community, which influences their beliefs (Khalil,
2017). Khalil (2017) noted that extremism is not confined to a country dominated by the
Muslim faith and can emerge from the global diaspora.
In understanding an insurgency or radical movement is crucial to understand the
culture, political belief system, and religious belief system that drives these groups.
Terror groups that operated in the 1970s and 1980s, such as Baader-Meinhof (Red Army
Faction), Peruvian Shining Path, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and
the Italian Red Brigades, were leftist political groups bent on disrupting or vanquishing
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the sitting capitalist government in the nation-state they operated. Today, much of
terrorism is based on radical Political Islam.
The world has labeled al-Qa’ida and ISIS as radical Islamists. However, the
Islamic belief system espoused by these groups, especially Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the
former leader of ISIS, is considered by followers to be the pure and true Islamic
representation of the religion. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi grounded this movement as political
in establishing the Caliphate or Islamic nation-state.
al-Qa’ida and ISIS look to the 7th century for their “radical” belief that Islam is
the only true religion. In the 7th century, the prophet Mohamed created Islam, conquered
Makkah, and swept the idols from the Ka’aba, leaving the black building, the Ka’aba, as
the center of Islam. ISIS had stated that it would like to sweep the idols from the Ka’aba
and destroy the building (Romey, 2015).
The broader Islamic faith believes the meteor was placed there by Abraham and
Ishmael, representing the covenant between the people and Allah. ISIS and Boko Haram
claim to represent the pure form of Islam, practiced in the method Allah and Mohammed
destined. The groups follow the Salafist (Salafiyyah) belief system, which is a violent
form of Wahhabism (Al-Muwahhidun), an austere practice of Islam that insists on a
literal interpretation in the Qur’an.
While ISIS and Boko Haram do not represent most Muslims, Khalil (2017) stated,
“it is not unreasonable to claim that ISIS represents the essence of Islam like no other and
that it is the perfect embodiment of the early era of Islamic history that followed Prophet
Mohammad’s migration to Medina” (para. 5). It is in this structure that ISIS and Boko
Haram “serves as an honest and authentic mirror that reflects the face of Islam” (Khalil,
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2017, para. 5). ISIS and their associates believe the purest form of Islam existed during
the Prophet Muhammad’s era, and, in the period after the Prophet's death, the four
Caliphs reigned.
Who ISIS Represents
ISIS, Boko Haram, and ISWAP believe their actions, regardless of how barbaric
or criminal, are condoned by Allah and accepted through the Salafist belief system while
following Islamic law and teachings (Khalil, 2017). The burning, crucifying, beheading,
the slaughtering of humans, Muslim and Christian, and the dropping of homosexuals
from rooftops are simply a means to an end. According to Khalil (2017), some Muslim
scholars find it difficult to dispute this ultra-pure belief system once practiced by the
founder of Islam.
Iyad el-Baghdadi (no relation to Abu Bakr el-Baghdadi, the former ISIS leader),
a prominent proponent of Middle East democracy, stated that “The dominant paradigm of
Islam is rule-based. It’s a rule-centric Islam. It’s not values centric. This plays very well
with ISIS because ISIS can just use the same rules and arguments that the establishment
scholars use” (Williams, 2015, para.4).
Iyad el-Baghdadi noted that the Salafist belief system offers something to many
young people they are not getting from mainstream Imans and religious scholars tied to
authoritarian regimes (Williams, 2015). The young feel they are not getting answers or
are given wrong or nebulous answers to spiritual questions. ISIS provides simple rulebased solutions which are easy to understand and follow. Baghdadi stated, “You can’t
beat a simplistic answer, rather just answering with another question. Because life is a
question, but these guys just want answers” (Williams, 2015, para. 4).
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ISIS represents Salafist Muslims and practices a strict interpretation of Islam
(Olidort, 2015). Comparisons between the radical violent Salafist movement and
Wahhabism, founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and is representative of ultraconservative Sunni Islam practiced mainly in Saudi Arabia have been made; however,
they are both part of the same ultra-conservative movement, although Salafists consider
being called “Wahhabi” derogatory (Olidort, 2015). However, terrorism experts had
identified Wahhabism as one source for global terrorism (Senate, 108th Cong., 2003).
When the CIA had completed their interrogation of Khalid Sheik Mohammed,
which included waterboarding, Mohammed began to offer information. However, it was
not through interrogation; Mohammed began to hold “classes” on the Sunni Salafist
Muslim belief system and doctrine (Mitchell, 2016). According to Sheik Mohammed, the
Western view of peace is far different than the Salafist Muslim. It was Sheik Mohammed
who gave the Western world an abject lesson in radical Sunni Islam.
Sheik Mohammed explained that unlike the definition of “Western peace”
between nations and peoples, peace for the radicalized Salafist Muslim means one of
three things; death to the infidel or apostate, subjugation of the infidel in which a tax is
paid to Islam, or conversion to Islam (Mitchell, 2016). The radical Muslim believes the
end is coming for Western civilization when Islam destroys all non-believers and ushers
the return of the Mahdi, the eschatological redeemer of Islam who will appear for several
years before the Day of Judgment and rid the world of evil. Peace to the Salafist means
complete control and strict adherence to Sharia by every living human.
According to its followers, Sharia is the one true Muslim religious, legal, and
political belief system, and those who practice fervently can approach near-mystical
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status. Khalid Sheik Mohammed referred to those who follow this ideology as “True
Muslims” (Mitchell, 2016). Radical Islamists use the true form of Sharia to justify killing
the infidel or apostate and is a sacrifice to Allah. Allah condones the killing of infidel and
apostate women and children.
According to Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Western women birth the infidel, and
their children represent the future of Western influence. Therefore, the children must die.
Democracy is the enemy of Islam because only Allah dictates how people live and are
governed (Mitchell, 2016). The radical Shia (Iran) and the Sunni Salafist are
theologically disparate but share the same belief that infidels and apostates must be
eradicated or enslaved. This is the path the Iranian theocrat (Shia) is currently following.
Faithful, true Muslims believe that there are no innocents, men and women who
fund the governments who fight the Muslims by paying taxes, are as guilty as their
soldiers. Children give comfort to the infidel father and mother and, therefore, should be
eradicated (Mitchell, 2016). Allah mandates true Muslims convert, kill, or enslave every
human being; it is their focus, their calling, their job, and is grounded in their devotion to
Allah (Mitchell, 2016).
On democracy and Western freedoms, Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s leader,
wrote, “The disease is unbelief, and as Allah says, disorder is worse than killing (Qur’an
2:191)...Everyone knows democracy is unbelief, and everyone knows the constitution is
unbelief, and everyone knows that there are things Allah has forbidden in the Qur’an and
forbidden in countless hadiths of the Prophet that are going on in Western schools...We
haven’t forbidden anything; we haven’t told the Muslim community to abandon anything,
we simply stand on the path of truth” (Thurston, 2016, p. 16).
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Finally, a “truce” in Western terms refers to a cessation of hostilities and restoring
peace and harmony, if short-lived. The True Muslim believes a truce is for regrouping,
training, planning, then springing into action against the enemy (Mitchell, 2016). And,
while peace is considered the goal in any conflict, to the True Muslim, peace means
uniting the world under the flag of Islam and imposing Sharia law (Mitchell, 2016).
International Law and Conflict
It is challenging to access confirmed and corroborative literature on the abuses
carried out by the Nigerian Military and National Police Force against the Nigerian
population. However, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented
human rights violations in countries across the globe for decades. Both humanitarian
groups are on the ground in Nigeria, documenting the military's actions, Boko Haram,
and the CJTF, established to fight Boko Haram.
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports are accepted as reliable,
and the US Department of State uses the reports as confirmed evidence of violations (US
Department of State, 2016). In 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry used information
from an Amnesty International report to press for human rights in Nigeria (Gordon,
2013). Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports are incorporated into
State Department memos, position papers, and official reports (US Department of State,
2017).
The violence perpetrated by Boko Haram began in 2009, and according to a 2012
Human Rights Watch report, the Nigerian government established a Civilian Joint
Military Task Force (CJTF) to supplement the military. This civilian group has killed
Boko Haram suspects and civilians (The Home Guard, 2016). Human Rights Watch
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obtained civilian testimony that the CJTF has used excessive force, physical abuse,
extortion, theft from civilians, rendition (forced disappearance), performed extrajudicial
detentions and killings, and recruited child soldiers (US State Department, 2016).
CJTF members are the local civilians who can be viewed in the Amnesty
International video (2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=GA7SIbvEO64) assisting the
Nigerian military in extrajudicial killings. The victims are suspects and not combatants.
According to Amnesty International, the CJTF have little training and are poorly armed,
using machetes and locally sourced weapons. While this is a loosely organized militia,
the members appear to act as vigilantes.
The video purportedly documents extrajudicial killings of potential suspects. In
addition, military soldiers are seen ordering civilians, the CJTF, to kill civilians (Amnesty
International, 2014). The military personnel are identifiable as Nigerian military due to
the insignia on their battle dress. It is illegal in Nigerian for anyone but military soldiers
to wear camouflage (Criminal Code Act, Chapter 77, 110). One stated reason was the
ability to acquire camouflage uniforms for impersonation. If found, the clothing is
immediately confiscated, and the individual arrested (Criminal Code Act, Chapter 77,
110).
International law is clear on civilians fighting within their country. Civilians have
the right to bear arms to meet a foreign invader and protect their home and family.
However, The CJTF was established and sanctioned by the Nigerian government.
Therefore, the CJTF is a State-sanctioned institution and is subject to the Law of War,
international law, and International Humanitarian Law (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck,
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2005). According to the Economist, the CJTF membership approached 26,000, with 1800
members receiving a salary of $50.00 US a month (The Home Guard, 2016).
Luban (2004) noted that crimes committed against fellow nationals, whether
carried out by civilian or military personnel, are considered international crimes and
humanitarian crimes. The Nuremberg Charter Article 6(c) codified that international
law crimes committed by a nation-state against its residents represented an intrusion
into state sovereignty (Luban, 2004, p. 94; Nuremburg Charter, 1951).
However, Articles 7 and 8 of the Nuremberg Charter Article 6(c) deny nationstate sovereignty as the Articles abolish sovereign immunity and the superior orders
defense (Luban, 2004). The Nuremberg Articles override the claim of domestic
authority and immunity. Therefore, when a state participates in crimes against
humanity against its nationals, “criminality overrides state sovereignty, turning them
into international crimes” (Luban, 2004, p. 95). When a nation-state commits crimes
against humanity against fellow nationals, those actions represent a pure case under the
law; that is, those violations are also war crimes (Luban, 2004).
Finally, Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter identifies two archetypes in crimes
against humanity jurisprudence. The first type includes “crime of the murder type;”
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation (to a ghetto or slave camp), and other
inhumane acts” (Luban, 2004, p. 95). Subsequent statues added (en)forced disappearance,
sex crimes against women, torture, and “imprisonment in violation of fundamental rules
of international law” (Luban, 2004, p. 95).
Article 6(c) second type of crimes against humanity includes the “crimes of the
persecution type.” These are related to racial, religious, ethnic, or political persecution.
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They include deprivations in the right to citizenship, marrying freely, arrest and
confinement, beatings, mutilation, torture, slave labor, confiscation of property, and
denial to obtain an education, practice a profession, and teach (Luban, 2004).
Boko Haram can target a civilian population to extract taxes, forced
recruitment, kidnap slaves, hate for the apostate, or out of a distorted god condoned
radicalism representing political Islam. The Nigeria military may target the
population as the simplest way to eradicate the insurgency living among the people.
Therefore, counterinsurgents attempt to separate the people from the insurgency to
protect civilians and reduce the opportunity for crime against humanity.
Luban (2004) also wrote that no assertion could be made that small-scale,
government-inflicted abuses or atrocities remain the business of the nation-state, whether
the government attacks a small community or individual as a matter of deliberate policy,
or wanton individual dereliction of duty, each example carries the same weight.
According to Luban (2004), the main animating idea in identifying and outlawing crimes
against humanity, chiefly, is that humankind is interested in preventing and punishing the
grievous crimes governments inflict on nationals, whether large or small.
The research was devoid of any example or evidence that abuses against the
Nigerian population by the military (specifically in the fight against Boko Haram) were
motivated by hate, religious belief, tribal affiliation, or ethnic identification; however,
this cannot be ruled out as causation. More likely than not, in flailing about the bush to
fight Boko Haram, the Nigerian Army simply kills those they believe are associated with
the group.
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It appears abuses were carried out because the Nigerian military was and is
grasping at conventional war tactics in the fight against Boko Haram; however, this does
not relieve the Nigerian government of responsibility. If this is the fact, then the Nigerian
military is not absolved of any legal jurisdiction in that the Nigerian government is
responsible for potential crimes against humanity (Luban, 2004).
In the Nigerian conflict, the Joint Civilian Task Force is a representative of the
Nigerian government, and in fact, some in the task force receive pay from the
government. In this case, the JCTF is held to the same international standard as a
government representative and is a “politically organized group acting under color of
policy,” making the group liable to international law (Luban, 2004, p. 95).
However, what cannot be ruled out is the premise, as Luban offered, that a
culture’s moral baseline is inclusive of violence and blood feuds are an accepted societal
norm (Luban, 2004). Rorty (1993) noted that most people “live in a world in which it
would be just too risky--indeed, would often be insanely dangerous--to let one’s sense of
moral community stretch beyond one’s family, clan, or tribe” (p. 125). For such people,
the claim to the right of a moral baseline in violence eschews crimes against humanity.
However, it is the right and the international community's responsibility to set the
standards for crimes against humanity, and the claim of cultural norms is not excused
(Luban, 2004).
Boko Haram eschews any worldly law and convention. They follow their
interpretation of Islamic Law and the Qur’an. While Boko Haram excludes itself from
Western laws, the Nigerian military is held accountable to international law, including
international humanitarian law. It is incumbent in the civilian and military leadership to
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ensure the army follows the international community's laws and conventions pertaining
to war and conflict.
The Rules of War
Carl Von Clausewitz noted that war is an extension of diplomacy, the
imposition of one nation-state’s will upon another, and that war was simply a duel
but on an extensive scale (von Clausewitz, 1832). Like duels, there are rules to guide
war, including distinguishing between “civilians and combatants with attacks
directed only against combatants” (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005, p. 198).
Additionally, “Attacks must not be directed against civilians. Civilians are persons
who are not members of the armed forces. The civilian population comprises all
persons who are civilians” (p. 198).
Using civilians to commit acts of war, murder or torture, denial of quarter,
extrajudicial killing is illegal, immoral, unethical, and violates the international rules of
law governing combat (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005). Civilians are considered
unlawful combatants. The civilian militia must be trained by the armed forces and subject
to the same rules of engagement, the laws of war, and humanitarian laws as militaries,
including wearing a uniform, which signifies their combatant status. In addition, a militia
must wear signifying uniforms of service to denote their combatant status.
One of the most widely cited rules of war is the Geneva Conventions. First
adopted in 1864, the international community has accepted the conventions as a guide for
war. The First Geneva Convention, in 1864, sets rules on how to deal with sick and
injured combatants, including the creation of the Red Cross-Geneva (ICRC, n.d.a;
Abrams, 2001).
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The Second Convention adopted in 1949 included the “amelioration of the
condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked member of armed forces at sea” (ICRC,
n.d.b), and the Third Convention addressed the treatment of prisoners of war (ICRC,
n.d.c). The fourth convention addressed civilian safety during war (ICRC, n.d.d). The
first Geneva protocol, adopted in 1977, addressed the protections afforded victims of
armed international conflicts.(ICRC, n.d.e). Subsequently, Protocol II dealt with
protecting victims in non-international armed conflicts (ICRC, n.d.f).
Teaching combatants the international laws of war are required by the 1949
Geneva Conventions, and not doing so is a breach of international law (Detter, 2007).
Even if a state does not instruct soldiers on the laws, the soldier cannot use the ignorance
defense if charged with war or humanitarian crimes (Detter, 2007). A state’s
understanding of these rules must meet international conventions. In addition, a nationstate or non-state actor who was not a cosignatory to international charters or laws is not
relieved in the responsibility of lawful and humanitarian conduct on the battlefield
(Detter, 2007). Terrorists and insurgents are considered unlawful combatants under Ex
parte Quirin, which determined that unlawful combatants are subject to the same rules as
soldiers, including capture, detention, trial, and punishment by military tribunals (Detter,
2007).
In 2003, with the dawn of the “new war” on terrorism and insurgencies, the Red
Cross decided that civilians could fight for one’s country and that terrorists and unlawful
combatants be afforded the same rights as lawful combatants (Detter, 2007). However, in
2005, the Red Cross reversed its position, writing “that if civilians directly engage in
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hostilities, they are considered “unlawful” or “unprivileged” combatants or belligerents
(Detter, 2007).
As an example of implementing international law, the US military’s Law of War
Manual, FM27-10, was produced using the Geneva Conventions, The Hague
Conventions, ICRC, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and various additional sources
related to international law to address the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war
victims (Department of Defense, 2015).
All told, the Law of War manual uses 120 years of international history, research,
and settled law to establish parameters by which the US military operates in war. FM2710 is appropriate for this study as the US and the British military work closely in creating
military doctrine. The Nigerian army traces its roots to the British, including its military
doctrine. The British army advises the Nigerian military in training in the fight against
Boko Haram (Ministry of Defence, 2016).
The law of war is an international law and is explained by US doctrine from the
Department of Defense Law of War Manual (Department of Defense, 2015, Chapter 8).
All countries are expected to follow the Law of War. FM3-24 and other US army
doctrinal manuals expound on the law of war and are repeated in the British, German,
Australian, and French doctrinal manuals as excepted international law.
The Law of War denotes the reality in military law that as soon as a combatant
becomes severely wounded, surrenders, or is captured, they become hors de combat, and
no military purpose is gained in continuing the attack on that individual or unit
(Department of Defense, 2015). The Law of War states, “Thus, the principle of humanity
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forbids making enemy combatants who have been placed hors de combat the object of
attack” (Department of Defense, 2015, p. 59).
The Law of War states that there are generally two classes of individuals
contained within the enemy state, combatants and civilians. Therefore, it is imperative
that separation between civilians and combatants exist. Certain types of persons do not fit
into the civilian or combatant designation. These include spies, mercenaries, child
soldiers, and civilians who directly participate in combat (ICRC, 2011). However, a
civilian has every right to take up arms to fight an invading force, or if they must defend
their life, the lives of their family, or property from combatants.
The internationally accepted Rule of Distinction requires nation-states to
distinguish the armed forces from the civilian population. Distinction denoted the
protected class from the unprotected class on the battlefield. Using camouflage is
consistent with distinction because foliage is not a protected category and because
civilians generally do not wear camouflage (Department of Defense, 2015), which
explains the illegality of wearing camouflage in Nigeria (See Section 251 of the Nigerian
Criminal Code). The Rule of Distinction applies to the CJTF, who are specifically not
considered legal combatants and are not distinct in their appearance from the civilian
population.
The Law of War, the Geneva Conventions, and the International Red Cross do not
address the treatment of nationalized civilians by the home country. It is assumed that a
nation-state would do whatever possible to protect its citizens. According to the Geneva
Conventions, the Law of War states that nationals who are in the care of their state are
not protected persons. This idea yields to the rule of international law in that the Geneva
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Convention does not interfere in the conduct of the state with its nationals (Department of
Defense, 2015). However, international humanitarian law is not precluded, and it is here
the Responsibility to Protect intercedes in domestic affairs.
However, the Law of War addresses the civilian population of the enemy state.
The civilian population of an enemy state is a protected class. Specifically, the Fourth
Geneva Convention and Protocols I and II protect civilians from harm from an
intervening army (Department of Defense, 2015).
War is immoral and unethical. However, war is inevitable based on the human
condition and diplomatic failures within the international community. As such, the
international community attempts to guide nation-states through the moral and ethical
considerations in the waging of war. Jus ad bellum is used to establish a threshold of
gravity of offense sufficient to justify military force (Kretzmer, 2013). Jus in bello
establishes the conduct pursued in war by the warring factions, just as jus gentium (law of
nations) establishes the laws of society people accept throughout the international
community (Kretzmer, 2013).
The literature on morals and ethics in war is derived from international law and
International Humanitarian Law from which the Geneva Conventions were constructed.
Lawful and humane conduct in war is expected. However, these international laws are
based on Western law and sensibilities. The Muslim world also follows the rules of war
based on Sharia law, Usal al-fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence. Islam is primarily a political
system but contains and administers a legal code. The Islamic legal code is called Sharia
(Shariah), meaning “the way.” The source of the Sharia is the Qur’an and the Sunnah
(also found in the Al-sīra al-Nabawiyya [Sira] and the Hadith) (Warner, 2017).
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Since Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims disagree on which Hadith to use, they
have slightly different Sharia systems. As such, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
is represented at the UN, and Sharia is noted to be complementary to the UN Charter in
that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation “reaffirms the commitment of its member
(Islamic) states, to the UN Charter and fundamental Human Rights, the purposes and
principles of which provide the basis for fruitful cooperation among all people” (Ali &
Rehman, 2005, p. 343).
Non-state actors, like Boko Haram, ignore any Western-influenced law, including
the accepted laws, tenets, and conditions put forth by the Muslim faith and endorsed by
the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, taking from the Qur’an a narrative that suits
their 7th-century Salafist belief system (Khalil, 2017).
Figure 11
Majority Muslim Sharia states in Nigeria

Note. (Lewis, 2011)
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With new tactics and weapons developed since the late 1800s, ethics and morals
became ever more critical in warfare. The use of chemical and biological weapons is
denied by jus in bello. It violates the discrimination and proportionality clause and the
international ban on chemical weapons by the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention
(Orend, 2000). The Geneva Conventions guide jus in bello, which protects civilians and
calls for proportionality in war. The 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations sought to
outlaw war, but this proved to be impossible.
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, established in 2005 by the
international community at a world summit, sought to ensure the international community
prevented genocide and other gross forms of human rights abuse (ICRtoP, 2017).
Responsibility to protect requires nation-states to protect their citizens from mass
atrocities. If unable to do so, the international community should assist the nation-state in
fulfilling its obligation.
Responsibility to protect represents an “emerging norm” and a political
instrument (ICRtoP, 2017) pertaining to war. Though not international law, this has
replaced the international policies in UN resolution 50/172 in not interfering in the
domestic affairs of a sovereign nation (UN, 2005). Rwanda, Darfur, and Kosovo
brought to light that civilian populations cannot be left to genocide or mass killing
while the world turned its collective back (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007).
However, according to Gentile (2009b), Responsibility to Protect is
expeditionary, and like counterinsurgency, if military force is applied to protect
civilians, more often than not, the force ends up killing those it was designed to
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protect. As the Nigerian insurgency continues, these policies and emerging norms
should be enforced but are willfully ignored.
In viewing the Nigerian Army and their summary executions of suspected
Boko Haram members (2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v= GA7SIbv EO64). Sharia
may provide the battlefield remedy in cutting off heads post-battle or after capture.
However, the Nigerian Army is held to international law and the Geneva
Conventions, and as such, Sharia is not justifiable in guiding the army.
Just War Theory
Just War Theory is part of an all-encompassing international group of laws and
theories which guide the application and processes of war. Operating in their home
country does not relieve a military from auspices of Just War, the Law of War,
International Humanitarian Law, the Geneva Conventions, or Right 2 Protect (ICRC,
n.d.-h). Just War Theory or jus ad bellum dictates that a nation-state must provide a
legitimate reason for going to war. These rules focus on specific criteria for what makes a
war just. Article 51 of the UN Charter clarifies: “Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations” (UN, n.d.a., Article 51). The world community
has set the parameters for going to war.
The three most influential documents which guide the international community
include the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact, the 1945 London Pact, and the UN Charter.
Beyond inherent self-defense, the UN Charter requires nations to seek a diplomatic
solution and, if not possible, requires UN authorization to initiate force (UN, n.d.b).
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There exist six criteria under jus ad bellum, which determines a Just War. All six criteria
must be met to affirm a nations moral right to wage war (UN, n.d.b):
1. Just Cause: There must exist just cause to implement the last resort in
diplomacy. Protecting the innocent and re-establishing order are two just
cause factors.
2. Proportionate Cause: The cause must be proportional to the offense. A
nation-state cannot go to war because a nation burned its flag; however, if an
aggressor state steals land (Russia into the Crimea) by attacking the nationstates, a proportional response is required and allowed. The offender can be
removed from the territory, and this is when escalation usually occurs.
3. Right Intention: The nation-state, in seeking war, can address a wrong and
bring lasting peace to the area.
4. Right Authority: In the late 20th century, the UN has been the arbiter in
confirming a nation-state has the authority to launch a war. However,
sovereign nation-states generally hold that in self-defense, no authorization is
needed. There are cases in which the nation-state went on the offensive,
destroying men and equipment to deny future incursions. The 1990 Kuwait
war stands out as an example of right authority by removing the offending
nation-state from Kuwait and destroying the offending military’s ability to
fight.
5. Reasonable Prospect of Success: War is an unknown. The nation-state must
assume a specific relative position of victory to ensure a better situation
would exist after the war was won.
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6. Last Resort: Diplomacy is always the preferred method of settling
disputes. Violence can only ensue after all moral and legal efforts have been
exhausted (Lazar, 2016). Under jus in bello, three criteria exist for the
imposition of violence to achieve a political means. As follows:
1. Discrimination: The conduct by combatants must be ethical and moral. The
rights of civilians must be protected. Civilians must not be targeted in a
targeted attack. This line has blurred in counterinsurgent operations as the
insurgency is entangled with the civilian population, and belligerents use
civilians as human shields.
2. Proportionality: The principle of using no more force than is necessary is in
play. A nuclear nation could not use a tactical nuclear device to respond to an
infantry attack. The lives of all on the battlefield, even the enemy, must be
considered. However, proportionality is pragmatic.
3. Necessity: Collateral damage within the civilian population is permissible only if,
in pursuing an objective, the least harmful means feasible are chosen (Lazar,
2016). Necessity is guided by: “take all feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of attack to avoid, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. (ICRC
1977) Geneva Convention, Article 57, 2(a)(ii); Lazar, 2016).
Nigeria’s War: The Rules of War and International Humanitarian Law
Nigerian Army Action
International humanitarian agencies moved to build internal displaced persons
camps for those Nigerians attacked and those affected by Boko Haram. However, it was
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the Nigerian airforce who bombed an internal displaced persons camp. The Nigerian air
force later apologized for the error, but according to Murray (2017), this was not the first
time “errors” have occurred, suggesting the attack was deliberate. The camps have been
attacked repeatedly by the Nigerian military, and Murray (2017) noted the military gets
away with atrocities because the world is simply not interested.
Murray (2017) described an attack on a village elder and a group of villagers by
the Fulani in which army troops observed as 13 were killed. “When challenged after a
massacre, soldiers often claim that they didn’t receive any orders — or had been
commanded not to intervene” (para. 9). This may be more a state than a federal issue.
When performing security tasks in a state, the state’s civilian leadership guides the army.
However, the army's actions against Christian civilians mirror the actions against
civilians in the states dealing with Boko Haram (Murray, 2017). Murray (2017) suggested
that it was indeed a plan of the Nigerian federal government to remove Christians from
Northern lands (para. 13).
The Fulani, like Boko Haram, are a serious threat to Nigerian stability. In 2016,
Baroness Caroline Cox, a member of the British House of Lords and president of
Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust, traveled through the Jos Plateau State to address
humanitarian rights for the Christians (Daily Mail, 2016; Hart Publications, 2016). The
Fulani targeted Cox for assassination in an attempt that failed. In the attack, the Fulani
dressed in all black and yelled Allahu Akbar (God is Great), mirroring ISIS in their
ferocity and ruthlessness (Daily Mail online, 2016).
The Nigerian Army conducts Foreign Internal Defense operations across Africa to
assist the Economic Community of West African States, ECOMOG, and various UN
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missions such as UNIFIL, UNMIL, and UNIMID (Adeniyi, 2016). The Nigerian military
had acquitted themselves professionally in these missions (e.g., Firsing, 2014). However,
the Nigerian military is not held to the same level of professional operation and
responsibility on the home front fighting Boko Haram. Over the years, peacekeeping
demands have diluted the effectiveness of the Nigerian Army at home fighting Boko
Haram (Firsing, 2014).
In December 2011, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of
emergency that restricted or suspended constitutional guarantees for six months in 15
areas of four Northern states (Human Rights Watch, 2012). The state of emergency failed
to increase security, and Boko Haram continued attacking civilian targets (Human Rights
Watch, 2012). In 2012, the administration issued enhanced emergency powers to the
security forces. Boko Haram increased its activity and eventually carried out more attacks
than in 2010 and 2011 combined (Human Rights Watch, 2012).
Boko Haram suspects held in detention were not charged and therefore are not
accorded a speedy trial as directed by the Constitution. Nigeria would have the authority
to hold these suspects as combatant prisoners of war, but Nigeria had not officially
declared war on the insurgent group. In 2014, African leaders met in France to formulate
a plan to eradicate Boko Haram after the Chibok School kidnapping.
Cameroon’s President Paul Biya stated, “We are here to declare war on Boko
Haram.” At the same time, Idriss Deby of Chad said it would be “total war” (Africa
Leaders Declare ‘War’ on Nigeria Boko Haram, 2014). The declaration of war was
necessary as Boko Haram was not a nation-state but an insurgent entity and non-state
actor. However, Boko Haram could be construed as a nation-state under Political Islam.
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These public declarations can be construed as a binding declaration of war but only
indemnifies Cameroon and Chad (Department of Defense, 2015).
Military doctrine is designed to prevent civilian casualties through rules of
engagement. However, according to Human Rights Watch (2012) and Nigerian civil
activists, the CJTF's abusive actions against civilians enhance Boko Haram’s narrative of
fighting government brutality. Community members and leaders are subjected to abuses
that ultimately denies cooperation with security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2012).
This is another tenet of counterinsurgency that the populace can provide intelligence,
local knowledge, and material support to the intervening forces.
The Nigerian Network on Police Reform found that between 2008 and 2012, the
Nigerian security forces extrajudicially killed 7,198 people (Campbell, 2013). John
Campbell (2013), former US ambassador to Nigeria, wrote that the police are so hated in
the country, and that hatred motivates Boko Haram to murder police officers and security
forces at a high rate. This thinking represents a misunderstanding of Boko Haram; it is
not that the group hates the police, the police represent the state, the only authority in
Islam is Allah, so any entity of the secular nation-state is an affront to Allah and must be
eradicated (Mitchell, 2016).
The police are as much an enemy of Boko Haran as are the Christians and the
Muslim apostate. As a result, reports indicated that the Nigerian government responded to
Boko Haram with a disregard for international human rights law using torture,
incommunicado detention, rendition, arbitrarily arrests, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings (Amnesty International, 2016a).
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Although Boko Haram utilizes brutal methods against the civilian population, the
Nigerian military cannot respond in kind against Boko Haram suspects or the population.
Doing so nullifies the Nigerian constitution, the rule of law, international law, and the
government's moral authority. A 2016 report issued by the US State Department Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, noted that extrajudicial vigilante killings
represented a serious human rights violation (US State Department 2016). It was the
government of Nigeria, along with the military, who established and set into motion the
operational mandate for the CJTF (Amnesty International, 2016).
In May 2016, 737 suspected Boko Haram fighters or supporters were sent to the
prison in Maiduguri. They were charged for being “incorrigible vagabonds,” which
indicated that no real connection to Boko Haram had been established (Amnesty
International, 2016a). According to Amnesty International, women in the internal
displaced person's camps were exploited for sex by both the army and the CJTF for
money, food, or the ability to leave the camps (Amnesty International, 2016a).
Through collected eyewitness accounts, Amnesty International reported that
thousands of young men, women, and children were arrested as they returned to the
repatriated towns of Banki and Bama in the Borno state (Amnesty International, 2016a).
The arrests reportedly were based on profiling and not evidence. In the same vein,
thousands were arrested fleeing Boko Haram atrocities, and those arrestees were not
allowed contact with family members or lawyers (Amnesty International, 2016a).
At the GIWA military barracks detention center in Maiduguri, cells were filled
beyond capacity while disease, dehydration, and starvation claimed 240 lives, including
twenty-nine children and babies (Amnesty International, 2016b). In February 2016,
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soldiers opened fire on approximately 200 members of the Indigenous People of Biafra
who had gathered for a prayer meeting at the National High School in Ada, Abia State
killing seventeen and injuring scores (Amnesty International, 2016a).
In March 2014, after a Boko Haram attack on the GIWA military barracks
detention center, the military executed 640 detainees (Amnesty International, 2016a).
Further contained in the Amnesty International report are additional military and national
security forces’ reports of torture, extrajudicial killings, and unauthorized detentions. In
addition, humanitarian agencies accused the CJTF of recruiting children, primarily
teenagers, to fight Boko Haram (Okeowo, 2014).
The lesson for Nigeria from Mao Zedong is this; “It is only undisciplined troops
who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element,
cannot live” (Tse-tung, 1961, p. 93). Mao’s quote does not pertain to Boko Haram but to
the Nigerian military, who treats the population as their enemy. While the CJTF has
exercised brutal treatment against Boko Haram suspects, fighters, and civilians; the
sanctioned government, represented by elected and appointed officials, condone crimes
against humanity as it serves their purpose of confronting Boko Haram leading to the need to
evaluate both groups’ actions during the insurgency (Okeowo, 2014),
In 2013, Boko Haram attacked the town of Baga, Borno State, Nigeria. The
Nigerian military moved in to confront the terror group, and reports indicated the army
used a scorched earth policy on the town. The army simply walked through the town,
burning buildings as they attempted to flush out Boko Haram fighters (Nossiter, 2013).
In the end, the army had torched some 2000 mostly thatched roofed homes and
businesses, and 200 inhabitants were killed (Nossiter, 2013). The soldiers shot civilians
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as they ran out of the conflagration. Mohammed Muhammed, a 40-year-old taxi driver,
gave eyewitness testimony, “People running into the flames, I saw that. If they didn’t run
into the flames, the army would shoot them” (Nossiter, 2013, para. 12).
Isa Kukulala, an eyewitness, stated, “They (soldiers) poured petrol on the
properties. At the same time, they are shooting sporadically inside the fire. They took a
small child from his mother and threw him inside the fire. This is what I have witnessed”
(Nossiter, 2013, para. 13). Eyewitnesses to the atrocities include refugees, survivors,
relief workers, and observers from other towns. Kole Shettima, chairman of the Center
for Democracy and Development in Ajuba, the capital of Nigeria, stated, “People are
tired of the excuses the military is giving, and that’s why they are demanding an
investigation. This time it’s different. There is a crisis of legitimacy in the military”
(Nossiter, 2013, para. 7).
Kashim Shettima, governor of Borno State, upon reaching Baga, stated, “They’ve
(the army) not adhered to the rules of engagement when you burn down shops and
massacre civilians, you are pushing them to join the camp of Boko Haram” (Nossiter,
2013, para. 9). Baga represented a vindictive and retributive action against civilians for
reportedly assisting Boko Haram, although evidence was not produced to that effect. This
is precisely what counterinsurgent tactics and doctrine are designed to prevent. The army
attacked the town because one of their own had been killed by Boko Haram near the
village.
After the attack, the army responded. Brigadier-General Chris Olukolade, director
of defense information, “angrily rejected” the accounts of residents and others. Olukolade
stated, “The burning, the killing is done by Boko Haram, not by the soldiers. Anybody
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blaming the soldiers must be a sympathizer with Boko Haram.” He said that “Boko
Haram was using the houses to shoot out at soldiers” (Nossiter, 2013, para. 16).
Brigadier General Austin Edokpaye stated that the soldiers used restraint and
“soldiers were ambushed by the insurgents and that a soldier was killed, and the terrorists
were shielded by the community members” (Channels Television, 2013, para. 5). The
army denied torching the village, blaming the action on Boko Haram. General
Olukolade’s assertion that if the population accuses soldiers of abuse or committing
atrocities, then “they are Boko Haram sympathizers” denies the truth and prevents the
military from accepting responsibility, looking inward to assess doctrine address serious
operational issues. It is this attitude that denies appropriate and forward-thinking
leadership.
Finally, Alhadji Adamo, a retailer in the Baga market, recounted, “I saw them
(soldiers) putting fire on people’s houses. They are the security of the state. They have no
right to kill anybody. They are supposed to protect the people” (Nossiter, 2013, para. 22).
The Nigerian Army believes that if civilians run when the army approaches, then the
civilians must be Boko Haram. This is not the reality on the ground; civilians run because
they fear the soldiers. This fact was reported in 2015 through the media and eyewitness
accounts (Nossiter, 2013; Wojtanik, 2015).
The Nigerian Army has boasted of successful operations and announced three
times that the army had defeated Boko Haram (Kazeem, 2017; Mora, 2017). Army public
relations officers apply positive rhetoric to their messaging. In September 2017, the army
announced they had defeated the insurgent group in Operation Lafiya Dole (Maina,

111

2017). This operation proved to be more difficult than thought, and Boko Haram
remained active.
Nwachukwu noted that this operation came on the heels of Operation Rescue
Finale, which routed the insurgents out of its tactical headquarters at Camp Zeiro in the
Sambisa forest and out of its spiritual headquarters in Alargarno (Maina, 2017).
Nwachukwu also noted that it “is very crucial to set the record straight by making it
crystal clear that contrary to opinions, the Boko Haram terrorist group does not hold or
control any local government area in Borno state or the northeast as claimed in the
interview” (Maina, 2017, para. 4).
However, in October 2017, the UN reported that Boko Haram still held three local
government enclaves (Goodwin, 2017). Eventually, international organizations turn a
deaf ear to overheated rhetoric and false information provided by the host government,
introducing a level of skepticism and distrust in official government positions. The
population, conditioned to hear and not believe government rhetoric, turns a blind eye to
events.
The Nigerian military conducts massive sweep operations to stop Boko Haram
and to gather intelligence. However, as noted in this literature review, prisoners are
treated poorly, abused, the sick are left to suffer and die, with no substantive intelligence
gathered. Women and children are taken without deference to due process. It had been
reported that between 2011 and 2015, 7000 men and boys had died at GIWA prison
(Human Rights Watch, 2016b). In June 2013, 1400 bodies were sent from the jail to the
mortuary, with an untold amount simply buried by the military (Human Rights Watch,
2016b). A full accounting of the Nigerian prison system and its conditions can be found
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in the British Home Office report, “Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Prison
conditions” (Home Office, 2016).
The outcome of a Nigerian military sweep operation led to civilian imprisonment
at the GIWA military barracks prison in which “cells were filled beyond capacity while
disease, dehydration, and starvation” claimed 240 lives, including 29 children and babies
(Amnesty International, 2016, pp. 10-15). David Rieff (1992), from an observation in the
Bosnian-Serbian war, noted, “To the Serbs, the Muslims are no longer human, Muslim
prisoners, lying on the ground awaiting interrogation were driven over by a Serb guard in
a small delivery van” (p. 94). This is the threat of dehumanization, and Africa is long a
witness to dehumanization (Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Central African Republic, and
Darfur).
Abuses and atrocities also plague the population un-involved in the Boko Haram
fight, indicating a systemic problem in military training, discipline, and the imposition of
moral and ethical clarity in conducting operations. In 2016, in Zaria, Kaduna state, the
military attempted to pass a convoy through protestors linked with the Islamic Movement
in Nigeria, a Shi’ite minority group (Amnesty International, 2016).
Some of the protestors carried machetes, knives, and batons. After failing to
negotiate an opening in the road, the army opened fire on the civilians killing seven.
Later, the military returned to Zaria, hunted down the Shia, and executed 347 people. The
State government then confessed to secretly burying the bodies in a mass grave (Amnesty
International, 2016). In 2019, reports between 2015 and 2017 indicated the Nigerian
military “killed hundreds of mostly Christian ethnic Igbo civilians advocating for selfdetermination” The army’s response stated that they had killed “terrorists” during
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“Operation Python Dance” (Smith, 2019, para. 11). However, it is difficult to justify the
killing of women and children as “terrorists.”
With the onslaught of ISWA attacks, the military has demonstrated poor
performance. In December 2018, ISWA seized the entire town of Baga, a hotly contested
town in northeastern Nigeria. It took the multi-national force from Nigeria, Chad, Niger,
and Cameroon to remove the terrorists. 100 soldiers were killed out-right when ISWA
stormed a military base. In addition, the group captured a large cache of weapons and
ammunition.
ISWA attacked an army base causing the soldiers to flee, and when the soldiers
returned to recover the bodies, they were hit again, sustaining a high casualty count. In
these cases, it may be leadership that is the problem. Military doctrine indicates that a
force should not return to a battle scene without using counteroffensive tactics or
prepared to meet an ambush. According to Carsten (2019), army bases and towns by the
dozens have sustained attacks since mid-2018. A recurring theme in many of the attacks
is soldiers fleeing the base for ISWA to ransack and loot.
Because of the increased operational tempo by ISWA, the Nigerian Army has
moved into “super camps” for better protection; noted to be a Vietnam area strategy and
considered a failure in counterinsurgency doctrine; soldiers should be out among the
population, engaging, cultivating (friendship and trust), and protecting. As a result of this
change, ISWA attacked the towns Gubio and Magumeri, took control, and burned
government buildings, killing those identified as government workers. Babagana Zulum,
Borno state governor, stated that it would “create a vacuum the insurgents could exploit
with the army leaving” (Campbell, 2019, para. 1).
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Unprotected towns are raided, insurgents manage roadblocks, and have more
unrestrained movement across the bush. The army is ambushed at will by ISWA, and
soldiers have vacated a large swath of northeastern Nigeria, leaving key roads open to
attack. Humanitarian workers have pulled out, leaving a disaster for humanitarian aid; in
addition, the army removed humanitarian NGOs from many areas to intimidate the
organizations (Dewast, 2021). The military has forsaken 223,000 people in the area. In
June 2019, 30 civilians were killed by the Shekau faction in a suicide bombing at
Konduga village in the Borno State. However, it is Boko Haram-ISWA who has
determined operational tempo and had taken momentum.
In December 2018, Lieutenant-General Tukur Buratai announced (again) that
Boko Haram had been defeated and was nothing more than a band of criminals. This
narrative, like those pronouncements before, had no foundation. This even though Boko
Haram insurgents had a few weeks earlier overrun the 157 Task Force Battalion in
Metele, killing 53 soldiers and removing caches of weapons and four tanks (BBC News,
2018a).
Nigerian soldiers are under immense stress, and morale is low (Admin, 2020).
This has led to continued population abuse. Children are victims of army brutality.
According to the UN, between January 2013 and March 2019, Nigerian armed forces
detained over 3,600 children, including 1,617 girls, for suspected involvement with nonstate armed groups. Children described beatings, overwhelming heat, frequent hunger,
and being packed tightly in their cells with hundreds of other detainees “like razor blades
in a pack,” as one former detainee said (Human Rights Watch, 2019, para.10).
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Prior to launching an attack on Jakana and Mailok in January 2019, ISWA
informed the inhabitants to flee the coming fighting (The Defence Post, 2019). The
Nigerian Army does not inform civilians of coming or current conflicts and allows
civilians to stay in harm’s way. According to army sources, this is done to prevent tipping
off Boko Haram. A July 2018 attack on the base at Jilli was devastating. The base held
734 soldiers and was overrun. The base commander and 63 soldiers made it out to a
nearby town, leaving hundreds missing, captured, or dead (Postings, 2019).
ISWA has understood how the Nigerian Army operates. Military bases and camps
are open to attack, and many times the attacks cause troops to flee. The group’s activity
also corresponds to seasonal changes. The insurgent operational tempo increases from
June to September, when the rainy season is active. This prevents the army from
navigating washed-out roads (The Economist, 2020).
Media from over the world have reported on the problems in Nigeria. Multiple
reports are documenting ISWA attacks against the military. The Nigerian Army expects
Nigerian news outlets to report events positively, favoring the army. On January 7, 2019,
the army raided The Daily Trust, a Nigerian newspaper, and arrested two reporters. The
army banned UNICEF and accused them of training “spies” for Boko Haram. In addition,
in 2018, the Nigerian military attempted to ban Amnesty International for reporting that
“3,641 people had died in clashes between farmers and herders in Nigeria since 2016.”
The army called the report “fictitious” (“Nigerian Military Calls for Amnesty
International Ban,” 2018).
According to Postings (2019), “Nigerian forces are overstretched and lack
initiative, often face multiple attacks on bases; inflicting casualties, causing damage, and
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sapping morale, with each time increasing the risks defenders will not be able to stave off
the next assault (para. 39). Nigerian Army failure and civilian abuse continue to this day.
The US opened arms sales to the country despite Nigeria’s human rights record. President
Trump continued the $363-million-dollar sale of the Super Tucano A-29 and provided an
additional $600-million-dollars for defense. Delivery of the Super Tucano should have
occurred in 2019; however, delivery has been pushed back to 2021-22 (Onuah, 2017;
Sirota, 2019).
In September 2019, reports indicated that Boko Haram, more likely ISWA, had
obtained sophisticated drones armed better than the Nigerian Army after continuous raids
on brigade bases (Searcey, 2019). Boko Haram does not simply appear walking out of the
bush but travel in trucks fitted with heavy machine guns and RPGs to attack government
troops.
The army is under material stress; arms are scarce, as is ammunition. Armor and
tanks have fallen into disrepair, and soldiers must scavenge for food, water, housing,
even a bed to sleep on; and many units have not received their pay for months at a time
(Postings, 2019). Army infrastructure does not exist, and logistics consists of whatever
the field soldier can cobble together. In 2021, the conditions for the army and soldiers
had not changed. While the army is entrenched in their super camps (a Vietnam-era
tactic) and large towns, Boko Haram owns the countryside. ISWA also controls four out
of ten zones adjacent to Lake Chad (Searcey, 2019).
Counterinsurgency is expensive, and justifying the expense to a nation requires
understanding and support from the governed. It is the people who justify the government
and provide legitimacy; therefore, an insurgency cannot offer a better or viable means to
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govern. Notably, the population provides a crucial avenue to gather intelligence about
Boko Haram and other internal forces threatening Nigeria. If the population fears the
military and refuses to engage, civilian assistance, including intelligence, field support,
and comfort, is forfeit.
Internal issues tend to focus on the extreme variances in social structure, with an
increasing number of writings in the literature devoted to the Boko Haram issue (The
Conversation, 2018). Tribalism maintains a firm hold on social and political structures.
However, Boko Haram does not represent all Muslims; however, it represents Islam to
many. Boko Haram (Shekau faction) kills Muslims at will unless they support the terror
group. Therefore, it is still possible for the government and the Army to cultivate trust,
camaraderie, and the soulful (within the people) purpose of bringing peace to Nigeria.
Nigeria’s Use of Vigilantes
The use of a vigilante force to augment a nation-state’s military is unethical,
immoral, and violates international law; however, one can understand the frustration of
the Nigerian people and the raids against them by Boko Haram. According to Okeowo
(2014), Shettima, the Borno State governor, stated the CJTF was doing commendable work
identifying and arresting Boko Haram members and that any abuses committed were
most likely “the fault of the military on joint exercises” (para 31).
Shettima described the CJTF as “almost a divine intervention” but stated that one
could not rule out “some infractions from some overzealous members” (Okeowo, 2014,
para. 31). In 2013, Kalli, who leads an 8,000-member CJTF militia unit, turned his 18-yearold nephew over to security forces and watched the military execute him. According to
Kalli, “I saw him with AK-47s, so that proves he’s a Boko Haram member” (Okeowo,
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2014, para. 33). However, the CJTF does provide military intelligence. Kalli recalled,
“You know, I’m tired of this thing,” he said. “We gave the security forces everything--information about the camps, where they are, and they’re not doing anything” (Okeowo,
2014, para. 41).
Vigilantism is a deviation from socially acceptable ethics and the law, but as
Luban (2004) asked, “how can we be certain which situationally induced moral beliefs
represent the baseline, and which represent the deviations? Why not suppose that
murderous attacks on supposed blood enemies of one’s ethnic, racial, or religious group,
encouraged by community leaders and moral authorities, do represent some people’s
moral baseline” (pp. 137-138)?
In 2017, the UN Development Programme developed an agreement with the
Nigerian government to train CJTF members and former Boko Haram members on
reintegration into society. According to the UNDP (2019), “training was conducted to
provide a basic level of civic understanding and build capacity in critical skills that will
allow members of CJTF and vigilante groups to improve their civil and social
engagements and to function better in civilian life” (para. 2). However, this program was
accomplished in the Plateau State, where Boko Haram activity has ceased, and not in any
area with activity still progressing.
Social Change
Social change is a change in the social structure or the order of a society. Social
change may include changing social behaviors, social institutions, symbology, behavioral
rules, value systems, or the social environment (Barkin, 2016). Social change is not
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stagnant but evolutionary. The Nigerian military, as are all militaries, is a social
institution.
The military of a democratic nation-state should mirror the society it emanates in
that society guides the culture and behavior of its army (Rosen, 1995). If society is not
unified towards a goal and dysfunctional, the military will follow suit. However, the
Nigerian army could lead social change in Nigeria by adopting counterinsurgency
concepts grounded in protecting the population. Chapter 2 demonstrated the need for
social change in Nigeria in both society and the army.
For example, in 2006, the US military, under the guidance of General David
Petraeus, initiated a complete realignment of how the US Army and Marine Corps
prosecuted the war. Counterinsurgency is grounded in social theories, and the US military
realized the need to change to effect social change. A shift occurred from conventional
warfare tactics to counterinsurgency tactics on a theater-wide basis. It was not an
overnight phenomenon as education and training needed to permeate the senior officer
corps down to the platoon level private. In addition, intelligence gathering, logistics, and
planning were required to shift to the new counterinsurgency paradigm.
Strategy and operational tactics changed the military structure, changing the
thinking and application of war execution and social dynamics. The US military evolved
in Iraq and Afghanistan to meet the challenges brought by insurgency and terrorist
warfare. Those actions implemented by David Petraeus implemented social change for
Iraq. Civilians were protected and gradually turned to the coalition’s side while
supporting the Iraqi government.
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Vilfredo Pareto observed that social change occurs when the elites of society
become decadent, and a new elitist replaces them (Smith, 2003a). In Washington, David
Petraeus and General Jack Keane convinced the army command structure, the president,
and the Pentagon (the elites) that counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine could end
dysfunctional and failed war efforts by replacing conventional doctrine to win the peace.
Petraeus convinced the “elites” in Iraq, the tribal elders, city mayors, councils,
Imams, and neighborhood leaders to trust the US army through change of deed.
Therefore, the example (or experiment) had been set to influence future wars. Nigeria
may require an elite, someone with the perseverance to change how the army operates
and implement reform.
Marshall McLuhan (1994) wrote, “We live mythically and integrally, but we
continue to think in the old, fragmented space and time patterns of the pre-electric age”
(p. 2). Societies are a living, breathing, complex system(s) struggling to maintain
homeostasis, evolving through a web of complexity, lacking any single influencing driver
to induce change. Evolution moves in chaos and includes transformation, bursts of
growth, collapse, randomness, disruption, and novelty (Xu, Yang, & Li, 2013).
Kotter’s eight-step model explains transformational change. It is a well-defined
well-delimited effort in which a leader establishes a new end state goal and moves the
organization to that end goal (Webster, n.d.; Kotter, 1996). Kotter’s model requires the
ability to create a sense of urgency to identify resistance and treat it as obstacles to be
overcome or suppressed (Webster, n.d.; Kotter, 2008). A single Nigerian soldier
recognized the need for change in advocating for a “Quick Reaction Force (QRF) or
constant patrols,” and that leadership placed soldiers at a post to remain stagnant
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(Akinola, 2017, Postings, 2019). The soldier stated, “that’s why Boko Haram insurgents
have space to move around” (a Maoist philosophy) (Akinola, 2017). The understanding
of this reality is a component of asymmetric warfare and has proved a successful tenet of
US Army doctrine noted in FM3-24.
In the case of Nigeria, military change may lead to social change in that Boko
Haram must be addressed in counterinsurgency terms. However, the army is a product of
society, so to change society is to change the army. US counterinsurgency doctrine was
developed for the US military and, as such, is not a remedy for a force structure
represented by the Nigerian Army. US military doctrine reflects how an interdicting
military force successfully approached an insurgency in a host country.
However, FM3-24 is easily transferrable to a country fighting an in-house
insurgency; one needs only an intelligent understanding of how to do so. There are best
practices and tactics in counterinsurgency that should be adopted by a force
representative of the Nigerian Army. The watchword in counterinsurgency is adaptation,
and Nigeria must adapt. In doing so, the Nigerian military can follow the success realized
by the US military in Iraq when changes were made to doctrine. Ultimately, social
change is afforded when the Nigerian population is no longer treated as the enemy but as
an asset to be protected.
Summary
Chapter 2 provided an exhaustive study of the literature; the realities of Nigeria,
the military, and the social and cultural structure so crucial in understanding the African
country. Nigerian society and army “society,” its actions and operations, were studied to
assess whether they may be tied to one truth, that a dysfunctional, corrupt society may
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indeed beget a dysfunctional, corrupt military. Chapter 2 also presented a history of
conflict within the country and the failures and abuses wrought upon the population by
the army (citations over ten years and breaking with APA convention). This was done to
demonstrate a pattern of military abuse, dysfunction, and failure.
The Nigerian military may attempt to operate under rules of engagement that
follow the Nigerian Constitution. However, as demonstrated, the activities of the
Nigerian Army fail in this endeavor. The Nigerian Army is guilty of humanitarian crimes
in the treatment of the indigenous. A discussion of the Law of War, Just War Theory, and
International Humanitarian Law advanced the moral and ethical understanding of how a
well-educated, trained, disciplined, and competently led army operates.
To fully understand the epistemological reality of Nigeria, it was necessary to
study the complexities of war, the social constructs that drive men to act and understand
the legalities of violent action. Military norms, culture, and leadership thinking on the
battlefield were discussed to identify the processes for thinking under stress and identify
normal and abnormal functioning by soldiers under pressure. I addressed the recent 10year Nigerian history to demonstrate a pattern of army action.
To understand Boko Haram and ISWA, the chapter discussed the foundations of
Islam to understand their culture, ethnic and religious belief system, and socio-economicpolitical factors which drive the insurgency. The US military experienced a moral and
ethical drift in Iraq until the military changed its thinking and tactics to
counterinsurgency, viewing the population not as the “playing field” of war but as
partners who should be engaged and not confronted as the enemy.
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The literature presents accepted rules of law governing war which Nigeria
follows. Nigeria is a cosignatory of the Geneva Conventions I-IV and Protocol I and II.
Protocol II addresses the population and victims of an internal conflict. Therefore, the
military understands its obligations on the battlefield towards civilians, combatants, and
non-combatants. Morals and ethics have a place on the battlefield and are enforced
through the Law of War, Just War Theory, International Humanitarian Law, and the
Geneva Conventions. Because Nigeria is fighting an in-house insurgency, it does not give
the army leeway or relieve them of their obligation through international law to treat the
population as required according to the Nigerian constitution.
This study would add to the literature by addressing how a nation fights an inhouse insurgency. It would also add to how a military is affected by the society from
which it emerged. Many articles have addressed Nigeria and Boko Haram; however, a
study does not address why the army acts against the Nigerian people and fails on the
battlefield. This study can act as a leap forward in understanding post-colonial African
nations heavily imbued with tribalism and how it can affect military performance.
Chapter 3 explains the scientific protocol for the research. In Chapter 3, I address
the research design for the study. The central phenomenon and research tradition are
reviewed, as is the role of the researcher in conducting the study. I also discuss how I
plan to manage ethical concerns and bias from the researcher’s role and the research
study participants. I explain the population used for the study and the procedures by
which the participants would participate. In addition, protection and security for the
participants and measures are described. I explain data management and storage,
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emphasizing safety, confidentiality, and security. Finally, how I plan to data-mine and
analyze the information is addressed to produce the outcomes for this study.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore whether social and cultural
dysfunction might affect military performance denying success on the battlefield and
abusing the Nigerian civilian population. In addition, this study hoped to identify the
endemic obstructing agents which negate full and unfettered support for the Nigerian
national government from the Nigerian population in the fight against Boko Haram. The
Nigerian military has not defeated Boko Haram, but their use of conventional tactics has
exposed the Nigerian population to institutional abuse, atrocities, and death.
Specifically, and to the previous paragraph, this study sought to understand if and
how civilian society and culture affect military performance. In that vein, this study also
sought to determine if the Nigerian military could defeat Boko Haram through a doctrinal
shift to counterinsurgency warfare. In adopting a population-centric counterinsurgency
doctrine, the army would reconsider its interaction with the population and change from a
confrontational relationship to population engagement.
This change would foster goodwill and cooperation, increase intelligence
gathering capabilities, encourage civilian support in the field through tangible
contributions, and unite Nigeria through fostering dialogue, thus assisting in vanquishing
disunity, tribalism, and religious conflict. In addition, there is evidence that adopting a
population-focused counterinsurgency doctrine reduces abuses, atrocities, and deaths
among the population.
Prior research on counterinsurgency has focused on formulating and
implementing US Army Field Manual FM3-24 Insurgencies and Countering
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Insurgencies (Cancian, 2017). In addition, NATO countries also undertook academic
endeavors to addressing counterinsurgency. Research has been conducted on historical
insurgencies to ascertain best practices and formulate current counterinsurgency
practices, including the shape-clear-hold-build strategy (FM3-24, 2014). In this
qualitative study, I sought to understand Nigeria and its deviant machinations, which
affect the Nigerian military, its fight against Boko Haram, and those actions which harm
and denigrate the population.
Chapter 3 addresses critical foundations embedded in the study, such as how the
qualitative grounded approach affected the study design, the purpose of the study, the
central phenomenon, and the efficacy of performing qualitative interviews within a
specifically identified population to gather data for analysis and interpretation to offer an
outcome to the research questions. The chapter describes the participating subjects,
sample descriptions, sample size, and recruitment methods to provide a thorough
understanding of the participants in the research.
This chapter also detailed the data analysis plan, trustworthiness and provided indepth information on the participants and any ethical considerations regarding the safety
of interviewees. All interviewees volunteered for this study, and considerations were
made through the informed consent to ensure participants knew that foreign terror entities
could have far-reaching assets and safety was a primary concern. However, those subjects
interviewed understood the risks involved, and confidentiality was a crucial concern.
Research Design and Rationale
The research questions were simple. They were designed to affect the interview
questions that dealt with the social and cultural relationships and associations between the
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civilian population and military performance. US military action in Iraq has been heavily
studied both before the surge and after. The US exhibited the same operational troubles in
Iraq that have occurred in Nigeria. If the military abuses its power by following a failing
doctrine, innocents are harmed and die. More importantly, is the possibility that the
Nigerian Army is indeed a reflection of the absolute dysfunction in Nigerian society.
Therefore, the research questions reflect those realities and include:
RQ1: How and to what extent does a nation’s military reflect or mirror the society
from which the military was derived?
RQ2: How and to what extent can marked societal dysfunction affect or inhibit
military performance in Nigeria?
Rationale
The rationale for this study and the methodology used lay in performing deep
research of Nigeria to determine the dysfunction and the possible societal relation to
military performance. To do this, I used a grounded constructivist approach to tell a
detailed and complete narrative. A grounded constructivist places a priority on a studied
phenomenon instead of the methods used to study it (Charmaz & Bryant, 2010).
Grounded theory has demonstrated that it is appropriate for studying “people's
understandings of the world and how these are related to their social context” (Charmaz
2001). For example, and used in this study, how does societal behavior affect the military
performance of an army? The methodology used provided a pathway to discover answers
as to the problems found in Nigeria. Therefore, focused interviews were done to
accumulate deep, detailed, and meaningful data.
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It was incumbent on me to choose the most appropriate research design to address
the identified problem. The literature review identified a sampling of issues within the
country. Still, the problem in this study lay in the Nigerian Army’s conflict with Boko
Haram and its interaction with the population, both of which have been potential failures
because of military doctrine; or the combined culture of doctrine, leadership, discipline,
and training within the military. The core issue could be that the same dysfunction found
in society transfers to the military, denying appropriate performance.
I established the research design to question whether society and its culture
influenced the military. Interviewing US military professionals produced direction in
understanding if and how much a nation’s military is affected by society. If the entirety of
the Nigerian Army continues to follow a conventional doctrine and if the army culture
army is mired in conventional thinking, Boko Haram will continue to exist in one form or
another. Therefore, I chose the qualitative method with a constructivist view to search for
causation and effects.
The interviewees selected for this study offer the best hope of obtaining
information to answer the research questions. The questions are noted in the appendices
and were constructed to provide an open-ended platform that could allow for questionanswer and follow-up, depending on the interviewee's answers.
Central Phenomenon
Galbin (2014) explained social interactions were found in external relationships as
external forces influence and shaped an individual’s view of the world or phenomenon.
Patton (2015) described social constructionist concepts concerning social structures,
which are understood through individual and collective perceptions. The Nigerian Army
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is a single unit shaped by internal constructs and societal realities when answering the
issues may lay in external concepts and truths. There are no individuals in an army, and
as such, the unit acts as one individual attempting to carry out doctrine and complete a
task. It is army culture, philosophy, and training that shapes the individual to act as one
with others as an army unit (US Army. Regulation 600-100, 2017).
Thus, the central phenomenon in this study is how the “individual” (Nigerian
Army) was affected by society, and in turn, the political structure, which is a societal
entity. To follow successful counterinsurgency doctrine, the army must act as one in
doing so. Therefore, the institution is responsible for its success or failure. If the Nigerian
Army adopts counterinsurgency changes in operations, it must also do so in every part of
the army, from logistics to intelligence. It may be possible to effect social change by
protecting the population and defeating the insurgency.
Research Tradition
Joint operating doctrine describes irregular warfare as “A violent struggle among
state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations”
(Department of Defense, 2017). Research on counterinsurgency had come from the
insurgency historiographies through studying David Galula, Mao Tse-tung, Che Guevara,
Castro, and foreign counterinsurgency operations in Algeria, Malaya, Vietnam, and
Thailand, forming the basis for FM3-24.
Gumz (2009) stated that authors on counterinsurgency have focused on what he
called the ‘modern era’ of insurgency, which is a largely extra-European narrative that
begins with 1945 and involved the colonial empire and third world national liberation
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movements. Irregular warfare has existed since the war has existed. Robert Rogers and
Francis Marion practiced irregular warfare long before army doctrine existed.
Insights had been gleaned by using O’Neill’s Insurgency and Terrorism and
Hammes’ The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21stCentury. Kilcullen’s numerous
articles and books on counterinsurgency provide a modern look at global insurgencies.
Nagl wrote a ground-breaking dissertation later turned book titled Learning to Eat Soup
with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Much has been
learned from the US-NATO effort in Afghanistan and Iraq.
A vital contribution to irregular warfare was the Philippine counterinsurgent effort
from 1899 through 1913 when General John Pershing implemented population-centric
tactics and turned away from violent tactics and strategies. Despite the recent and vast
studies of irregular warfare, the focus has centered on a country that interdicts into
another country to defeat an insurgency.
In Algeria, it was the French who fought against decolonization. Vietnam
involved the French and eventually the US in practicing insurgent warfare against the
Communists. Vietnam served as the example of the US Army's halfhearted attempt to
accept the reality of an unconventional conflict and was not discussed until the US had to
develop counterinsurgency doctrine in the early 2000s. Malaya found the British fighting
the Communists and represents the only example of victory for the interdicting force. As
such, Malaya has been heavily studied by the US and other countries. However, the
Malaya insurgency campaign contained certain specificities and realities which allowed
colonial victory.
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Gumz (2009) noted that “virtually all who write on COIN view the historical
narrative through the lens of a rigid constructural dichotomy between irregular war and
the conventional. In publishing counterinsurgency doctrine, the US military has made the
unconventional conventional. War is made and remade by those entities who participate.
In addition, it is the technology, environment, and social realities which dictate how war
is fought, the idea that conventionality may be left to history represents short-sighted
thinking. New is the conventional turning to the unconventional and irregular, never
accepting defeat. Iraq and Afghanistan brought this idea to the forefront.
Although a quantified method, the history of measurement theory was used to
construct the latest FM3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. Engelhard (1991)
noted that the central task in the history of measurement theory is to examine progress.
By looking back, the US military has projected itself and its doctrine forward. While a
quantitative concept, the progress witnessed through the historical significance of a
revamped FM3-24 cannot be understated with its application in Iraq. Historical records
were analyzed, and the best practices used in each insurgent conflict were coopted and
made relevant to the 21st century.
Current counterinsurgency thinking can be applied to Nigeria; however, the
insurgency represents a unique problem in a unique environment. Any counterinsurgency
doctrine must come from the viewpoint of a flawed national military fighting a less than
capable in-house insurgency. However, each insurgency is an independent construct of
war. No two are alike. To compare Iraq or Afghanistan to Nigeria is a non-sequitur.
While counterinsurgency is decidedly a population-focused model and the Nigerian

132
population and the dysfunction found therein denies the military complex the functional
ability to address Boko Haram.
Role of the Researcher
Initially, I requested permission from Walden University to conduct a research
study. I received approval, and I proceeded to begin the study by writing the proposal. I
was the researcher for this study and, therefore, the instrument of record. I collected all
the data and was the sole instrument of data collection. According to Xu and Storr
(2012), in a qualitative research study, “the researcher as an instrument is an accepted
and acceptable stance” (p. 3). Pannucci and Wilkins (2011) stated that the instrument
decided how the interview questions were structured. I was the instrument that
determined how the information was collected and recorded. I needed to ask neutral
interview questions that did not reflect bias to achieve a particular answer or support an
agenda. My role as the researcher for this study included following the policies and
research procedures of Walden University and accepted research practices advocated by
the APA and HIPAA. The interviews were conducted in a professional and timely
manner.
Reflexivity
Patton (1990) noted that reflexivity referred to disclosing personal information
about the researcher to enhance transparency and increase study credibility. Therefore, in
the interview process, I revealed my relationship with the study and the central topics. I
had no vested interest in Nigeria or the US Military. I did not have a professional
connection with any of the interviewees. At the time of this study, I did not work within
the U.S. government or the U.S. military.
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Sampling
Population
For this study, I chose to enlist military experts in the US. The US military
maintains a cottage industry of scholars and experts used to examine doctrine,
procedures, culture, leadership, and a host of other facets within the military-industrial
complex. I utilized professional command officers and PhDs who study war to act as
interviewees for this study. It is impossible for any command officer or academic could
understand every culture, including Nigeria. However, two participants did serve in
Nigeria and had first-person experience with Nigerian army command and army units.
Armies over the globe act, train, and function in a professional manner affecting
leadership, discipline, training, the understanding of ethics and moral responsibility in
battle, and all must answer to the Geneva Conventions, The Law of War, the U.N.’s R2P,
and the Rules of War. The Nigerian army follows the traditions of the British army, the
former colonial force that held power over Nigeria.
The US set the standard for counterinsurgency operations in the publication of
FM3-24, adopted by NATO countries as the published doctrine intermeshed with their
military doctrine. FM3-24 provides a best-practices guide to counterinsurgency and is
continuously reviewed, commented on, and if new information or case studies are
discovered that affect doctrine, revised.
The participants carried either doctoral degrees in their field of expertise or had
decades of military training, education, and experience. The initial interviewees
represented purposeful sampling as I identified those military officers with strategic
leadership education and experience. I did not seek tactical, operational, or strategic
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expertise. But expertise on military culture, performance, social constructs, and
leadership.
As for sampling size, Ritchie et al. (2013) suggested that within a qualitative
research study, the sample size is usually primarily small due to the phenomena that need
only to appear once to be part of the analytical map. The point of diminishing returns can
occur rapidly depending on the type and how complex the issue is.
Diciccio‐Bloom and Crabtree (2006) referred to the process of diminishing
returns as the event horizon of data saturation and signals that data collection was at or
nearing completion. Guest et al. (2006) viewed data saturation as occurring within the
first twelve interviews, and after that number, significantly few new phenomena were
likely to emerge. Gonzalez (2009) noted that sample size is generally driven by the desire
or need to reveal the main variants of the phenomenological approach. Gonzalez (2009)
suggested that small survey samples of less than twenty are considered typical.
Creswell and Creswell (2018) offered that sample size within the qualitative
method lay in studying a few individuals or cases. I had planned for ten interviews.
However, saturation occurred early in the interview process, so seven interviews were
conducted. Since those interviewed had all served in the US military, saturation occurred
early; the interviewees participated in the same training, doctrinal instruction and were
culturally aligned to the US military’s culture and academic standards. Thinking among
the interviewees was linear and provided a clear path to coding.
Strauss and Corbin (1998) noted that saturation occurred when new information
proved "counter-productive" and that when ‘the new’ is discovered, it does not
necessarily add anything to the overall story, model, theory or framework” (p. 136). The
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researcher must decide at what point saturation occurs; generally, no new information is
gleaned from the data or literature. It is in this way that data saturation occurs.
Illenberger and Flotterod (2012) noted that snowball sampling allowed existing
relationships to forge new relationships. I blended criterion, purposeful, and snowball
sampling to understand better the population I was trying to access and to provide an allencompassing sample for the study. I sought individuals who could best contribute to the
research and then sought their advice on further candidates for interviews. Two
interviewees did provide contacts with the knowledge that I was seeking. Based on my
research prerogatives, these interviewees were appropriate to assess the Nigerian
situation and offer scholarly direction to identify the issues within Nigerian society and
the military.
The interviewees were recruited through email and phone calls and asked if they
would be interested in expanding on social/military relational research due to a country
dealing with an endemic insurgent threat. I knew of three participants by reputation and
had read accounts of actions in Afghanistan involving two of the participants. I am a
civilian and had no working relationship or professional connection with any
participant. I was fortunate in that I connected at a Walden residency, and that
individual offered to put me in touch with an individual I desired to interview. The
participant guided me to contact additional interviewees. I was contacted one individual
through a friend but did not know him prior to meeting him for an interview.
The participants in this study were also data instruments, imparting collected
experiential expertise and education to answer the research questions. Using a qualitative
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approach, I obtained critical data from a select group of individuals during the interview
process. I sent the potential interviewees an informed consent for signature.
Sampling Strategy
I decided the sample size would be at least six to eight interviewees. If new
information presented itself at eight interviews, I would expand the interview pool. The
interview group represented a specific group of people who had been trained in the US
military and served. Therefore, understanding the realities of military culture, doctrine,
and performance would be quite linear and focused within the group. Consequently, I
expected saturation at an early point in the interview process.
Sampling consisted of a theory-based construct. Those interviewed provided the
researcher with an idea and the data to understand how society and the military function
in an environment. According to Patton (1990), criterion sampling could be used for
participant selection because it allowed for a predetermined criterion of importance.
Therefore, those Americans interviewed could discuss how a society and its culture
could drive military function ad performance. Military function includes combat and
doctrine, training, behavior, discipline, and military functioning within a foreign and
domestic population.
Sample Size
The number of interviews conducted in a qualitative grounded study to be 15 to
40 interviewees has been suggested. Crouch and McKenzie (2006) proposed no less than
20 participants in a qualitative research study assists the researcher in building and
maintaining a close relationship, thereby improving on and encouraging an open and
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frank exchange of information. This procedure can help mitigate some of the bias and
validity threats inherent in qualitative research.
Consequently, many qualitative research studies' sweet spot sample size is 15 to
20 homogeneous interview participants (Crouch & McKenzie, 2006). Glaser and Strauss
combined accumulated data and data analysis into one category until saturation before
moving on to a new category. As understood in grounded theory, a category is a
conceptual element under discovery (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
The type of saturation the researcher is aiming for may not be theoretical
saturation. Bertaux (1981) introduced the concept “saturation of knowledge” (p. 37).
Bertaux noted that researchers learn a great deal from the first interviews, which quickly
decreases knowledge discovery as the interviews progress. Guest, Bunce, and Johnson
(2006) proposed that saturation often occurs around 12 participants in homogeneous
groups. Creswell (1998) noted 20-30 interviews were enough for saturation. Creswell
indicated that 5 to 25 interviews would suffice for a phenomenological study, and Morse
(1994) suggested at least six interviews.
Morse (1994) suggested that in using grounded theory, 30-50 interviews were
enough. However, in an article written in 2000, Morse also recommended: “that the more
useable data collected from each person, the fewer participants needed” (p. 2). Morse
(2000) invited researchers to consider study parameters and included “quality of data, the
scope of the study, the nature of the topic, the amount of useful information obtained
from each participant, the number of interviews per participant, the use of shadowed data,
and the qualitative method and study design used” (p. 3).

138
Lincoln and Guba proposed the criterion of informational redundancy guide that
sample size determination, that is, sampling can be terminated when no new information
is obtained through data collection. Morse (2015) added, “whilst saturation is the most
frequently invoked ‘guarantee of qualitative rigor,’ it is the one we know least about” (p.
587). Sandelowski recommended that qualitative sample sizes be large enough to provide
a “new and richly textured understanding” of the study phenomenon but small so a ”deep,
case-oriented analysis” is produced.
Patton (1990) noted that “qualitative inquiry typically focuses in-depth on
relatively small samples, even single cases (n = 1), selected purposefully” (p. 169). That
“sample size adequacy, like all aspects of research, is subject to peer review, consensual
validation, and judgment” (Patton, 1990, p. 186). Once I reached the fourth interview, the
following three interviews provided no new knowledge and ended data collection.
The “senior” officer corps represents 0.012% of all army personnel and is
incalculable against the US population (Duffin, 2021). Therefore, the interview sample
size was purposeful and focused. According to Vasileiou, Barnett, Thorpe, and Young
(2018), “choosing a suitable sample size in qualitative research is an area of conceptual
debate and practical uncertainty” (para. 1). Vasileiou et al. (2018) noted that research
showed that reporting and justifying sample size was often poor if not absent in most
qualitative studies. Vasileiou et al. (2018), in addressing the issue, noted that researchers
should report “transparent study-specific reporting” (para. 3,4).
My group was homogenous, almost homologous in nature, but not in the usual
sense. As an example, a homogeneous group may consist of interviewing CEOs from
different companies. However, each CEO was educated and trained in various and
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different higher institutions of learning. Each CEO led an organization whose culture and
operations would differ. Therefore, they are homogeneous by identity as a CEO, but not
in education, training, experience, or the company they each operated. While educated in
differing higher education institutions, including the military academies, my participants
represented a true and strict homogeneous group. Their training, education, and
experience focused on this study's topic, so slight deviation from the study’s questions
and subsequent answers could be anticipated.
I decided to use the Strauss and Corbin (1998) concept of interviewing until
saturation reached, instead of interviewing a more significant number of individuals to
reach an arbitrary and proposed saturation number such as 20 for a grounded study. I
interviewed for Bertaux’s “saturation of knowledge,” and I interviewed until I was sure
that “no new properties, dimensions, or relationships emerge during analysis” (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998, p. 143).
Bertaux’s (1981) saturation of knowledge was deemed appropriate for my study
due to the research questions asked and the extensive knowledge base required of the
interviewees who participated. I openly coded each interview when completed and
maintained an understanding of emerging themes, keywords, and ideas as first-round
coding was ongoing. Initially coded interviews were added to the data set; then, axial
coding ensued.
Military Education
Each interviewee had participated in US military basic training and AIT. Each
participant was a serving line officer in the US military and, as mandated by rank,
attended all required schools within the military educational complex as their promotions
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mandated. For example, U.S. army colonels attend war college or a senior staff college
equivalent to study joint warfare and war. The majority of army colonels receive
postgraduate level senior and joint professional military education at the Army War
College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, prior to promotion.
According to the US Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, the
Command and General Staff School “provides Intermediate Level Education (ILE) for
US Army and sister service officers, interagency representatives, and international
military officers” (US Army Combined Arms Center, 2019a).
Intermediate Level Education is a nearly year-long graduate-level academic
program that includes military history, leadership and leadership philosophy, military
planning and strategy, and the decision-making process both in combat. One of the
essential learning attributes in the program is the grasp of critical thinking (Command
and General Staff Foundation, 2019a).
The US military provides for a Master of Military Arts and Sciences degree
through a graduate master’s program at the School of Advanced Military Studies. This
program is offered to ILE students representing mid-career field-grade officers preparing
for battalion command or staff positions at the division, brigade, or battalion level
(Command and General Staff Foundation, 2019b).
The School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics provides Army officers “continuing
education towards developing the Scholar-Warrior-Leader from first lieutenant to selection for
major. The result is mastery of branch-specific technical and tactical skills, staff processes in
battalions and brigades, direct leadership and command competencies, and initial broadening
opportunities” (US Army Combined Arms Center, 2014b).
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The School for Command Preparation “provides advanced instruction for
lieutenant colonels, colonels, and command sergeants major who have achieved brigade
or battalion command selection. Courses are taught individually according to the “special
topics unique to the assumption of command at the levels indicated” (Command and
General Staff Foundation, 2019b). The US military places a premium on advanced
education and scholarship. Indeed, there is a cottage industry of academics and
infrastructure to meet the goal of a highly educated military.
In this study, I achieved saturation early at the fourth interview. I continued with
three additional interviews based on differing educational participation and senior leader
status. Therefore, I used the Glaser and Strauss concept of achieving saturation over
quantity of interviews and Bertaux’s saturation of knowledge. It was the strict hyperhomogeneous profile that allowed for seven interviews.
Selection Criteria
One of the most substantial reasons I chose seven interviews dealt with the
military education of each senior leader. The selection criterion for this study lay in that
each participant either had professional expertise within military doctrine, training, and
discipline and or had experienced combat fighting an insurgency, either in Afghanistan or
in Iraq. One interviewee, a senior command general officer, spent four years in Nigeria
leading American Special Forces and had an acute understanding of Nigerian society.
The ideal sample size of this study was determined to be six to eight interview
candidates. Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2006) argued that purposive sampling techniques
had been successfully employed in research. They noted that qualitative studies which
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utilized twelve participants were found to have maintained research integrity in numerous
studies. This study used a purposeful sampling technique in choosing participants.
Multerud, Siersma, and Guassora (2016) offered that the sample size should be
driven by informational power, achieving saturation depended on the “goal of the study,
sample specificity, the use of established theory, the quality of the dialogue, and the
analysis strategy” (p. 1753).
Selection criteria involved senior military command officers and PhDs with a
military career who understood military function, theory, and performance. They were
connected to a system 230 years in the making that delineates similar, harmonious
thinking and understanding of operational performance, culture, function, and discipline.
As noted earlier in this study, American military officers and military educators
cannot understand every culture (or multiples of cultures) in every country across the
globe. However, every nation has an army that shares specific shared ideas on training,
doctrine, education, and professionalism that makes a nation’s army a successful entity.
There is no “secret sauce” used to produce a high-functioning professional army. It is a
combination of military culture, discipline, training, appropriate doctrine, expert
leadership, and the proper utilization of human resources and equipment.
In addition, society and its culture determine the existence of the military and how
it functions. In interviewing the candidates, I determined it would be possible to glean
themes and ideas from the data to understand how a society and its culture affect military
performance and function.
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Instrumentation
I was the researcher for this study and formulated the interview questions for the
interviewees. In this way, the interview questions acted as the data collection instruments.
The information sought for this study was unavailable elsewhere and not collectible
through quantitative research. I determined that interviews with individuals accessing
their area of expertise offered the most reliable way of data accumulation.
I designed the protocol for the interview process. The interviews were conducted
via internet conference or in person, and the interviewee chose their location to provide
comfort, safety, and convenience. The interviews were semi-structured to allow for a free
flow of information.
Although not ideal, interviews occurred using an online conference instrument as
each interviewee was located throughout the US and across the globe. The target
collection period for the interviewee was 45 to 60 minutes in one interview session. If not
possible, then a second interview session would be scheduled. After the interview, I
asked each participant if it would be conducive for me to contact them for a follow-up if
needed. The interviewee could decline further follow-up without prejudice.
To assist in formulating the interview questions, I utilized the Survey/Interview
Validation Rubric for Expert Panel - VREP© found in Appendix A. (Simon & White,
n.d.). The interview questions, as noted in Appendix B, were developed to be neutral and
non-biased. Questions were formulated to assist in answering the research questions. The
research questions mapped with interview questions can be found in Appendix C.
To ensure the interviewee answered adequately, I required qualification,
elaboration, and other non-directive probes such as “Can you tell me more about that?”
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Bachman and Schutt (2017, p. 186). I developed the interview questions to inquire about
specific aspects of society and culture, extrapolating how they might affect military
functioning.
Several questions appear to be redundant but are not. They were designed as a
self-validation tool to check and validate answers. These questions were specific in
assessing if appropriate military functioning could occur if the population were
dysfunctional and experiences an abnormal societal existence compared to wellfunctioning democracies.
Data Collection
Data collection occurred using email and teleconference, specifically ZOOM®, a
business video conferencing platform; this provided a secure path to collect video and
audio data from the interviewee. The interviews occurred with the interviewee at the
location of the interviewee’s choice to allow for security, safety, and comfort.
To safeguard data collection, ZOOM® records video and audio and backs up the
conference data in both hard drive and in the cloud, which is secured. ZOOM® is HIPAA
compliant and uses a host of security measures to ensure privacy and security. According
to ZOOM®, “HIPAA compliance is based upon the HIPAA Security Standards rule
published in the Federal Register on January 25, 2013 (45 CFR Parts 160, 162 and 164
Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards; Final Rule)” (ZOOM®, 2018). In addition,
security is ensured through Advanced Encryption Codes (AES) with a 256-bit encryption
key. HMAC-SMA-1 message authentication codes secure transmitted data.
The instigator of the meetings provides a unique password for the interviewees to
log into ZOOM® using their chosen email address (ZOOM®, 2018). Interviewees were
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advised of the parameters for the interviews. All information collected was stored on the
researcher’s secured computer backed up by the secure digital backup service “IDrive®.”
According to IDrive, information is stored in the digital cloud, which according to
IDrive®, is secured by the latest 256-bit AES encryption and accessible only by me
through a self-contained encryption key. Any download of information without my
encryption key would be unintelligible. Informed consent was obtained from the
interviewees before the interviews to ensure the interviewees were aware of the
environmental, digital, and time conditions.
Interview Procedure
The procedure for the interview included the initial contact with the interviewee
requesting participation. Once an agreement was reached, the necessary informed consent
was forwarded to the interviewee to be read, signed, and returned. Both participants
agreed upon the interview date and time. An email would be sent out to the interviewee
one week prior to the interview with instructions on how to access ZOOM® with their
email, and I would then provide the password to enter the meeting in this email.
One interviewee opted for a face-to-face interview, and he drove from Fort
Leavenworth to Omaha to meet me for the interview. It was held at a relative's home,
where he was comfortable. In this case, all procedures were followed as described, and
the interviews recorded using my computer. Three interviewees opted to provide written
answers to my questions, and again, all procedures were followed. In these cases, followup questions, if any, were handled via email. It should be made clear that classified
information was not discussed or offered.
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The interview questions were presented randomly to prevent patterning and
anticipatory answers by the interviewees. I devised a table found in Appendix C to
demonstrate which interview questions pertained to which research question. Once the
meeting began, I explained the procedure, including recording both voice and video
through ZOOM®. The interviews were scheduled to run at forty-five minutes in length,
but no hard time limit was enforced to allow for completion. The participants were asked
only the pre-prescribed interview questions. However, follow-up questions were not
restricted.
At the end of the interview, I thanked the interviewee, asked if there were any
questions or concerns, and a request was made to perform a follow-up interview if
needed. However, the interviewee was asked to be available in the future for questions or
clarifications throughout data analysis. In this case, all signed documents for participation
would still be in effect. It was also explained that even though we had completed the
interview, the interviewee could withdraw from the study at any time.
I transcribed the recorded interviews using the online transcription software
“Transcribe®.” This transcription software proved to be the most reliable and precise in
translating the recorded word. The interviews, once transcribed, were downloaded to my
computer, and no copy was left in the online portal. Only I had access to the translating
program as a two-step authentication protected it. After I checked the correctness of the
transcription against the recording, the interviewee received the hard copy transcription
for review. If the interviewee found no issue with the transcription, the interviewee did
not need to return the copy, which they could then keep or destroy at their discretion.
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Data Collection Management
The requirements for data collection and storage are significant throughout all
study designs. ZOOM® stores collected data to be accessed by the instigator of the
meeting for future reference. Storage also occurred through a personal recorder held by
me in a secured drawer in my office. All recorded data is stored on a separate encrypted
hard drive specifically dedicated to this study. Transcription of recorded interviews
occurred through a computer software program, and human interaction with the
recordings did not occur.
Three interviewees provided written answers to the interview questions. These
emails and their attachments were removed from the emails and stored on my computer. I
downloaded the written documents into a specific file on my laptop. I maintained the
only copies of hard data. As required by Walden University, I have kept in a secured
fashion all audio recordings, video recordings, hard copies, and transcripts for a
minimum of five years. The research study data, including the participants' identities, are
stored on a USB drive and stored in a safe.
Data Analysis Plan
It was Lincoln and Guba (1985) who remarked on the qualitative method, “Not
very much can be said about data analysis in advance of the study” (p. 241). Data
analysis solely depends on the data collected; too little and the research is for naught, too
much, and the researcher is mired, lost in incomprehensible data streams. Therefore, the
amount of data obtained is restricted to the research questions posited and should eschew
unsubstantiated opinion and conjecture given by the interviewee. Data should be
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adequate and appropriate for the researcher to provide substantiated answers to the
research questions.
Triangulation can affect the analysis, and, in this study, triangulation was
achieved using interview answers provided by multiple interviewees, interview analysis,
and real-world demonstrations of military philosophy and societal-military conditioning.
The sources provided triangulation, not the application of different methods. Senior
officer leadership, senior NCO leadership, interviewing a sergeant major, interviewing a
Ph.D. in political science and history, studying military history, policy and war. Each
offered triangulation by differing points of view and in the structure of their prospective
careers.
Data triangulation was applied using historical records, government documents,
and interview responses to achieve triangulation in the study. Triangulation in qualitative
research aims to increase the veracity, integrity, and credibility of the results.
Triangulation is a three-dimensional view from every angle possible, considering the
positives, negatives, and alternate views of a subject. If the information accumulated
results in a culmination of data that agrees with itself, the triangulation has confirmed the
data.
Triangulation leads to confirmability within the study. For confirmability, it was
necessary to update information as time moved forward. Nigeria is involved in an active
war, and events occur, and truths can change. As a result, and as the study went forward,
I informed my committee of changes to realities of life, life-changing events within
Nigeria, and data or scholarship which may have changed as used in the foundation for
this study. Simon (2011a) noted that a researcher should follow the initial coding into
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more elaborate codes and linkages to produce a formal data analysis. Analysis should
continue and all questions resolved until theoretical saturation is achieved. When no new
themes, questions, or issues arise in a category, the category is established and validated
(Simon, 2011a).
According to Krippendorff and Bock (2008), the most significant harm in data
analysis can come from human error. Researcher bias can skew the results and
understanding of the phenomenon. The misinterpretation of data, the intentional
misalignment of data, or a skewed conclusion can provide an incorrect answer. Content
analysis should be carried out in a structured format to provide non-bias conclusions.
Qualitative research is subjective, so the interpretation of the data lay in the researcher to
complete. Therefore, triangulation is best applied to achieve truth in this framework.
A researcher must adhere to factual determinations of meaning in the data. A
qualitative researcher must adhere to the facts presented by the data received from the
interviewees to produce answers to the research questions. Interpretation is a dangerous
word, and it implies the researcher could assign meaning based on their understanding of
data which could introduce bias and error (Bowling, 2005). Interpretation of fact should
be the route taken as facts and truths cannot be smeared by erroneous bias.
Intentional bias goes to honesty and is a different concern, to imply bias to
guarantee a specific result. Therefore, in the qualitative method, multiple interviews are
done to acquire information streams providing linear themes and ideas from unique
isolated sources to understand the research question.
According to Bernard and Ryan (2014), analyzing data involves five complicated
tasks and include: “discovering themes and subthemes, describing the core and peripheral
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elements of themes, building hierarchies of themes or codebooks, applying themes—that
is, attaching them to chunks of actual text, and linking themes into theoretical models” (p.
54).
Data collected through the interview process is coded to reveal themes, patterns,
linearity, divergence, and discrepant information. According to Miles, Huberman, and
Saldana (2014), initial coding is done to break down information and assign the data to
“broad chunk” categories. The second round of coding then breaks down the broad
chunks, refining and defining the data's focused explanation. Here is where patterns and
themes become apparent.
Manual coding allows the researcher to immerse themselves in the data, become
intimate in analysis, enabling the flow of themes and patterns to emerge. Inductive
coding creates codes based on the qualitative data assembled and is less fraught with
bias. I used constructivism to create a narrative from thematic coding. I planned to
manually code the interview data from initial coding to creating nodes and reportable
results.
Manual data extrapolation runs the risk of researcher bias, finding themes and
patterns which are hard to justify and confirm but are accepted as they may fit the
researcher’s narrative. However, awareness of bias issues and inductive reasoning
lessened the opportunity of bias to present itself. The researcher must still code and then
assign unbiased meanings to the coding. Utilizing a double extrapolation method fits the
explanation provided by Miles et al. (2014), describing this technique as summarizing
data through basic response topics and identifying common and key phrases or word
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applications for their significance. Multiple coding avenues would be fruitful to ensure a
correlation of data.
Trustworthiness
A qualitative research study is assessed for the value it provides to the field of
study. The study should reflect a high degree and academic vigor. Qualitative studies are
known to be interpretive and are more vulnerable to issues impacting trustworthiness.
Therefore, I made every effort to ensure the trustworthiness and credibility of this study.
This study was completed using a research lens focused on credibility, transferability,
dependability, and confirmability.
Internet sourcing dominates accessibility to literature and research. However, the
researcher must take care in using any information provided on the internet. What may
appear as vetted or peer-reviewed information may simply be someone’s opinion.
Therefore, care was taken to vet internet sourcing used for this study. Unless the
information was tied to a university, a peer-reviewed journal, a vetted news organization,
or an expert in a particular field, the information was not used as a foundation of fact,
merely to continue searching for authenticated, vetted, and factual information.
According to Shenton (2004), trustworthiness in a qualitative study is suspect,
especially from positivists, because their view of validity and reliability cannot be
addressed in a naturalistic study. Humans become the source of conflict and provide
information on the conflict. Therefore, Shenton (2004) offered Cuba’s constructs of
trustworthiness using credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability, which
differs from the positivist view of internal validity, external validity/ generalizability,

152
reliability, and objectivity. Cuba’s Four Criteria for Trustworthiness is noted in Table 2
below, and I became cognizant throughout this work of presenting a trustworthy study.
Table 2.
Guba’s Four Criteria for Trustworthiness
Quality
criteria
Credibility

Possible provision made by a researcher
Adoption of appropriate well recognized research methods.
Development of early familiarity with the culture of participating
organizations.
Random sampling of individuals serving as informants.
Triangulation via the use of different methods, informants, and sites.
Tactics to help ensure honesty in informants.
Iterative questioning in data, collection dialogues.
Negative case analysis.
Debriefing sessions between researcher and superiors.
Peer scrutiny of the project.
Use of “reflexive commentary.”
Description of background, qualifications, and experience of
researchers.
Member checks of data collected, and interpretations/theories
formed.
Thick description of the phenomenon under scrutiny.
Examination of previous research to frame findings.

Transferability Provision of background data to establish the study context and detailed
description of the phenomenon in question to allow comparisons to be
made.
Dependability

Employment of “overlapping methods.”
In-depth methodology description to allow the study to be repeated.

Confirmability Triangulation to reduce the effect of investigator bias.
Admission of researchers’ beliefs and assumptions.
Recognition of shortcomings of methods and potential effects.
In-depth methodological description to allow the integrity
of research results to be scrutinized.
Use of diagrams to demonstrate “audit trail.”
Note: Shenton, 2004, p. 73.
Credibility
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Some degree of bias is nearly always present in a qualitative study. How it effects
the result is the researcher's responsibility and should approach null in conclusion
(Gerhard, 2008). The interviewees for this study were drawn from two specific areas, the
military, and the military educational complex. As such, credibility was achieved simply
by interviewing individuals who swore an oath to serve the country and uphold the
Constitution. In addition, the individuals who functioned as senior leadership studied war
at the graduate or Ph.D. level or taught within the military educational complex.
Credibility involves utilizing different data sources within the same method. To
help ensure credibility, I used the provisions suggested by Cuba in Table 2, including
“adoption of appropriate well-recognized research methods, development of early
familiarity with the culture of participating organizations (and individuals), adoption of
appropriate well-recognized research methods, triangulation via the use of different
methods, informants, and sites, tactics to help ensure honesty in informants, iterative
questioning in data, collection dialogues, a thick description of the phenomenon under
scrutiny, and, the examination of previous research to frame findings” (Shenton, 2004, p.
73). In addition, study participants would be encouraged to review interview data they
supplied as a member checking procedure, also suggested by Cuba.
A researcher cannot use one interview to validate evidence as it is impossible to
triangulate, even if triangulation involves matching against additional source material.
Triangulation exists within the constructs of the interview process in which information is
validated among those interviewed, and multiple interviews must be done to complete
triangulation and saturation.
Creswell and Miller (2001) offered eight separate validation strategies for the
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qualitative researcher: prolonged engagement and persistent field observation,
triangulation, peer review, and debriefing, negative case analysis clarifying, member
checking, providing a rich, thick description, and external audits. Triangulation was
utilized to provide the primary validating construct for this study.
It is beneficial to use multiple streams to construct credibility, and I accepted each
interview for what it offered, not expecting or wanting congruent and linear answers to
provide credibility. However, if the answers were harmonious and linear, then the
interview process could be non-biased.
Each interviewee worked in their specific area of expertise and acquired an
advanced education. In this study, the military experts I used are well known within the
military-industrial complex and actively participated in the Iraq or Afghanistan theater of
operations, providing counterinsurgency guidance to command officers. This reality
confirmed the credibility of the experts used to comment on military matters.
Additionally, the Ph. D.s interviewed were retired senior officers in the US
military and either studied warfare and its components or taught at the various military
academic schools. This fact provided credibility for their participation. I interviewed an
officer with less senior status and experience; however, he was familiar with civilianmilitary interactions and cultural interactions in a conflict zone. He was attending school
at the US Army War College at Fort Leavenworth at the time of the interview. Therefore,
as an army officer engaged in advanced military scholarship, credibility was established.
A credible interviewee provides for a credible interview and data. The credibility
of interviews and findings was enhanced using rich descriptions provided through
interviews enhanced by follow-up questions, member checking, clarification of
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interviewee or researcher bias where appropriate. I achieved triangulation between
interviewee responses and confirmed facts and accounts and negative case analysis where
applicable to disclose abhorrent or disconfirming information. Wrong answers were not
considered because every answer contributed to the study. In the interview process, there
were no wrong answers. In the interview process, and I was determined to follow
whatever path the research provided. Disagreeable information was not viewed as being
faulty but simply as providing a different approach to knowledge.
Transferability
Transferability refers to the degree to which the results of qualitative research can
be generalized or transferred to other contexts or settings (Trochim, 2006). By
interviewing a select group of experts who participated in, have taught, and have
commanded using state-sponsored and accepted military doctrine and have followed the
Law of War and the Rules of War on the active battlefield allowed for a transference path
in like situations.
According to Trochim (2006), the qualitative researcher can enhance
transferability by offering an intimate view of research context and assumptions. It is then
relevant to a researcher to transfer the results to their study, making sensible judgments
on transfer (Trochim, 2006). I achieved transferability through Cuba’s proposals,
including the “provision of background data to establish the context of the study, and
detailed description of the phenomenon in question to allow comparisons to be made”
(Shenton, 2004, p. 73).
Chapter 2 provided the history and context of population-centric
counterinsurgency operations. It is not a factor that “Westernized” military doctrine can
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be transferred to a sub-Saharan African country to realize success. It is the fact that state
armies are responsible for and carry out activities that are acceptable to the world
community, represented by the United Nations and global human rights organizations.
Dependability
In the quantitative realm, reliability is viewed from the assumption of replicability
and repeatability. The qualitative researcher uses dependability instead of the
quantitatively applied reliability rubric and requires the researcher to account for an
evolving environment and context within the research. Therefore, the researcher
documents change within the study and how these changes affected the researcher in
moving forward in the study (Trochim, 2006).
Cuba suggested to achieve dependability; researchers could install the use of
“overlapping methods” and an “in-depth methodology description to allow the study to
be repeated” (Shenton, 2004, p. 71). Lincoln and Guba stressed the almost dependent
nature between credibility and dependability and argued that in practice the “the
demonstration of the former goes some distance in ensuring the latter” (Shenton, 2004, p.
71). Therefore, the study began with a rich and detailed review of the literature and
environment in which the study lay, followed by a rich and complex narrative of the
research process and outcomes.
Confirmability
Confirmability refers to the researcher's unique perspective on a study and
whether the study's results could be corroborated or confirmed by outside researchers
(Trochim, 2006). In this study, the researcher continuously checked for changes in the
philosophy, doctrine, and the study of counterinsurgent doctrine. Assessing the
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theoretical foundations for this study became a continuous obligation. Additionally, the
Nigerian military history and operational standing occurred through primary resources for
operational doctrine and tactics changes and whether actions were considered to adjust
for the Nigerian civilian community. The latest and most up-to-date philosophies and
doctrine were monitored as counterinsurgency is an evolving doctrinal model.
Addressing legitimization is a concern for the study. According to Benge,
Onwuegbuzie, and Robbins (2012), legitimization issues should be addressed
pragmatically and is justified when sufficient research is conducted to validate results.
Benge et al. (2012) offered the qualitative legitimation model to assist in significantly
mitigating validity and verification in the research, with credibility sustained in the
research study addressing “applicability, consistency, neutrality, dependability, and or
credibility of interpretations, and conclusions within the underlying setting or group” (p.
69). Interviews with military experts on the Nigeria problem should produce results that
are closely aligned. However, if an interviewee presented answers which sway far and
wide from the consensual quorum, it can be considered either an anomaly or a rationale
for further exploration.
There exist internal and external threats to legitimation and credibility. Internal
threats consist of bias from the researcher, the interviewees, miscommunication,
misinterpretation, or skewed observations (Benge et al., 2012). External credibility
represents “the confirmability and transferability of findings and conclusions,” or the
ability of outside researchers to review and test the validity and produce the same
findings throughout the strategies of trustworthiness put forth by Cuba (Onwuegbuzie &
Frels, 2016, p. 235). Constant themes presented for each of the four quality criteria of
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credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability included the use of a rich
and detailed narrative, overlapping methods, triangulation, member and peer review, and
the rejection of bias.
Finally, the researcher obtained trustworthiness in that the researcher would selfregulate for bias, obtained a peer to review the work, the research, and outcomes. In
addition, the dissertation committee assessed the study at a peer level. The researcher had
no preconceived idea on how the research would evolve or conclude. It was in this format
that honest, non-biased data collection, analysis, and reporting were achieved.
I followed Cuba’s example in table 2, and chapter 2 represents an exhaustive
description involving every parameter involved in the Nigerian story. The credibility of
reporting was done by cross-checking facts with additional sources. Information was
taken from eyewitness accounts found in the Amnesty International Reports, reports from
Human Rights Watch, and independent news reporting agencies.
I derived data triangulation from the literature review, interviews with military
experts, and member checking. The selected participants also added triangulation when
all facets of study and research provided an accepted, trustworthy narrative.
Ethical Procedures and Participant Protections
I received approval to conduct research from the Institutional Review Board on
05/30/2018, and my study was assigned # 05-30-18-0545414. An extension to continue
research was obtained from the IRB on 06/18/2019 and 08/17/2020. Hesse-Beiber
(2016) noted that researchers should anticipate ethical issues and use standardized
format and guidelines to mitigate credibility concerns. I represented Walden University
as a doctoral candidate and researcher. I understood and adhered to the criteria presented
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by the Institutional Review Board for Ethical Standards. To ensure ethical practice, I
adhered to data collection policies, interview protocols, obtaining informed consent and
permissions, the guidelines regarding the recording of interviewees, and the
transcription process.
According to Fritz (2008), all researchers are responsible for ensuring
participants are “well informed about the purpose of the research they are asked to
participate in, understand the risks by participating in the research, understand the
benefits of participating in the research, and should feel free to make independent
decisions such as withdrawing for the study without any fear of negative consequences”
(p. 5).
To ensure ethical practice, I followed the five principles of research ethics by the
American Psychological Association and noted on page 170 (Smith, 2003b). The
recommendations are to discuss intellectual property, including copyright, frankly, and be
cognizant of plagiarism (Smith, 2003b). Although APA is related to psychiatrists and
medical practice, a researcher must be mindful of the multiple roles a researcher can play
and the roles of the interviewed (Smith, 2003b). No individual should have undue
influence over the study, and neither the interviewee nor interviewer should use the study
for-profit or expect compensation. Following informed consent, rules are essential for
protecting both the interviewer and interviewee (Smith, 2003b).
The interviewee should be made aware of all the study's parameters and how their
input is utilized. If parameters change during the study, the interviewee should be
informed and the informed consent updated, for informed consent is not static but a
process. The interviewee signed the informed consent “I agree” on the subject line or in
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the body of the returned email. Each interviewee was identified by name on the informed
consent. Should the interviewee desire to change their participation status over the life of
the active study, they had every right to do so. I would have informed the interviewee that
I would need to obtain new informed consent if any study parameter changed.
Respecting privacy and confidentiality is the hallmark of any study, and this
aspect ensures the patency of the research and the protection of the participants (Smith,
2003b). There are limits to confidentiality, and the interviewee should understand who
will be viewing the raw data and interview transcripts. In this study, I and my committee
chair were the only individuals who viewed the raw data or knew the interviewees'
identities.
The researcher must be aware of “federal and state laws” pertaining to any
research study. If a study crosses international borders, the researcher must be aware of
local laws which may affect the researcher-subject-interviewee relationship (Smith,
2003b). The researcher must apply “practical security measures” to protect, acquire, and
store data and evidence.
Security is applied to protect participants and the accumulated data (Smith,
2003b). Protection was provided by keeping the identity of the interviewees confidential,
known only to me. Data was secured on a password-protected laptop. As my computer is
backed up to the cloud, the data stored there is encrypted and accessible through a 2-step
verification system using IDrive®. Several interviewees voluntarily offered their
permission to publish their names in the study. I explained this was against protocol and
confidentiality must be maintained.
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Once Chapter 4 had been written, the information in the cloud was deleted and
unobtainable. The data was located on my computer and, once the study was complete,
transferred to a thumb drive for archiving in a secured location. Finally, the APA
recommended “utilizing ethics resources” during the study, especially if one is in doubt
or requires direction on ethical conduct (Smith, 2003b).
The APA recommends using the Belmont Report, which “provided the ethical
framework for ensuing human participant research regulations and still serves as the basis
for human participant protection legislation,” as well as the APA’s guide to Ethical
Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (Smith, 2003b, p. 56). This is a
complete ethical guide covering ten research and ethical practice areas, and I used the
Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct to guide this study. These
principles include:
1. Beneficence and Nonmaleficence: To strive to protect the rights and welfare of those
they work with professionally.
2. Fidelity and Responsibility: The moral responsibility to help ensure that others
working in their profession also uphold high ethical standards.
3. Integrity: should never attempt to deceive or misrepresent.
4. Justice: the responsibility to be fair and impartial.
5. Respect for People's Rights and Dignity: should respect the right to dignity, privacy,
and confidentiality of those they work with (Smith, 2003b, p. 56).
Bias
I took precautions to avoid the actual or perceived influence or bias in performing
interviews and examining findings. Data collection consisted of one-on-one interviews
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recorded on my laptop's hard drive and notes taken. Intentional bias is easy to identify if
the researcher is aware of it; however, unintentional bias is more difficult to perceive. In
this study, I was aware that my concern for the people of Nigeria could have created
unintentional bias, which could have affected data collection, analysis, and interpretation.
A non-biased approach to seeking the truth would have far more meaning than a
researcher's emotional or professional concern. Interview bias can affect interview data
collection, analysis, and interpretation, so the researcher must always be aware of bias,
including self-induced bias (Pannucci & Wilkins, 2011).
Self-awareness in correcting for bias is a researcher’s prime responsibility to
safeguard the efficacy of the study. Therefore, the interview questions were constructed
to remove any bias, and the effort was made through coding to negate infused researcher
bias. In addition, external bias can come from the interviewee during the interview
process if the interviewee attempts to sway the argument located in the study.
Multiple interviews were done to assess any anomaly in accrued information and
watch for bias interjection from an interviewee. If required, follow-up questions are also
helpful to clarify intent and meanings from the interviewee and perform all follow-up
questions.
The interviewee could end the interview at any time, for any reason. The
interviews would be scheduled based on an agreement between the participants and
generally followed the interviewee's schedule. No time frame for interviews was
mandated, and interviews proceeded in their own good time; however, for scheduling
purposes, it was suggested to the interviewees that the interviews should not take more
than forty-five minutes to one hour.
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A transcript record of the interview was provided to the interviewee to assess for
accuracy and returned to the interviewee for any changes or clarifications. A request for
potential follow-up was made to the interviewee at the interview's conclusion, and I
asked if contact through email was acceptable.
Creswell (2009) noted that specific inclusions must be made available in the
informed consent. These inclusions consisted of a summary of the research study, the
reason for interviewee selection, an overview of the research, the purpose of the study,
the procedures for the interview process, the volunteer agreement, notification of riskbenefit in participating; this was an uncompensated study, confidentiality, consent
statement, contact information, and finally, the need to have a printed name, signature,
and date of consent.
Creswell (2009) provided the substance for the Interview Protocol Form. It
should include the date, place, time, identification of the interviewee and interviewer, a
brief description of the study, a confidentiality agreement, informed consent, and finally,
the interview questions. Include the date, place, interviewer, interviewee, and briefly
describe the research study, confidentiality, and informed consent followed by the
interview questions.
It was incumbent on me to ensure the interviewees understand that I represent
Walden University as a student and that I had no connection to the military or a
corporation that may benefit from this study. However, I informed the interviewees the
study might be written as a journal article, but this was strictly a scholarly endeavor.
There was the possibility that during the interview process, the researcher could receive
a name to interview by an interviewee for this study (snowball sampling). In this case,
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the name was confidential, and contact was made in the same format as with all other
initial interviewees. Continuation into data collection from the research study proposal
occurred after approval from the Walden University Institutional Review Board. Ethical
considerations take on a “do no harm” modality with interviewee participation.
Finally, when I coded the data. I removed all names from the data to remove any
bias I might encounter by knowing the interview data came from a Ph.D., a general
officer, or an officer who served in Nigeria. I also did not realize until after coding
which interview question pertained to which research question. This again removed bias
to provide for precise, unadulterated analysis. I simply wanted each data set to stand on
its merit.
Ethical Protection of Participants
Participant protection is of paramount concern. I wrote the proposal to account
for the safety of each participant, and the participants were asked to volunteer. The legal
mandates of the Constitution ultimately guaranteed the safety of those participants in the
US and abroad.
Each participant signed an informed consent authorization based on Creswell’s
(2009) inclusion list, which consisted of a research study summary, the reason for
participant selection, the purpose of the study, procedures for the interview process, a
volunteer agreement clause, the risks and benefits of participation, compensation, contact
information, consent statement, the name of the participant printed then signed with the
date of consent, and the printed name.
The interviewee understands their participation, and subsequent interview
analyses are kept confidential. Only specific members of the dissertation committee may
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be made privy to the information with the understanding that interviewee participation is
confidential and not shared outside the confines of the dissertation process. All
paperwork that identified the participants, including the informed consent and
participation forms, will be kept secured and available only to the committee if required.
Procedures.
The following procedures were performed to ensure ethical function and
collection of data. The procedures noted guided the researcher in obtaining authorizations
to collect and analyze voluntarily offered data from the interviewee instruments and to
win Walden University IRB approval for the study.
Forms were constructed to ensure compliance with ethical and legal requirements
and protect the interviewee, the interviewer, and Walden University. Walden University
IRB approval for this research study was received in May 2018 and reaffirmed in May
2019. As such, initial contact was made after IRB approval using email and phone calls
to assess the ability of the proposed interviewee's participation in the study.
Follow-up emails were sent to further explain and expound on the study and
requirements to ensure the participant was comfortable with the process. Upon agreement
to participate in the study, arrangements were made with the interviewee or their
representative on a date, time, and location. Where possible, I attempted to schedule a
face-to-face interview. If this were not possible, ZOOM®, a business internet conference
provider, would be used. ZOOM® offers real-time face-to-face interaction via internet
connection. The interview proceeded only if the consent had been signed and received.
One week before the interview, the interviewee was contacted, and the interviewee's
availability and interview date, time, and venue (ZOOM®) were confirmed.
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The day before the interview was scheduled, a third email was sent out, and a
phone call was made to the interviewee to establish a personal connection and rapport.
The authorization to interview, authorization to be recorded, and the informed consent,
was obtained from the interviewee prior to the interview. I provided my cell number to
the interviewee in case of a connection issue with ZOOM®. This occurred in two of the
interviews and was resolved quickly through a phone call.
Once the interview began, the interviewer stated the purpose of the study, the
procedures for the interview, confidentiality, recording parameters, and how the
information presented would be transcribed and archived. I stated the interviewee was
free to stop the interview at any time. The interviewees could withdraw at any time. All
data collected from the individual who withdrew was destroyed.
The interview was constructed to allow for a free flow of information and
accommodate a complete transfer of data and information from the interviewee. Once the
questions had been answered, and both the interviewer and interviewee were satisfied
that no further questions or conversation was needed, the interview ended with the
grateful appreciation of the interviewer.
A request was made of the interviewee for further contact if follow-up questions
were needed or clarification of an already answered question. In this case, original
consents and instructions would still be in force. The post-interview discussion included a
request for the interviewee to review the transcribed interview document and 72 hours
allotted for transcription. The transcription document would be sent via email and
returned via email if the interviewee had a question or felt they needed to clarify or
change a response.
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Recorded interviews were stored in a thumb drive for security, with only the
researcher having access. In this study, no interviewee thought it necessary to return the
transcript for clarification or change. If the interviewee had contacted the researcher to
clarify a statement, all consents remained in effect. The name of the interviewee was not
included in any document to maintain confidentiality. Each interviewee was assigned a
number that corresponded with their specific transcript.
Time was taken, as much as deemed appropriate by the researcher, to transcribe
and produce a transcript of the interviews; however, transcriptions occurred within the
72-hour time goal. An attempt was made to have each interview transcribed within
seventy-two hours while the interview was fresh in the participant's mind. The final
interview transcripts were collated, and the coding process began. Interviewees also had a
choice to submit written answers to the questions. This was done to facilitate time
management for the researcher and the interviewee. If a respondent felt more comfortable
writing responses or required a written format because of their work and professional
schedule, they were accommodated. The written questions were sent via email, and the
answers received by email.
This process allowed for data collection using manual coding towards
completing Chapter 4 and providing results for Chapter 5. A formal letter was sent to
each interviewee thanking them for their participation. In addition, once Walden
University accepted the dissertation as complete, the collected data move was securely
archived.
Summary
This qualitative study aimed to explore Nigerian society's social and cultural
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dysfunction and its potential effects on Nigerian military performance. In Chapter 3, I
laid out the methodology by which this study was conducted. I discussed essential
foundations embedded in the study, such as how the qualitative grounded approach
affected the study design, the purpose of the study, the central phenomenon, and efficacy
of performing qualitative interviews within a specifically identified population to gather
data for analysis and interpreted to offer an outcome to the research questions. The
chapter described the population, sample descriptions, sample size, and recruitment
methods to understand the participants utilized for data collection thoroughly.
This chapter also detailed the data analysis plan, trustworthiness and provided indepth information on the participants and any ethical considerations regarding the safety
of interviewees. All interviewees volunteered for this study, and considerations were
made through informed consent to ensure participants knew that their identities were
protected. It is improbable that any foreign actor who means harm would ever have the
opportunity to target an interviewee in any way. However, that reality, no matter how
remote, was accounted for. Chapter 4 examines the research collected and provides a
detailed, in-depth narrative to explain the findings after completing multilevel coding.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The foundation for this chapter was collecting data from primary and secondary
sources to understand the problems and failures of the Nigerian Army. Understanding the
issues and concerns within Nigeria allowed me to formulate a problem statement and
research questions. The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore whether social
and cultural dysfunction might affect military performance in denying success on the
battlefield and causing the Nigerian army to abuse the Nigerian civilian population. This
foundation of study resulted in two research questions:
RQ1: How and to what extent does a nation’s military reflect or mirror the society
from which the military was derived?
RQ2: How and to what extent can marked societal dysfunction affect or inhibit
military performance in Nigeria?
Chapter 4 is structured as follows: I describe the setting, demographics, and data
collection. My in-depth manual analysis of respondent answers allowed me to have a
complete and immersive understanding of the material. I address each research question
and the subsequent patterns and themes provided by the coding to support the findings.
To report the results, I decided to utilize the themes I discovered through coding. I
formulated three themes, and they are (1) society influences military performance, (2)
failure in military performance, and (3) tribalism influences military performance. A
summary of the findings is presented prior to Chapter 5.
Setting
There were three different interview settings. Four interviews were conducted
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online using the ZOOM® business meeting platform. The interviews were recorded using
both audio and video through ZOOM® and transcribed using the Transcribe®
transcription software. This software was found to be highly accurate in reporting the
recorded voice. Slight correction was needed when compared to the recorded material.
One interview occurred via a face-to-face meeting and was audio recorded on my
computer using the Microsoft® recording program. This interview was transcribed using
Transcribe® transcription software. I conducted the face-to-face interview in the
interviewee's home, a location he chose after traveling from his duty station. Two
respondents, at their request, provided a written transcript of their interviews, and these
were transmitted to me via email. This effort produced a detailed and complete discourse
on the interview questions to the point that no follow-up questions were required.
Demographics
For this study, I chose military professionals of senior rank: lieutenant colonel and
above and Command Sergeant Major and Sergeant Major for NCOs. The US military is a
closed society, and as such, I had great difficulty recruiting participants for this study.
However, I met a retired Army colonel at a Walden residency, and he offered to
introduce me to colleagues with whom he had served. He had access to high-ranking
officers, both retired and active duty. He vouched for my ability, discretion, and that I
could be trusted as a researcher, leading to eight respondents for this study.
I interviewed two lieutenant colonels (ret), who held a Ph.D. in history and
political science who studied military history and the political challenges of conducting
warfare. Two Generals, a brigadier (ret) and a major general (active duty), were
interviewed. The major general had a long and distinguished record of leadership and an
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acute understanding of command responsibilities not only to the DoD but to civilians
impacted by military operations, efforts, and policies abroad. The brigadier was
experienced in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and spent four years in
Nigeria working with the Nigerian Army through AFRICOM.
I interviewed a command sergeant major (ret) with a 30-year career working with
the indigenous forces and their civilian counterparts to fight the Taliban and al-Qa’ida.
He had a unique understanding of nation-building and the quality of fighting force. He
was fluent in army doctrine, especially counterinsurgent tactics and methodology, and the
importance of the host country's social and cultural dynamics.
I interviewed a retired colonel who had also spent multiple tours in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Africa. This participant had a unique understanding of counterinsurgency and
the importance of civilian involvement in counterinsurgent philosophy. He understood
military-civilian-political dynamics and the necessity of society and their participation in
counterinsurgency support and tactics. And finally, I interviewed an officer from Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. He attended school at the Army War College but had a history of
command and was knowledgeable in civilian-military operations. Every army officer is
fluent in civilian-military relations, which came to the forefront with the insurgent wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
After data collection was complete during the study, I lost one interviewee as he
withdrew from the study. Saturation occurred at the fourth interview; however, I felt that
seven interviews provided surety that no new information would be generated. I am
prevented from disclosing if the eighth interview validated the accumulated data. I

172
utilized all seven interviews in coding and produced a coding book that allowed me to
catalog responses and integrate coding easily.
Data Collection
I interviewed seven participants, with each interviewee having undergone similar
training and military education over their decades of service.
Six of the seven interviews lasted approximately one hour, with the identified 5th
(individual) interview occurring over multiple sessions and lasting about 3 hours. Each
interview provided thoughtful, complete, and in-depth answers. The interviews produced
approximately 86-pages of coded material.
In this study, men comprised the interview cohort and provided the data.
Therefore a zero-gender variation in the sample. No variations did not occur using
ZOOM® other than the necessity to complete one interview over two sessions. Variations
did not happen with written submissions. In the end, I did not require data clarification
from the written submissions, nor did I have any follow-up questions.
Data Analysis
Strauss and Corbin (1998) proposed that theoretical saturation occurred when “no
new properties, dimensions, or relationships emerge during analysis” (p. 143). Glaser and
Holton (2004) noted that “the analyst develops several workable coded categories, he/she
should begin early to saturate as much as possible those that seem to have explanatory
power” (p. 54). Strauss and Corbin’s theoretical explanation of saturation was met with
seven interviews.
Tabor (2013) noted that grounded theory “is only considered ready for publication
once theoretical saturation is reached. That is when new data collection (indicated by
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theoretical sampling) does not lead to any further changes to the theory, as the scheme of
categories and their properties and relationships fit new data without further
modification” (p. 103). Again, seven interviews provided theoretical and saturation of
knowledge, as identified by Bertaux (1981).
Before I began the coding process, I deidentified any information that might
provide the interviewee's identity, using only a number. I also removed any names
supplied in an interview. Therefore, I did not know whose interview I was coding. This
allowed for confidentiality and mitigated bias.
I began coding using the manual open coding method. I copied each response for
the first interview question into a word document. I read through each answer to question
one to get a feel for content and flow. I then read through each question while listening to
the recorded response. It was through this process that I understood emotional inflections
in the response. Emotion does creep into qualitative research. An interview question
invoked emotion from the interviewees. However, emotion cannot enter the scientific
analysis. The emotion produced came directed at the lack of appropriate functioning and
professionalism so ingrained in each interviewee. Face-to-face interviews were done
(Zoom) to recognize the affect portrayed by the interviewee to the interviewer.
I coded each response using a pen and different colored highlighters to highlight
keywords, themes, phrases, and opinions. I looked for consequential passages that
represented an idea. I began to pull these out and memoed, assigning meaning to the
notations. I assigned “theory,” “concept,” “code,” or “theme” to items that may be
representative of a more significant idea throughout each answer. I looked for both overt
and underlying patterns.
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When I had completed coding question one, I assembled all keywords, ideas, and
themes into a table and then visualized an answer to the interview question. More
importantly, how the answer related to the specific research question for which it was
designed. Once I completed the two-step method, I axially coded the data by connecting
codes (concepts and categories).
According to Scott and Medaugh (2017), “axial coding requires researchers to
continually modify and reshape their emerging conceptual framework as more data is
examined” (p. 1). According to Allen (2017), axial coding accounted for “behaviors,
events, activities, strategies, states, meanings, participation, relationships, conditions,
consequences, and settings” (p. 80). I found this helpful as I discovered synonyms, like
ideas and concepts expressed differently by different interviewees.
I presented the data and its interpretation as a scholar, devoid of emotion and bias.
I decided through coding what was important and relevant in interpreting the answers.
The first review of the accumulated data offered the path forward to pull every data
nuance from the interviews, distilling the information out as the second and third analyses
continued. In chapter 4, I presented a plethora of interviewee quotes to provide grounded
theory analysis in providing a deep, rich, and detailed understanding of the problem.
Because of the nature of interviewees, their “hyper-homogeneous” nature, coding
was relatively straightforward and uncomplicated. Responses to the interview questions
were quite linear and provided a solid foundation to understanding the research questions.
In the end, coding produced three primary themes to answer the research questions. There
was a multitude of codes to combine to produce themes. The theme, society influences
military performance, was taken from the following codes: army subservient to civilian
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government and people, democracy in jeopardy, society reflected in military, societal
traits affecting army, affect military performance, civilian culture into the military,
society influences the military, poor civilian control part of culture, tribalism, external
and internal cultural influence, civilian and cultural Influence, poor culture and societal
values (inadequate or non-existent morals and values), anarchy, population involvement,
government and societal credibility, systemic civilian violence, societal acceptance of
institutional corruption, corrupt society, military corruption (endemic in all government
entities), people of the country are responsible, elected officials, societal influence,
military cannot separate from society (societal beliefs and values).
The theme, failure in military performance, produced the following codes: army
cannot enforce domestic policy, army a tool for foreign political policy, leadership, moral
and ethical behavior, inadequate training, poor leadership, poor discipline, poor military
behavior, army assists in humanitarian actions, army trained to kill, heavy-handed tactics.
army could disavow civilian leadership, coup d'état, army breaks laws—will do anything
to maintain order, (lack of) discipline, values, professional military, training and
instruction, moral and ethical armies involved in atrocities, education to achieve a
professional military, attributes of a professional and successful military, commanding
officers, chain of command.
And finally, the third theme and the theme presented as a revelation added
validity to the first two themes: tribalism affects military performance. The codes
included: tribalism, army a tribe, tribalism and sectarianism, act as a tribe, Nigerian army
a tribe. However, this was not the tribalism as found so entrenched in Nigerian society.
But tribalism is found in the army as a standalone and internal societal structure. This
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finding is discussed in depth in the results section. Coding produced a coding book of
approximately 86 pages in length, and documents my journey to identify themes
Evidence of Trustworthiness
A research study’s value is demonstrated through trustworthiness and academic
rigor. Qualitative research studies can suffer from a lack of transparency in justifying
sample size. I explained the rationale behind the sample size used for this study and the
qualifications of the data collection participants. In addition, qualitative studies can be
viewed through the lens that quality may suffer due to the accumulation of unstructured
data and the interpretation and analysis of that data. It is up to the researcher to interpret
the data and report findings. After all, a quantitative study is based on numerical science
and does not suffer from interpretive findings.
Credibility
Credibility addresses the linearity between the participant's views and the
researcher’s representation of them. To ensure this, I followed the coding rubric and
coded only the data that directly impacted the research question. I triangulated the data
based on the data received from each interviewee, the research noted in Chapter 2, and
those documents, both government and private, used in chapter 2 to explain Nigerian
social realities. I also member checked the data accumulated through interviews; no
interviewee returned the interview manuscript for correction. The data collected
represented phrases, ideas, words, codes, and themes culled from each member into a
combined thematic understanding of the data accumulated. In addition, questions were
structured to determine validity in responses. For example, two aligned interview
questions are noted below:
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1K. Nigeria has well-documented issues, both past, and present, of
corruption, tribalism, ethnic conflicts, kidnapping, “godfatherism”
(political patronage), media manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism,
religious power hegemony, female subjugation, illiteracy, and economic
disparity. Based on your military training, experience, and advanced
education, use your command experience, education, and training. How is
it possible for a nation’s army to isolate itself from society’s ills,
exclusively acting as an independent institution of success? Please explain.
And.
1M. Based on your military training, experience, and advanced education,
use your command experience, education, and training. Do you believe
that if a nation’s army sprang from an exclusively dysfunctional society,
where corruption is endemic, rampant, and pervasive, where tribalism
rules the culture, sectarian violence is pervasive, political and civil
accountability is non-existent and is on the verge of social and cultural
failure; could field a professional and successful army? Please elaborate.
I would have expected to see data from the closely aligned and comparative
answers, establishing an intuitive member checking narrative. All seven interviewees
answered the two questions comparatively. As for credibility and recognizing bias, I was
the instrument for interpreting the information, reminding myself that discrimination
could be present and guarding against it. In residency 4, I had been asked by a peer, a
student from Nigeria, “how can you not have bias” after researching Boko Haram. Boko
Haram operates based on their understanding of Salafist Islam, and the group leads a
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simple life guided by simple rules provided by the prophet Muhammed and Allah. Boko
Haram does what they do, and I understand them.
To be honest, I found bias in my understanding of the Nigerian Army. An army of
a democratic nation should stand as a force for good, help citizens, and restore balance by
addressing a horrible violent uprising. The standing army of a democratic nation should
exist to serve the people, not to add to the population’s misery and insecurity. I constantly
checked my writing, mindset, and interpretation in analysis to fend off any implied or
explicit bias in understanding this bias.
The student then rechallenged in asking me, “How can a white man with no
knowledge of my country possibly carry out a study of Nigeria. He missed the point of
scholarship and research. Through this study, I learned to understand Nigeria. I have not
lived the culture or social constructs. However, I utilized research and data collection to
point to a solution based on accepted professional military operations and functioning.
Transferability
Trochim (2006) noted that transferability referred to the extent the results of a
qualitative research study could be transferred (generalized) to other settings or contexts.
This study dealt with a democratic nation and the nation’s social dysfunction. Nigeria is a
near post-colonial country and has existed in its fourth republic form for 21-years. I
assumed this study could apply to any democratic nation, especially when assessing postcolonial African states, tribalism, or studying the societal effects on military performance.
The transferability of this study should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, as is the
norm for qualitative studies (Tobin & Begley, 2004).
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Dependability
Tobin and Begley (2004) stated that to achieve dependability, “researchers could
ensure the research process is logical, traceable, and clearly documented” (p.91). The
research process lies in the theoretical foundation built upon providing a rich and detailed
explanation of the problem and subsequent evidence in Chapter 2. The interview
questions were constructed based on the evidence discovered on Nigerian societal
dysfunction. The data accumulated directed the answers to the research questions and
provided no further bearing on the study or any outlying issue.
Confirmability
According to Guba and Lincoln (1989), confirmability is established when
credibility, transferability, and dependability are achieved. Coding the data was a long
and arduous task and provided a clear path to understanding the data. Axial coding finetuned the data so that interpretations and conclusions could be made without bias and
erroneous researcher input.
Results
The results of this study provided three themes to answer the research questions.
The results were reported by theme instead of the research question. While coding, I
discovered a unique framework that I had missed during the literature review and
subsequent research. This idea led to an exceptional understanding of the Nigerian Army
and their immersion in a tribal environment, and therefore I included tribalism as a coded
theme.
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Theme 1: Society Affects the Military
Theme 1 was based on answers to interview questions, 1B, 1C, 1D, I, 1K. I asked
interview question 1A to identify if a nation’s army should be used to carry out or enforce
domestic policy. This question pertained to research questions 1 and 2, and all seven
respondents answered that yes, the army should not be used to enforce domestic policy.
While the officers and Ph. D.s interviewed represented a western-centric school of
thought; this reality applies to any state military. Much negatively can occur between the
army and the civilian population, which denigrates and harms the manner of a democratic
nation. Chapter 2 notes the terrible interactions between the military and the people in
attempting to counter an insurgency.
The interviewees, veterans, and active duty understood that the US does not use
its regular army to enforce domestic policy. European nations are reluctant to use their
armies against the people. This mandate falls to the national guard or law enforcement. In
Western countries, the use of the military to enforce domestic policy is rare and frowned
upon. The US and their NATO allies understand the unique roles and responsibilities play
on the international scene.
To that point, in 2000, Condoleezza Rice advised President Bush: “The president
must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be.
It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not
designed to build a civilian society” (Rice, 2000, p. 53). The army, as an organization, is
designed to be an effective killing machine. This is true of any nation-state army. Two
respondents discussed the Kent State shooting as an example when army troops are used
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against civilians. In that case, the national guard troops were poorly trained, had no clear
rules of engagement, lacked discipline, and suffered poor leadership.
All respondents reported that it was not appropriate to use the nation’s standing
army for domestic policy. Terrorism is a law enforcement mandate. However, countering
an insurgency is a military function. Boko Haram is considered a terror group as they
focus their attacks on the civilian population. ISWA is an insurgency group as they focus
its attacks on the military and government institutions. Each has its mandate to establish a
caliphate in the Northeastern region of Nigeria.
Unfortunately, using the army to fight Boko Haram was necessary as the national
police force is corrupt, underequipped, undertrained, undermanned, and is a ghost law
enforcement agency devoid of a real presence in Northeast Nigeria (Campbell, 2018a).
According to the data, the reasons for not using the army domestically included harm to
the public, a potential threat to the sitting government owing to Nigeria’s history of
military coups, and the possible abuse to the democratic system in general.
All participants indicated that a nation’s military is reflective of a nation’s
society. The society that exists in a military organization is grounded in the society and
culture of the nation. That is the point; the military is a representative and caretaker of the
people, much like Nigeria's president and national assembly. The army exists to serve the
people through the rights and guidelines provided by the constitution. Additionally, the
military embraces the culture and belief system of the country. Respondent 2 stated:
If a society has strong leadership, if the laws are strong and the structure is
in place to administer those laws, and strong expectation[s] are made in
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how society acts, then the answer is yes, the army is a reflection of the
society.
Because Nigeria does not have strong national leadership, the country's laws are
tossed aside by a corrupt government. The people do not demand accountability; they do
not expect their government and army to do better. The army exists to serve the people
and should follow the rule of law and the constitution. The army is not an island unto
itself in the middle of chaos; an army is designed to restore order from chaos, and a
military reflects the members' norms, values, and cultures. Respondent 3 offered:
The military does not strip anyone of their culture, their belief system, or
their heritage. After all, we soldiers live among civilians. We eat with
them, party with them, go to church with them, play with them and help
them as they help us. We are them, and they are us.
Military Culture
The results indicated that the military of a democratic nation adopts its culture
based on the culture and societal influence of the nation. Society is a strong motivator
affecting military performance both on and off the battlefield. Respondent 1 stated:
As an example, if you view the US or France through the political lens of
republicanism and as a republic, you find high functioning societies and
militaries. Britain is also a high functioning society that fields a strong and
high functioning army but is a constitutional monarchy and exists without
a particular founding document. What do I mean by ‘high functioning?’ It
is a nation and political system entrenched in the law, accountability to the
people is strong, has processes and methods that ensure open and honest
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functioning, and maintains a high moral and ethical code. On the other
hand, Nigeria and from what I have read and seen, appears to be a low
functioning society with a low functioning military where the rule of law
is a burden, corruption runs rampant, and society is disengaged in the
political, economic, and societal systems.
Respondent 3 offered on Nigeria:
Countries with low-developed law enforcement, such as Nigeria, and I use
Nigeria because I served there, must depend on their army to keep the
peace, not always successful because the Nigerian Army has been accused
of abuses. In the end, it is not a good idea for the army to be used to
enforce domestic policy. The potential for harm against the people and
institutions is far too great. It also should not happen because political
factions may use the army against the people in general to enforce their
will.
Respondent 3 continued:
Recruits enter the [Nigerian] military indoctrinated in society’s culture; in
boot camp, they are stripped of their civilian mentality and introduced to
military culture. However, soldiers are not stripped of their cultural traits,
religion, or societal belief system, including tribalism.”
A significant component for the military in a democratic society is civilian
authority's control over the military. In Nigeria, this comes from the Nigerian constitution
and is a crucial anchor for society. It is the responsibility of the national assembly, the
president, and the people to provide oversight to army actions. The Nigerian military is
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responsible for being accountable to the people and takes its directives from civilian
control as found in the constitution. However, this is tenuous and is a concern based on
Nigeria’s history with military coups.
Structuring Military Culture
Analysis indicates that, first and foremost, military culture is taken from
civilian culture, the founding documents, leadership, the rule of law, and expectations
the international community places on a nation. The army enforces and reinforces
societal expectations on moral and ethical behavior taught from a young age by
parents, schooling, mentors, athletics, and religious experiences. The army is not
expected to teach foundational moral and ethical behavior, rather carry on societal
expectations to the military and reinforce the importance of expected correct
behavior.
Society carries the burden of maintaining and ensuring the nation's military
culture represents the country. Parents and teachers are the first authoritarian figures to
impart knowledge of acceptable social behavior. The military is a lethal weapon trained
to kill, and moral and ethical values are continuously taught and reinforced in highfunctioning armies. Army leadership, including NCOs, are solely responsible for the
moral and ethical performance of the military. Respondent 6 stated:
“It is the repetition of seeing it in your leaders, expecting it from one another. If that's
honesty and trust, for instance, it would undoubtedly emphasize repetition as the key to
pedagogy there.”
A proper military makes every effort to train in ethics, morals, and rules of
engagement to guarantee lawful behavior. The NCO corps has daily contact with the
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soldier and is responsible for reinforcing discipline, morals, ethics, and a positive attitude.
According to Respondent 1:
Morals and ethics are taught; these two components are not intrinsic in the
upbringing of anyone. They must be taught, which starts young and at
home. Parents are the first teachers to impart knowledge of acceptable
social behavior.
However, Nigerian society is fragmented, attributable to the societal reality of
tribalism, creating protectionism and isolationism. As the norms of social functioning are
different across the world, African society does not replicate nor identify with Western
society. Nigeria is unique even among its African brothers, a tenuous democracy with
tribalism affecting and sometimes negating democracy. To say the Nigerian army must
operate on a particular moral and ethical plane is not guaranteed by the world order or
any country and resides in post-colonial thinking. One society's brutalism could be
another’s norm; “that a culture’s moral baseline is inclusive of violence and blood feuds
are an accepted societal norm” (Luban, 2004, p. 138).
From the outset, soldiers are taught discipline, what rules of engagement mean,
the ethics and moral behavior expected on the battlefield and in peacetime; this is
universal. Respondent 5 stated:
My military instruction included the foundational concept that I was
entering a profession as elite as that of doctors or lawyers, but one
entrusted with the capability to kill. And that Officers are consistently
reminded of army values and morals which emanate from the nation.
Respondent 1 added on moral and ethical values:
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A society that follows the founding documents follows civilian leadership,
is grounded in the law, and has high moral and ethical expectations
produces an army that follows suit [US]. [Our] Congress has mandated
additional training on social issues such as human trafficking, suicide
prevention, illegal discrimination, and sexual assault. The cumulative
effect of this training emphasizes the morals that we are expected to
uphold.
To answer the actions of the Nigerian Army operating against the people,
Respondent 7 elaborated on the training he received to define his understanding in the use
of force and the rules of engagement which are utilized for “Operational Law discipline”
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).
Every year for over thirty years, I have received instruction on the Laws of
Armed Conflict (a collection of international treaties and domestic law)
that define the limits of how I can employ lethal force.
Military Corruption
In their interview, Respondent 5 eschewed the top-down model of command and
control that made the situation in Afghanistan worse and untenable. Instead, he believed
the bottom-up model made for a far better fighting force:
Let the NCOs train and lead their men and decide what is needed daily to
create a successful fighting force and deny corruption. You have that kind
of organizational structure, that kind of corruption in a government; it will
extend itself inside all the institutions. And that's why I have been a huge
critic of top-down programs because they feed that corruption and at the
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expense of where the problem is and where we need to apply resources to,
and that's the bottom-up level.
Respondent 5 went on:
[M]y views about feeding top-down because it feeds corruption, you don't
build the house from the roof down, you built it from the bottom up, and
that applies to local governance connected to national governance. And
the biggest mistakes we made in Afghanistan were trying to turn it into a
western society and two, trying to turn its military, its police, and its
government into western-style and investing all kinds of money up there.
It perpetuated an already corrupt system... it took functional corruption
inside Afghanistan and turned it into a booming business where it was no
longer functional anymore; it just took care of the people at the top at the
expense of everybody else.
Respondent 5 was correct about Afghanistan, and it translates to Nigeria. In
Nigeria, corruption at the top affects the serving line soldier and inhibits satisfactory
function. However, Nigeria fosters corruption at every level. Nigeria uses the top-down
command model. This is made evident by the fact that the army uses order-based tactics
(Onuoha et al., 2020). Junior officers are not provided leeway to use initiative in battle.
Any initiative, any change in an order, must emanate or be approved through command.
American and British Special Forces have served in Nigeria, training the army in
tactics through a seven-week course emphasizing “offense and defensive tactics such as
reacting to contact, countering an improvised explosive device, and seizing an objective”
(Sheehan, 2019, para. 5). The translation from training ground to the Northeast battle

188
zone is lost. The American and British instructors must adjust to the Nigerian army's
command and leadership style; however, the Nigerian army does not adjust to new
training and doctrinal influences.
Civil to military corruption. As Respondent 3 noted,
An army is tied to society, and military culture is based on that society. It
is not possible to isolate an army from those social issues you described”
(interview question 1k, 1m). Although the issue of ‘cleans’ and ‘dirties’
was done away with before the fourth republic, respondent 5 reported that:
A corrupt government, a predominantly corrupt government, a
government that doesn't espouse values and ethics, violates laws of war,
putting people in positions, and I've heard it said in Nigeria. In the police
and the military, everybody takes their turn inside commands designed to
get them wealthy; they leave, somebody else comes in, designed to get
them rich. I saw it in Afghanistan too.
Corruption permeates every aspect of the Nigerian government. Nigeria is ranked
145 out of 188 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index
(Krek, 2019, para. 4). It is especially hideous when the population accepts the condition
as the status quo and does not challenge the norm (Ubi, Ecko, & Ndem, 2012).
The top-down corruption pattern is evident in Nigeria and noted when the defense
minister absconded with 2 billion dollars meant to fund the military.
On social issues, Respondent 3 stated: I know the society which you
describe (Nigeria). As I said prior, an army is tied to society, and military
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culture is based on society. It is not possible to isolate an army from those
social issues you described.”
Respondent 7 went so far as to state: The international community should
not let such a country have an army without oversight. Military aid and
training could be used as an incentive to adjust the army’s culture, but that
would not be enough.
Could the Nigerian Army escape the social ills that surround the organization?
According to Respondent 1:
I believe that it would be impossible in this context to produce a
professional and successful army. A nation’s army is the society. It is not
possible to separate the ills of society, especially ills that are so pervasive.
Every individual who joins the military has been immersed in society for
at least 18 years, if not more. They take with them what their parents have
taught and their situation of growing up. Tribalism would seem to [be] a
serious stumbling block in military leadership, discipline, and unit
cohesion, both on a large divisional level to the platoon level.
Respondent 1 went on to state:
The military can't escape societal norms, which I am talking about,
societal norms that transfer to the army. Society lives and breathes inside a
national organization. Society and its influences permeate every aspect of
military operations and culture. Separation or extraction of deeply
embedded abnorms of social behavior is not possible.
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Respondent 7 was blunt in saying: No. No. No. No. I think it would probably be a
basket case. Militaries generally are microcosms of their larger culture, of
the parent culture. I think that military would be bad news. Respondent 3
stated on the army in Nigeria:
The only way for an army to be free from those issues is if the army were
tied directly to the state or to a dictatorial or oligarchical regime in which
the military is held above the population and cared for. The military owes
their allegiance to the ruler or political party and is taken care of as a tool
of the state.
Summary of Theme: Society Influences Military Performance
The data answered the first research question; “How and to what extent does a
nation’s military reflect/mirror the society from which the military was derived?” The
respondents were quite clear that it was a flawed idea to use a nation's military to carry out
or enforce domestic policy. The harm that could be perpetrated on the civilian population
was simply too great, and in Nigeria, civilian harm has been documented. Having an army
operating within the confines of the country could open the door to military hegemony in
politics and provide a threat to the sitting government.
The army of a democratic nation is subservient to the civilian government and
the people. As far as effectiveness and performance, the army must be free from the
overwhelming societal dysfunction as and according to the data, militaries generally are
microcosms of their larger culture. The data produced the idea that the military follows
the actions and desires of the population and civilian leadership in how they perform on
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the battlefield. An army also mimics society in action, so dysfunction produces
dysfunction.
According to the respondents, the army cannot isolate itself from society; to
somehow escape societal norms, societal norms transfer to the military. The only armies
not tied to the people are the armies of the dictator and the many authoritarian regimes
that exist. In those structures, the army serves the state and its system and is frequently
used against the people to enforce the edicts of the ruling party.
Therefore, a nation’s army is the society, and according to respondent 3 who
stated,
it would be impossible in the context of Nigeria to field a successful and
professional army. The army is tied to society; its culture, belief system,
and military culture are derived from the parent society; thus, it is
impossible to isolate an army from those negative social issues ingrained
in the population.
As far as corruption, all the respondents agreed that corruption was an indelible
problem. The government structure, a structure that allows, if not encourages corruption,
extends itself inside all state and many private institutions. In this corrupt atmosphere, the
government does not espouse the values and ethics required to prosecute a just war.
Corruption is overwhelming in both the civilian sector and in the military (Banini,
2020). According to Banini (2020), military corruption denies success on the battlefield.
Banini (2020) stated, “corruption in the defence sector weakened the military’s capacity
to respond to security threats swiftly” (p. 131). Soldiers fighting Boko Haram do so
without adequate weapons, without adequate transportation, or armor. Air support does
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not exist, and when used is poorly executed, killing civilians. Troops must scrounge for
food and a place to sleep. Morale is low, as is the will to fight.
The Nigerian Army, without government or societal control and intervention,
violates the law of war, humanitarian law, and its constitution. In the obverse, a
government that follows and adheres to the country's founding documents follows
civilian leadership, is grounded in the law, and has high moral and ethical expectations
produces a highly successful army and creates an army the people can trust and depend
on.
Finally, the army recruits officers, the enlisted, and the soldier from a society that
has been underperforming and ill-performing their entire lives. A population in which
tribalism is the central anthropological-socio-political system has learned and endemic
societal traits and culture based on the Muslim or Christian religion, tribalism, and
centuries of expectations. Respondent 5 noted that “army recruits are immersed in society
in their formative years. A nation does not remove learned traits or learned societal
culture from army recruits.”
This is especially true in a tribal system where tribalism is revered. Therefore,
societal traits and culture are present within the military, and the two realities are joined.
According to five respondents, it is impossible to remove the abnormal societal
characteristics (tribalism, sectarianism, lawlessness, godfatherism, patronage, media
manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, religious power hegemony, female subjugation,
high crime rates, illiteracy, economic disparity, unemployment, high child mortality, and
poor educational opportunities) unless those societal structures are replaced; by an army
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which may represent a new tribe for the soldier. The tribal system is explained further in
the third theme.
Theme 2: Failure in Military Performance
The following interview questions provided the second theme, Failure in Military
Performance: 1E, 1F, 1G, 1H, 1I, 1J, 1M. Theme 1 identified how society and the
military are inexorably linked in dysfunction. Therefore, the question then becomes how
that linked dysfunction affects military performance. If the research to answer RQ1 had
demonstrated that society and its military are not connected, and the army was not a
reflection of society, RQ2 would have been nulled.
According to the literature, Nigeria is exclusively dysfunctional, where corruption
is endemic, rampant, and pervasive, where tribalism rules the culture, sectarian violence
is pervasive, political, and civil accountability is non-existent and is on the verge of
political, economic, social, and cultural failure (Globalvoices, 2020; Kinnan, 2020). The
Nigerian military has matched the dysfunction of society by being utterly ineffective
against the insurgent groups.
It has been documented throughout the eleven years of conflict that the Nigerian
Army has little concern for human rights (Campbell, 2018b). Therefore, there must be a
cause for the unsolicited harming of innocents, the extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram
suspects, and the burning and pillaging of entire villages.
Data indicated that if a society does not have a history of respecting human rights,
then the fight will be unconstrained by Western norms. There is little chance for a
military member to overcome the societal tendencies from which they are immersed. On
this, respondent 7 stated: “If recruits are sourced from a corrupt society with little respect
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for human rights, soldiers are nothing more but armed thugs carrying out murder.”
Respondent 1 stated on army action:
[The] Nigerian constitution means nothing to the people or the military,
and you know what they say a behavior a lot of times is how you act when
no one else is looking. The honor portion of it, having a military
organization believe in a set of values that instill honor and the sanctity of
life, is a very difficult thing in certain combat circumstances; cruelty
occurs in any culture. It can occur. Maybe some are more prevalent than
others.
Determining causation for the Nigerian Army to commit acts of violence may be
embedded in the culture, tribalism, and poor military performance. Military performance
would include leadership, training, discipline, and potential self-acknowledgment of a
tribalistic environment.
Lack of Professionalism
To answer two interview questions, I had the interviewees view an Amnesty
International Video and a New York Times article on Nigerian army abuses, extrajudicial
killings, and wanton violence against the population. This video produced emotion from
four of the interviewees when they watched the video. This reaction was due to the men
being professional soldiers and sickened by what they viewed.
This video represented a singular incident caught on tape. However, research
indicated the video was not representative of an isolated incident. The army had a long
history of abusing and killing civilians, as reported by the UN, relief agencies, and
humanitarian groups. The US State Department stopped providing arms based on
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humanitarian reports. The video was shown to the interviewees to obtain responses and
provide assessments on military performance. Respondent 3 offered:
This looks like anarchy; these are not professional soldiers but armed
thugs carrying out murder. Respondent 3s incredulity continued. When I
served
in Nigeria training their soldiers, we were not allowed to accompany them
into the field. Now I think I know why. Respondent 3, to no one in
particular, trying to wrap his mind around what he saw: Where was the
leadership on this incident? Did they condone this? This is not
professional, nor does it represent what it means to be a soldier by
anyone’s measure.
Although the video represents one incident, many cases of abuse and killings are
associated with the insurgent conflict and societal violence affecting all of Nigeria
(Murray, 2017; McGregor, 2017). No Nigerian state has been free of army abuse and
misbehavior. In response to an incident in 2019 nearly identical to the 2014 Amnesty
International video, the Nigerian Army vowed to apprehend the soldiers responsible in
the video acting to commit extrajudicial killings of suspected Boko Haram terrorists
(SaharaReporters, 2019, para. 1).
The results of watching the video produced statements from the coding from the
respondents such as “lack of professionalism, poor or absent leadership, lacking any
morals or ethics.” Several respondents noted a breakdown in society, and all respondents
bemoaned the absolute lack of professionalism demonstrated by the soldiers. Coding
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indicated that anarchy, tribalism, a complete lack of discipline, and a lack of control and
supervision were present.
Military Performance
How society and its dysfunction might affect military performance was identified
as a theme in coding. The interviewees provided material related to the performance they
witnessed by the Nigerian Army. General responses included the fact that army members
exhibited zero regard for the law, no regard for the army as a professional organization,
and absolutely no regard for the people. All respondents noted the abject lack of
discipline and leadership in the video.
The more professional the army, the fewer issues of violence and corruption you
have. Respondent 1 stated:
This represents anarchy by an organization specifically tasked with
preventing anarchy. I am seeing potential war crimes and these soldiers
are no better than the enemy. Respondent 6 noted: There's no difference
between them and the rest of the crowd that's there. What I see are soldiers
who are nothing more than vigilantes and thugs, with little to no discipline
in the unit or the military.
Each interviewee discussed the lack of discipline and leadership demonstrated in
the video and article. Respondent 1 noted: “Discipline is nonexistent, societal values are
non-existent.” Respondent 5 stated: “A complete lack of discipline, structure, the soldiers
are acting just like the terrorists we know Boko Haram to be.” On both media files,
Respondent 1 noted: “These soldiers lack leadership, unless their immediate leadership
was involved, making the scenes all the worse.”
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Respondent 6 observed: “no seemingly tactical leadership other than one guy with
a machete and now turns to people.” (the people are urging and driving the actions of the
soldiers). Finally, in disgust, Respondent 6 said: “they're ill trained; they don't truly know
how to do even what they're doing other than murdering people.” The interviewees
decried the lack of professionalism and the absence of leadership. Two interviewees
thought using a primitive weapon (machete) by army members to kill smacked of tribal
influence.
Affecting Military Behavior and Performance
At question are the norms of military behavior. The norms of the military are
affected by society. This fact is made clear in the following description and evidence
provided by the interviewees. The interviewees continued to comment on the video and
news article. The insurgent battlefield is located not along static lines but within the
population. Respondent 1 stated:
Military power is no longer tied to material power but power granted by
the people. In an insurgency, the people are the goal in victory. It is the
people who grant legitimacy to either the nation’s army or to the
insurgency. Respondent 1 then concluded: The norms of military behavior
are not present when viewed through the YouTube video. This is extranormal in military behavior. Those soldiers remind me more of the Nazi
SS than a democratically grounded army.
Respondent 2 made an interesting observation of Nigeria and African armies in
general: I guess the point I'm trying to make is that in other armies and
other cultures, getting hit on the head, or getting hit with an open fist, or
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whatever slapped up or whatever. It's just something that happens. I think
we've kind of maybe advanced as a society, and we can't really expect,
some might say third world nations, to be all nice, I guess.
Respondent 2 intimated that:
African armies or third-world nations simply have a differing view on
violence than the higher developed Western system. That ancestral and
cultural systems hundreds of years old have not advanced to the level seen
in highly developed countries. Therefore we who study Africa may not be
able to assign causation or blame for violence.
From the answer provided by Respondent 3: A nation’s military is always a
professional organization. A nation’s military lives and breathes doctrine,
the rule of law, and the imposition of discipline.” Respondent 3 stated that
based on the video: I do not see leadership, discipline, or the effects of
training. The norms of behavior expected for a professional military are
sorely lacking. These are not professional military soldiers but lawless
thugs who are nothing but vigilantes. The culture within this army must be
one of unaccountability and morass.
The Respondent (3) went on to say: …if these are Boko Haram, the
military is required to protect them, treat them fairly, and bring them to
justice. These soldiers violated the law of war and any international
convention regarding non-combatant prisoners.
Respondent 7 referred to their answer for question E, which answered if the army
is reflective of the democratic society: If recruits are sourced from a
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corrupt society with little respect for human rights, only a purposeful
training and indoctrination program has any chance of creating a
professional military force. Without such inculcation of professionalism,
there is no chance for a military member to overcome the societal
tendencies from which they were drawn.
Training and Leadership
The data accumulated on military performance pointed to leadership, training, and
culture within the army. In the end, five out of seven respondents noted it was leadership,
training, and discipline which alter the norms of military behavior. These lapses
contribute to poor military functioning against Boko Haram and ISWA and how the army
treats the population.
Respondent 7 remarked that the video indicated “a breakdown in civil society and
a lack of professional leadership.” Another respondent (4) noted that,
I think we touched base on the leadership aspect of things, but the training
aspect is that they might not even have any type of moral ethic-type
training. Respondent 4 continued, But it's kind of the training aspect of it,
leadership. The military norms, it's…(pause)… how you put it? I think it
is not expected. It is not normal for that kind of conduct to happen. I
believe that lack of leadership, training, accountability, and discipline are
to blame.
From Respondent 5, who commanded in Africa:
You're looking at a military that's lost complete control of its junior
officers. There's probably a lot of defections there. There's probably a lot
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of AWOLs; there's probably a lot of people that have left. They have
absolutely no control over this Northern environment from Maiduguri to
Bama and in all the areas in between.
In speaking of military behavior, societal failure, and the stresses brought about
by cultural, military failure, respondent 5 added (about the US troops training the
Nigerian Army): “We have to do things that teach them the right way to take care of
people inside their country. And it's the large reason why Boko Haram and ISIS West
Africa exists there.”
The New York Times article drew specific responses from the interviewees. I had
asked about the professionalism, internal culture, and actions demonstrated by the
Nigerian Army in committing atrocities against the population. On the contents of the
article, Respondent 7 stated: “I can’t draw any conclusions from the article.” However,
the respondent did add: “Atrocities are committed in war, even by armies of a moral
country. The response of the government and military leaders to those atrocities is more
indicative of the culture than the atrocities themselves. Respondent 3 added: “It is
difficult to believe that anyone could open up on unarmed civilians, let alone a soldier.”
Respondent 3 added, I read this passage (from the article). As more
combatants from Boko Haram have been hiding within the civilian
population, the line between who is civilian and who is not has been
blurred.” This is the reason counterinsurgent doctrine exists, to protect
civilians and turn the tide of supporting the insurgency.
Respondent 1 offered a stinging rebuke of the army:
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…that innocent civilians pay the price for an inept and unprofessional
army. What I read from the article is an army out of control, flailing
against an enemy. I noticed that when the army provided explanations for
the deaths and abuses, they pointed to the civilians, cults, criminals, and
Boko Haram as the cause.
The army does not own what they do, even though President Buhari, in the
article, pledged to stamp out corruption, promised to clean up the abuses (Searcy,
2017). So, while the army denies, the civilian leadership vows to clean up abuses.
Respondent 1 then offered:
What is clear from the article is the pattern of abuse and killings by the
army over the years. The article discussed the Baga massacre from 2013,
which matches the current abuses by the army. The article is from 2017,
but I have read of the same abuses in 2019. The pattern continues. It is
hard to argue with patterning. The army is out of control and practices
anarchical violence, flailing about the countryside and lacking a strategy.
A hedge against this behavior could well be training and education. All
respondents reported on the importance of education from the bottom up. It is not enough
to train and educate the officers; the enlisted and soldiers must be exposed to continuous
training and education. The Nigerian Army suffers from poor leadership, discipline,
training, and many additional problems associated with a poor example of
professionalism and existing as an unsuccessful army.
I asked what it required to be a highly successful army. There are certain social,
cultural, and expectational norms adherent to a professional army. Respondent 1 offered:
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This is simple. A well-functioning, professional, and successful army
adheres to the rule of law. The army is disciplined, follows orders, carries
out the expectations put forth by the civilian leadership and the population.
They train consistently and are schooled on a regular basis in all aspects of
behavior and in military professionalism.
Respondent 1 stated: Aberrancies in behavior are dealt with swiftly with
follow-up training to prevent repeats. Above all, discipline is followed and
enforced. Through military norms of behavior, soldiers keep their
comrades accountable for proper conduct.
Respondent 2 stated: Yeah, I think the big thing, I guess, if this is norms
and expectations, is for people, is for soldiers, military personnel to be
mission-oriented and be willing to do what it takes to perform the mission.
Unfortunately, the Nigerian Army operates under an order-based leadership
system, not a mission-based system. Completing the mission is not taught to officers or
their men. Once the objective of the order is achieved, activity may stop (Onuoha et al.,
2020).
From the responses in general, and I am paraphrasing, a single personal failure
could begin a tidal wave, and expectations are high for a soldier to perform. One soldier
could start to abuse civilians, and a tribal mob mentality ensues. Professionalism,
training, and discipline negate negative behavior. Most of all, any professionally trained
and disciplined soldier invested in the group would instead take a bullet than abandon his
comrades and friends on the battlefield. A single personal failure by a Nigerian soldier
who runs from battle causes a tidal wave of soldiers to abandon their post. Fear, although
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irrational, is a powerful motivator. This goes to leadership and training, which then
disavows discipline on the line.
This is the same military behavior that soldiers follow on the battlefield to
enhance the battle experience. Trust among soldiers in battle is crucial, that comrades
will not cut and run when it gets tough; they stand side by side against overwhelming
odds. A successful, aggressive, well-trained army is a force multiplier, fighting as a
singular entity to achieve success.
To these ideas, respondent 6 stated: I think trust is a hallmark of an
effective unit, and obviously, the door swings both ways. If the
commander can't trust his guys and they can't trust him to have their
backs, then effectiveness breaks down. The trust is built, I think, from a
disciplined work ethic that ensures that they're doing the right thing when
no one's watching.
The respondent went on: We spend a tremendous amount of time training,
but he (the soldier) has to demonstrate that expertise in the application of
his responsibilities. So that nexus forms between discipline, trust, and hard
work that allows a unit to be highly effective.
Respondent 4 stated: “I really think it's driven by a top-down leadership
structure, but also, when I first got in, there's a set of morals and values that are
instilled or expected out of you.” Respondent 7 offered the viewpoint of respect:
The underlying cultural norm should be one of respect for others. Most
importantly, respect of all the joint and coalition partners and respect
extending to civilians and even the enemy. The problem arises when the
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need for respect is balanced against the need to kill the enemy. This
involves a certain level of dehumanization to accomplish state-sponsored
taking of life.
It does take a certain amount of dehumanization to kill. However, that
dehumanization cannot extend to the population or captured prisoners. To this idea,
Respondent 3 offered:
A well-functioning army is an army of discipline, training, a solid
command and control structure, and an army that is focused on education.
Training and education lift an army out of mediocrity and allows an army
to perform at a high level.
It is command and control which ultimately has the responsibility for their
soldiers and their actions in combat. Rules of engagement exist to protect the soldier as
well as civilians and noncombatants. Respondent 5 offered this in closing:
What you have, first and foremost, is a value and ethics system that allows
the military to be able to employ good order and discipline. The chain of
command understands that it works for the people inside their command
as opposed to the other way around. You see less drug and alcohol
problems. You see less AWOL problems. You see less desertion
problems, and you find high morale. If recruits are sourced from a corrupt
society with little respect for human rights, soldiers are nothing more but
armed thugs carrying out murder. In Iraq, as the war dragged on and the
standards for enlistment got lower, that's when we started having some of
these same issues.
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Respondent (5) discussed a higher level of thinking towards command.
We have to develop this idea of servant leadership in accountability and
responsibility in our senior leaders for the people below us. Importantly,
and in an ending statement 5 noted: trust is the biggest force multiplier in
the military at all levels. And when that is sacrificed, in my experience,
that is what undermines the good order and discipline and the functioning
that you need in a military unit. The character of the individual that
matters. It's that person's ability to understand what is right and what is
wrong and to hold their ground on that.
Trusting your comrades, trusting in your ability and the ability of the army to
support you in a firefight by providing layered forms of intervention (i.e., artillery
support, close air support) allows the soldier to stay in place and fight an overwhelming
force on the attack. It was made clear by the data accumulated that there are multiple
threads of contribution to military function and performance.
Leadership, military culture, training, discipline, and quality of recruitment play
an integral part in military performance, whether in large or small units. Leadership,
training, and discipline mitigate if not remove the irrationality of fear. These attributes
affect the normative theory of military performance and the injunctive norms that dictate
military performance. There are a host of additional considerations. Pertaining to
performance and action, the military of any country is not an isolated monolithic
organization but an organization with multiple strings of influence (including civilian
oversight).
Counterinsurgency Doctrine
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In general, Nigeria and African countries may be accountable to different ideas on
morals and ethics due to tribalism, an ingrained ancient anthropological culture, or
sectarianism. To understand counterinsurgency, I constructed an interview question to
uncover whether the Nigerian situation was a mimic of 2006 Iraq when US troops were
indiscriminately killing Iraqis when fighting the rising insurgency (Ricks, 2006). What is
occurring in Nigeria is more likely than the Nigerian Army leadership's inability to fight
the insurgency. Thus, the field troops do not have a tactical plan to address the issue.
Conventional warfare tactics do not work when addressing an insurgency. David
Galula, a French officer, fought in Algeria and formulated one of the first
counterinsurgency doctrines. One of the first attempts at counterinsurgency can be traced
back to General John Pershing and his efforts to quell the 1901 Moro insurgency in the
Philippines. In countering an insurgency, the garnering the people's consent is the
essential asset to conduct a successful campaign. It is the people who provide the
government and the army with legitimacy. Respondent 3 stated:
Field troops do not know who the enemy is, so they may shoot at everyone
because they don’t want to be shot or attacked. It is entirely possible that
Nigerian Army troops attack and kill civilians because they simply do not
know how to conduct intervening actions.
Respondent 5 noted:
Yes, absolutely. I give Petraeus a lot of credit, one for what he did in Iraq.
And in these rural kinds of areas where bottom-up security really matters
more than top-down security, bottom-up really matters; this is what you
end up getting. And so, yes, the conventional approach does not work...
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same thing with the counter-terrorism approach. The top-down counterterrorism approach does not secure areas. It kills bad people. Good should
be part of the strategy. But it doesn't secure areas.
Respondent 6 said: Yeah, if you could say it. I'm trying to get my arms
around it. I don't believe it's a fair comparison unless I'm mistaken that
what U.S forces were doing in Iraq is comparable to the, I guess, wanton
slaughter of random civilians in Nigeria.
As an aside, in an interview, Ricks described the treatment of Iraqis by US troops.
“…some soldiers in Baghdad decided that the best way to deter looters was to make them
cry--and they sometimes did this by threatening to shoot the children of looters, and even
conducting mock executions” (Nissley, 2006, para. 8)
Respondent 6 stated: [I]f you're treating everybody as a combatant, then
regardless if they are or certainly in those circumstances are not, then
order and discipline breaks down, mission direction is lost. Any sanctity of
life then in what you're trying to achieve, which is tied to every military
operation in accomplishing ultimately the political objective is lost. So, it's
even in trained, disciplined armies at times because of the stresses
associated with combat. I guess degrees of violence and the rapidity or the
rapidness in which it unveils itself can certainly lead one to believe that
there's a value breakdown.
Respondent 1 indicated: “I would say what is viewed in the video is more related
to personal accountability, training, discipline, leadership, and the lack of a moral and
ethical base.” Respondent 1 did not believe Iraq and Nigeria were identical platforms
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with insurgency issues. Instead, he believed the Nigerian issue was related to his answer
of “personal accountability, training, discipline, leadership, and the lack of a moral and
ethical base.”
The discussion on Iraq and Nigeria provided an uncomfortable moment for a few
interviewees. They did not seem interested in discussing Iraq. However, the difference
between the Nigerian Army and the US Army is that the US military command
recognized the problem and moved as quickly as possible to remedy the situation.
I sought to identify if the Nigerian Army may be experiencing what the US did in
2006 with frustration, adrift in doctrine, applying conventional warfare strategies to an
insurgency, and identify whether civilians' damage might represent an association
between the two armies. In the end, the interviewees simply did not have enough
information to fully confirm that Nigeria might reflect what occurred in 2006 Iraq.
The data indicated that the Nigerian situation was reflective of a poorly
performing army attempting to combat an insurgency. From the historical record, it was
clear that what occurred in Iraq represented a change in warfare from a conventional
platform to counter-insurgency. While first struggling with the change and how to
prosecute counterinsurgency, the US made mistakes and committed a moral drift.
However, the “surge” and change of tactics remedied the situation. Therefore, there is no
tangible connection between 2005 Iraq and Nigeria in addressing an insurgency.
Nigeria uses conventional tactics and cannot make the doctrinal change to
counterinsurgency either out of incompetence, leadership failure, or simply the command
staff incapable of correctly prosecuting asymmetric warfare. The US dealt with tribalism
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in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the Nigerian Army is tribal, totally standing on its own in
military performance. Luban (2004, p. 117) offered:
To criminalize acts of a government toward groups in its own jurisdiction,
and thus to pierce the veil of sovereignty through international criminal
law, is tantamount to recognizing that the cancerous, auto-polemic
character of crimes against humanity represents a perversion of politics,
and thus a perversion of the political animal.
Initial Military Training
War is the implementation of political policy through violent means. Training and
education appeared to be a foundation by which the army flourishes on the battlefield.
The Nigerian Army puts its recruits through a nine-week boot camp. After boot, the
recruits are sent to Advanced Individualized Training (AIT) to learn their specific job.
From AIT, the soldier is sent to their unit, which may be involved in combat in the
Northeast.
However, there is little evidence the Nigerian Army continuously trains and
educates the troops in the field. Even on the battlefront, training should be mandatory and
ongoing. Successful armies conduct after-action debriefings to discuss performance and
to make changes in tactics and performance if necessary.
Training continues if doctrine changes or the operational theater exhibits a shift in
combat nature. For example, in 2019, the Nigerian Army moved from disseminated bases
and town fortifications to “super camps” (Wolf, 2020). The super camp change delivered
entire localized populations to the insurgents as the army abandoned towns (Wolf, 2020).
The army changed its tactical doctrine to confront the insurgents in a new way, but
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education and training must adapt to and provide for the new plan for super camps.
Moving to a super camp but carrying on the same doctrine denies any intention of a
conventional shift to counterinsurgency. The super camp became an extension of
conventional warfare failure (Carsten, 2019).
Participants were asked whether a 90-day basic training boot camp is enough to
instruct recruits in appropriate discipline, military culture, expectations, and moral and
ethical responsibilities in combat? The following evidence was garnered from the data.
Respondent 1 suggested that:
90 days of basic training is a start, an introduction to the concept of the
profession of arms. That training must continue throughout their military
career and be exemplified by their senior non-commissioned officers
(most importantly) and the commissioned officers in their chain of
command. Only in continuing to emphasize proper and moral conduct will
a recruit grow to understand that no matter the societal norms before they
entered the military, this level of professionalism is the new expectation.
Respondent 3 added:
We teach soldiers how to function at a minimum level. These soldiers are
not yet ready to be deployed and fight a battle. It is an introductory course
at best, and no army is ready to fight straight out of BT. I should note that
the US army tries to be selective. Morals and ethics are constantly taught
because a soldier can be easily swayed to do poorly in the fog of war.
Therefore, the military enforces rules of engagement which makes
warfighting easier for the individual soldier.
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In disagreement, respondent 4 stated:
Yeah, I think 90-days is good. There might be some social proof that 90
days is or isn't, but I can tell you from my experience that 90 is enough
time to establish again what the expectations are the morals and the ethics
expected within the military. However, respondent then 4 added: But I
also think it doesn't permanently change somebody's thought process and
beliefs. It's enough to just make them cognizant that this is where the
military stands. And if you don't want to, in a sense, play ball or conform
to that, then we don't want you in this organization. Yeah. And yeah, that
gets to the frequent amount of training that we receive just to reiterate that
this is still part of our culture, practiced morals and ethics.
Respondent 4 believed that a 90-day training regimen was acceptable but then
reiterated the fact that frequent training is a must to perform as an organization, and if
that was not possible, “we don’t want you in this organization” (Respondent 4).
Respondent 6 had a different take as he actively commanded a training program
in Afghanistan. He offered:
No. And I guess the question can become more complex if we're going to
go to another country and try to implement a 90-day boot camp and create
an entity, a security force that possesses our own military’s values, it won't
happen. The ALP example that I provided, the Afghan Local Police
example, I think is evidence of that. If it's taking us 15-months to get our
local police trainees who were going through a six week how to shoot a
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gun, wear a uniform, those kinds of things walk in formation, riding in a
truck.
Respondent 5 then offered that it took just as much time to train and to get
the recruits to stop stealing from the local [Afghan] population, stay awake
during nighttime guard sifts, not to use drugs and abuse detainees.
Respondent 3 stated that it took a tremendous amount of time to overcome
native cultural values and instill a comprehensive inculcation of a set of
professional military values.
Respondent 1 stated that: a ninety-day boot camp is designed to move a
civilian into the military. The program is an introductory endeavor to all
aspects of the military. The one item most enforced during boot camp is
discipline.
Respondent 1 went on to say for AIT: Depending on the MOS, such as
infantryman, as an example, these soldiers are further instructed in small
and large unit tactics, firearms, heavy weapons, and various other aspects
of operations.
Respondent 2 offered: That's a good question, 90 days. Oh wow. I would say at
least possibly. I think with basic training, you just get some of it. Then you
go onto your advanced individual training, and you're going to get some
there too, usually. Then when you get to your unit, hopefully, you're not
thrown into the fray right away but kind of eased into things. Now with
Murphy's Law and how things go in life, especially in the military, it can
happen that you don't get the training you need. For instance, when I
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deployed to Bosnia and Iraq, they gave me a nine-millimeter handgun,
Beretta pistol. Well, I'd never fired one before. I'd fired other pistols
before, so I wasn't too worried. But they didn't have the training for me
there at home station in Heidelberg and Stuttgart.
Respondent 3 agreed simply by stating:
A 90-day basic training course is just that. Basic. We teach soldiers how to
function at a minimum level. Bootcamp is an introduction and formulates
the beginnings of military behavior. Appropriate military behavior is
consistently taught and reinforced. Training cannot stop after 8 months of
training. (boot + AIT).
From respondent 2: I believe the key statement here is: Hopefully, you're not
thrown into the fray right away, but kind of eased into things. Young
inexperienced soldiers who are put into battle cannot function as expected.
Fear is real, and it is an irrational construct of the mind. For the army, one
avenue to decrease or eradicate fear is extensive training to build skill and
confidence. In battle, the fog of war amplifies and contributes to that fear.
Soldiers might run from battle, experience fears, panic, and forget their
training.
It is unknown why Nigerian soldiers flee the battlefield, tearing off their uniforms
as they run (Al-Jazeera, 2020; Ogundipe, 2019; Ross, 2015). However, fear and lack of
trust in the army to have their backs must be a strong motivator and the fact they may not
trust their comrades to stand with them. The answers I received indicated discipline,
leadership, training, and the lack of, induce this battlefield behavior.
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Society, the Army, and Failure
In March 2020, the Emir of the Kano State, Lamido Sanusi, was removed by the
state for “disrespect to lawful instructions” (Campbell, 2020). Many believe this was
done to quiet his objections to government corruption and ineptitude (Campbell, 2020).
Nigerian is highly corrupt; in fact, the country suffers from not only corruption, but
tribalism, ethnic conflict, kidnapping, lawlessness, godfatherism, which is political
patronage, media manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, religious power hegemony,
female subjugation, high crime rates, illiteracy, and economic disparity, unemployment,
high child mortality, and poor educational opportunities among many other social
function problems. Although addressed earlier, I asked an additional question;
Considering these social issues, is it possible for the army to isolate itself from society's
ills exclusively acting as an independent institution of success?
Respondent 5, who served in Nigeria, made the following statement:
No, I don't think so at all. I think from a civilian view, anything that the
military does is going to be a direct representation of the government. So,
Nigeria is worse today than it was in June of 2017. It is bad today, and the
military has not been able to separate itself from its rogue NCOs, its rogue
enlisted people. Even when you have good division commanders and good
battalion commanders that are trying to do the right thing, they're existing
inside a system in Nigeria that has gone to hell in a handbag, and we're
partly at fault for that. We had it going in the right direction, and then we
left, and we left them to their own devices, and they weren't ready to be
left to their own devices.
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Respondent 5 continued: “I think we're seeing a collapse of military
behavior. Yeah, Nigeria. It's a terrible thing. It's a terrible thing to read
about, to watch, to see the videos like you showed. Not in a country that
has all those problems, I don't think.” Respondent 3 added:
As in the previous response concerning social problems. In a democracy,
it is not possible to separate or isolate the military from the people.
Society is the anchor for the military. A high-functioning society that
expects a high-functioning army will see that they have one. A society
that suffers from the social issues listed cannot, by the nature of a
democracy, carry a successful military.
Respondent 3 continued:
For the Nigerian Army to perform at a high functioning level, the army
would have to isolate completely from society, root out any of society’s
ills, be funded to a high level, have a military education system second to
none, weapons systems second to none, discipline, cohesiveness, a strong
moral and ethical compass, and enjoy a strong civilian control system
which expects excellence. None of this is possible, so the army languishes
alongside the corrupt civilian and political structure fumbling their way
through war.
Respondent 7 offered the example of Egypt as an example of an army that existed
in the same social and political climate as Nigeria. 7 stated: “This has taken decades of
professional military training with the U.S. and military-to-military interactions that have
explicitly or implicitly emphasized professionalism.”
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Respondent 4 added on the military reflecting society:
Is it possible? I guess anything is possible, but probable, I would say
probably not. Here, it asks (interview question) about the religious beliefs,
terrorism, tribalism, and if you're getting an organization that has all these
problems, and I mean, it's very hard to weed it out, to not have an
influence on the way business is conducted. I, and in that case, yeah, you
could say that it would be a very, a pretty accurate (societal) reflection.
(Yeah).
Respondent 6 added: I would say the characteristics you described, I
would say no. It's just, it's seemingly an impossible task when the society
is so fractured and dysfunctional to solidify it under a unified entity.
Respondent 1 stated:
I can refer to my answer I gave for 1K. It is not possible for a military to
isolate and separate itself from the society it emerged from and the society
which supports the military and sends its young men to fight. Society’s ills
and abnormal functioning follow from organization to organization
throughout society. The army is no exception. It's just, it's seemingly an
impossible task when the society is so fractured and dysfunctional to
solidify it under a unified entity.
Respondent 2 discussed the conditions in 1989 Romania when Ceausescu formed
his Praetorian Guard and gave them extra favors, paid them well, provided them with
better food, what have you, similar to North Korea. That is how an oligarch enjoins army
loyalty to protect the dictator. But as far as the democratic state of Nigeria, he (2) stated:
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As far as Nigeria goes, and this kind of goes back to the previous question
of societal impact on a military, whether the army could overcome all the
negatives in society, and with the culture, and operate or act as an
independent institution of success. Okay. Yeah, I would think Nigeria is, I
hate to use the term, but a basket case in so many respects, that I don't
think an army is going to be able to rise above that.
Societal constructs affect how the military functions; if society is dysfunctional,
then so will the military. Boot camp and AIT are the basic training courses used to create
a soldier. However, you have a command system and a training system mired in the
mediocrity that society imposes on the army.
Responsibility and Oversight
In a democratic nation, who bears the ultimate responsibility and accountability in
how a military conducts itself? Senior leadership accepts responsibility on the battlefield
for how their soldiers act. They are also responsible for their soldiers in peacetime,
expecting appropriate behavior. However, in a democracy, responsibility does not end
with army control. Respondent 5 suggested that the commanders, “those closest to the
operation, have the responsibility on how the unit operates. It is the responsibility of
elected officials to maintain oversight, to make sure that the senior military leadership is
taken to task on what they're doing.”
Respondent 5 also offered:
Oversight's one thing, providing advice and guidance, giving them
information, resources, working for them so that they can do their job
better. Respondent 3 noted that: there exists a chain of command in
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accountability. A military conducts itself through the will of the people.
The people elect their government representatives, who in turn administer
the military.
Respondent 7 was blunt: “In a democratic nation, that responsibility lies with the
population. An easy answer is to blame the politicians, but in a democracy, the people get
the government they deserve.” Respondent 4 discussed who bore the ultimate
responsibility in that it was society. It was the society that understands what is happening
in both peacetime and war.
Respondent 6 said: “I would fully endorse our system that the military has to
ensure the liberty of the people it's protecting the entity has to answer to those people or
political leadership as our country does.” Respondent 1 provided an enlightened
argument:
In a democratic nation, and strictly pointed to democracy, civilian political
control is the hallmark of civilian-military association. Since civilian
authorities take their power from the people, it does befall the people of a
nation to expect their military to function in a manner befitting societal
expectations.
When discussing Nigeria, respondent 1 stated:
Military leadership must hold those under their command accountable,
followed by the civilian authority holding the leadership accountable. If
this does not happen, then it must be the people of the country to demand
accountability.
Respondent 1 discussed the reality of Nigeria, stating:
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In Nigeria, it would appear the army is a domestic threat to the people. It
appears the people do not have a voice; their people are simply humans
caught in a terrible war and are abused by both sides. Sometimes,
humanity is lost. They do not have a voice to demand better of their army.
Social dysfunction negates oversight of army function. The Nigerian tribes are
anthropologically inclusive and strive for national hegemony but tranquility in the tribe.
If the tribe has reached a positive level of functioning in the system, then they do not
bother with the country. For example, if the Hausa-Fulani live in peace and have a
hegemonic control system, then the tribe is at homeostasis. They do not engage other
tribes to reach the same level of harmony, which would be a nationalistic narrative.
Summary of Theme 2: Failure in Military Performance
Failure in military performance was intrinsically tied to societal dysfunction. The
data made it clear how a dysfunctional society can affect military performance. The
results are summarized through respondent 5:
For the Nigerian Army to successfully function when society is so
fractured and dysfunctional is an impossible task. It is not possible to
solidify the army under a unified entity and fight in a professional manner.
It is not possible for the army to isolate and separate itself from the society
it emerged from. It is society that sends its young men to fight, young men
who have been exposed to society’s ills their entire life. Society’s ills and
aberrant behavior follow through an organization to organization
throughout society, and the army is no exception.
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Recruits are sourced from a corrupt society with little respect for human rights. In
this situation, only a purposeful training and indoctrination program throughout a military
career can create a professional military force. Without the continuous inculcation of
professionalism, there is no avenue for any military member to overcome the societal
tendencies from which they were drawn. In a democracy, it is not possible to separate or
isolate the military from the people. Society represents the anchor and foundation for the
military and for all societal organizations.
All respondents noted that a well-functioning and successful army has discipline,
training, education, a solid command and control structure, and a staunch moral and
ethical belief system. Through training, discipline, education, and a culture of excellence,
demanding the highest of professional performance, an army is lifted out of mediocrity
and despair. The army has many weapons; they are a lethal killing machine, and in the
end, the Nigerian people are at the army’s mercy.
In a democracy, the army is a representative of the government and the people.
Respondent 5 was clear on the Nigerian Army and rogue NCOs he witnessed in 2017 and
stated that it was bad. The situation has not changed. The army had rogue NCOs then,
and he believes the army still has rogue NCOs.
Respondent 6 tied Afghanistan and Nigeria together as he had seen similar
conditions in Afghanistan and applied those witnessed conditions to Nigeria. In the
Amnesty International video and the New York Times article, the respondents were vocal
about the abject lack of discipline and leadership.
The Nigerian constitution and the Geneva Conventions specifically direct that
noncombatants are treated fairly and without compromise. The Nigerian constitution also
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protects the rights of all Nigerians. Respondent 1 discussed the Nigerian constitution in
that it means nothing to the people or the military. He offered, and I paraphrase, that it is
easy to conduct behavior when someone is looking, but actual behavior comes when no
one is looking. It is here that the rogue NCO problem comes into play. It is the NCO who
is directly commanding the soldiers. If he is terrible, then the norms of military behavior
are jeopardized if not lost. The norms of military behavior are not present when viewed
through the YouTube video. This is extra-normal in military behavior.
Response to the video, which represents a singular event, specifically included
that the video represented anarchy by an organization tasked explicitly with preventing
anarchy. Respondents agreed that potential war crimes were committed and the soldiers
were no better than the enemy. To respondent 5, the soldiers appeared to be thugs and
vigilantes, completely lacking discipline and proper military culture.
According to respondent 5, army members demonstrated a complete lack of
discipline, structure and acted like Boko Haram. In addition, the soldiers lacked
leadership unless the leadership on the ground was involved, which makes the actions
even more deplorable. Respondent 6 discussed (paraphrasing) and relating to
counterinsurgency that no one knows who the real enemy is. In rounding up people and
executing them, they are ill-trained. The soldiers do not know what they are doing other
than murdering people. The tribal narrative began to emerge from the data from
secondary descriptions such as this.
In conjunction with tribalism is corruption, not in a monetary sense, but
sociological patterns. One would assume then the elements of corruption are there as well
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so that they do not know if they are killing a terrorist organization or are they being hired
to or told to go out and eliminate a rival faction of people.
It then becomes apparent in viewing the video and reading the New York Times
article that there is a pattern of army abuse and killings. This is further confirmed through
the historiography in Chapter 2 documenting the years of army abuse and killing. In this
way, innocent civilians pay the price for an inept and an unprofessional army.
These types of military maneuvers demonstrate the army has lost control of its
NCOs and junior officers, an army out of control and flailing at an enemy they do not
understand. In the end, it represents a collapse of military behavior, a complete abdication
of the normative theory of military performance and the norms of military behavior.
This reality goes to leadership, training, discipline, and oversight. Each is a part of
the greater holistic approach to army function and success. The incidents presented here
and in chapter 2 indicate that leadership, training discipline, and oversight are sorely
lacking, making for an army out of control. Additional data exists as background
information and contextual data, confirming the validity of the data collected reported
here.
Sun Tzu wrote that everyone depends on the arts of war. This is a lesson for
Nigeria in that military strength begins with a single soldier, and unity is crucial.
A united nation is strong, a divided nation is weak. A united army is strong, a divided
army is weak. A united force is strong, a divided force is weak. A united unit is strong,
a divided unit is weak. United men are strong, divided men are weak (Tzu, 2004, p. 42).
So goes the nation of Nigeria. If Nigerian society is fractured and weak, then there is
absent control over the army, citizens will die by the army’s hand and Boko Haram.
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Theme 3: Tribalism and Military Performance
I identified a third theme, Tribalism and Military Performance. Tribalism
presented as somewhat of a revelation in the coding. The tribalism narrative emerged as a
completely organic subject offered by the respondents. I did not structure any interview
questions to inquire about tribalism or its possible influence on the army. Four
respondents brought up the tribalism theme in that the army operated as a tribe,
implementing tribal actions (violence) against the people. If tribalism is a main animating
factor in the negative actions of society, then undoubtedly, that concept transfers to the
military. The soldier does not view a citizen as Nigerian or a victim, but simply an
individual from a competitor or antagonist tribe who must be dealt with. If you are not
with the army, you must be with Boko Haram.
Four respondents organically suggested tribalism as causation for deviant military
performance. As stated in chapter 2, tribalism rules Nigerian society, and sectarian
violence is prevalent across the country. Tribal imperatives drive much of the violence as
tribes seek hegemony over a competing tribe; an example is the Muslim Fulani fighting
against the Christian farmers in the Sahel to control lands to graze cattle (Murray, 2017;
McGregor, 2017).
The data indicating the Nigerian Army is a tribe unto itself. The respondents
indicated that the military's actions mimic a tribal mentality of it is them or us. In fact,
one respondent noted: “The army operates as its own tribe and carries out punishments
based on some anthropological narrative of violence…This is tribalism as practiced by
the army.”
As noted earlier, respondent 6 offered:
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And one would assume then, the elements of corruption are there as well
so that they don't know if they're killing a terrorist organization or are they
[army] being hired to or told to go out and eliminate a rival faction of
people. (sectarian violence).
Tribalism is the principal foundation of Nigerian culture. Long before the colonial
powers carved up the African continent to fulfill their imperialistic mandates, the African
tribal system had a thriving, prosperous, social, cultural, political, and economic success
story. Tribalism continues to be the overriding cultural and structural component of
society. In viewing the video and reading the New York Times article describing
additional abuses documented in Nigeria, respondent 5 stated:
It's leadership, and its discipline, it's tribal tensions. It's historical violence
against each other that is now left unchecked without governance to
maintain security. Tribalism is global; it is a narrative that transcends
national boundaries and Western conceptions.
Respondent 4 tied Afghanistan and Nigeria together as he had seen similar
conditions in Nigeria while serving there:
[In] leveraging the Pashtunwali code (Afghanistan), the tribal affinity that
the people have, and having them we're recruiting from those bases.
Allowing them to be in a formalized security force but still working under
the belief, they're protecting their tribe, their families, and themselves in
local areas. And that's part of the reason I think the Afghan army has
struggled a great deal because coming in, we didn't understand any of it
arguably of their culture, values. We just grabbed whoever we could
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regardless of tribe and ethnic affiliation and put Pashtuns in Hazaran areas
and Hazaras in Pashtun areas. And we ignore those differences and the
tribal differences within the Pashtun tribe itself, and that ultimately caused
those soldiers to be strangers in those areas that there's- Even in their own
country and the people wouldn't talk to them. They knew they were
different, and so they couldn't make inroads very easily at all, even though
they were Afghans trying to win over the people.
Respondent 1 referred to the video in discussing tribalism:
The fact that the populace is condoning this behavior is even more
disturbing. Today, it might be Boko Haram suspects; tomorrow, it could
happen to the very Nigerians cheering the activity on.
Westerners do not understand the tribal condition which exists across the Middle
East and Africa. Westerners understand the concept of tribalism, but cultural realities are
lost when applied to the daily machinations in living a life. It is not possible to know if
Nigerian army brass understands their tribalistic environment, and it cannot be assessed if
a tribal army is by nature assumed from society or is actively encouraged by army
leadership and culture.
The army has repeatedly demonstrated its penchant for moving against the
population. This was noted in Chapter 2 when, after Boko Haram had killed a soldier, the
soldier's comrades torched the town and shot anyone trying to flee the flames. This had
the earmarks of acting as a tribe. If army units feel threatened by the population, the army
will take adverse, punitive action if the populace is seen as Boko Haram supporters.
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It cannot be underestimated the hold tribalism has on the Nigerian people and the
army. Isolated in their country and viewed as a violent arbiter of policy, the army has
assumed a tribal identity and views the population as an uncooperative enemy element.
Summary of Theme 3: Tribalism as a Theme
This theme provided food for thought in reassessing the first two identified
themes. Tribal culture dominates Nigeria and predominates the military. So disjointed is
the thinking that any group, tribe, or organization could feel the army's violence. As it is
structured and applied in Nigeria, Tribalism may be as dysfunctional as any of the
country's disorders. In fact, tribalism may be a foundational aspect of dysfunction
contributing to a national narrative of cultural insolvency.
The interviewees recognized tribal realities in watching the videos and in reading
the New York Times article. Four of the interviewees believed the Nigerian army was
tribal in its application of violence towards the population. The interviewees had
witnessed tribalism in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and it took the US army quite some
time to come to grips with how to approach the tribal theater. Tribalism presents a
political quagmire. The condition presents one of the most challenging and convoluted
diplomatic enterprises as any leader bent on national and state-to-state cooperation. Each
tribal state has specific and usually diametrically opposed views on cooperation, tribal
needs and desires, and leadership, and this reality makes Nigeria a fragile state.
Summary of Chapter 4
In chapter 4, I presented three themes culled from the codes identified from the
data. Tribalism presented as a unique idea in describing army action. The data revealed
that societal dysfunction and function, in general, are carried over to the institution of the
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army. If not a direct mirror, the army reflects Nigerian society; as such, ancient violent
narratives are found in society and are carried out by civilian groups and the army.
A nation’s army should be a force for good to protect the country's people; that is
their first and foremost mandate. Nigeria is a republican democracy with a constitution
centered on the population. However, Nigeria seems to forget that the country is mired in
a dissociative political, economic, religious, social, and military system.
The data and analysis presented in Chapter 4 provided a clear path to discuss the
findings, form conclusions, and make recommendations for further study in Chapter 5.
Chapter 5 uses the data to explain the sociological outcomes of military function
compared to existing theories, including the normative theory of military performance
and the neorealist combat balance theory.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Introduction
Since 2009, the Nigerian Army has been fighting Boko Haram, a once peaceful
youth community group founded in 1995. The Nigerian Army has failed to adequately
address the insurgency of Boko Haram and ISWA, formed in 2016, and a splinter group
from Boko Haram. Incontrovertible documentation and eyewitness accounts of army
abuses, including extrajudicial killings of Boko Haram suspects, false imprisonment,
Fulani attacks bordering on genocide (Stanton, 2020), and the murder of civilians,
demonstrates an army out of control and unprofessional.
I conducted this study to identify base causation for Nigerian military actions and
offer recommendations for moving forward. Counterinsurgency carries the moniker of
“The Long War” (Berger, 2009). However, countering insurgencies cannot become a
never-ending war. Countless lives can be saved, and the suffering can end by acting on
appropriate military doctrine with strategic and tactical initiatives.
I asked whether the military of a democratic nation reflected or mirrored the
society from which it emerged. I asked this question because Nigerian society is
dysfunctional (Fagbadebo, 2019). Nigeria has long documented issues of basic
sociological maladies where corruption is endemic and pervasive; tribalism supersedes
national unity and democratic rule, ethnic conflict and sectarian violence are pervasive
(Fagbadebo, 2019, p. 58).
Nigeria suffers from media manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, religious
power hegemony, female subjugation, illiteracy, severe economic disparity, and political
and civil accountability is non-existent (Fagbadebo, 2019, p. 59). The socioeconomic and
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political issues have been present in Nigeria for centuries. The British played the tribes
against each other to prevent a movement from forming to declare nationalism. That
conflict and animosity exist today as each tribe competes for hegemony.
Interpretation of Key Findings
Based on the data, the Nigerian military mirrors Nigerian society. The issues may
be complicated and abundant, but in reflecting the society from which the Nigerian army
emanates, Boko Haram will continue to be a scrouge on the land causing death and
destruction.
The patterns of social, economic, and political dysfunction found in Nigerian
society are the same patterns denying positive military performance. The social disorders
found in Nigeria, which were responsible for the founding and rise of Boko Haram, are
the very reasons why the army is a failure. The society of a nation is directly reflected in
the nation’s military. The military cannot extract itself from societal influence. The
analysis of data revealed this fact. All respondents concluded that a nation’s military is
the society in which it is immersed.
Therefore, if a society is high functioning, that is; where the rule of law is adhered
to, where accountability is present in every aspect of society, where corruption is not
tolerated and dealt with when discovered, where the people are engaged in every aspect
of society and government, and the military understands that it is subservient to the
people the rule of law, and the civilian government, then the army will be high
functioning as well.
A successful and high functioning army has high standards and supports an
educational and training system designed to maintain and improve on professionalism,
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maintains a high level of discipline; not through coercion, but through their culture and
professional expectations, and practices a mission-driven leadership program of selfaccountability expected not only of officers but of NCOs and the basic soldier. Finally,
the army understands the law of war, the rules denoting combat, and instills rules of
engagement on the battlefield to protect civilians.
On the contrary, the Nigerian society is dysfunctional where the rule of law is not
adhered to, accountability is lax if not absent, where corruption is endemic and tolerated,
where the population is not engaged in every aspect of society and government. The
military does not understand or ignores that it exists to serve the people and the civilian
government.
The Nigerian Army is an unsuccessful low functioning organization that does not
display high standards, where education and training are inadequate or non-existent,
thereby negating professionalism. Discipline is lacking, sometimes enforced through
coercion, and the leadership uses military doctrine designed not to enhance army
performance but to hinder success. The army does not practice a mission-driven
leadership program of self-accountability expected of officers and NCOs and the basic
soldier.
This is the crux of RQ2. Nigerian society affects military performance negatively,
negates the normative theory of military performance, and abolishes both the injunctive
and descriptive norms within the military environment. In this reality, aberrancy becomes
the norm.
Tribalism isolates and protects tribes while seeking hegemony over other tribes
negating nationalism, essential in the national consciousness. The wealthy Christian
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South is not engaged with the Muslim North, viewing Boko Haram and ISWA as a
Muslim problem. In discussing a tribal army, it may be true then that religion propagates
tribalism based on the Muslim faith, dominant in the army. In 2016, the army made a
move to recruit more Christians into the officer corps. The Muslim Rights Concern
criticized this move (MURIC), stating that “it gave undue military advantage to
Christians thereby endangering the lives and properties of Muslims nationwide”
(Godwin, 2016, para. 4).
The army may indeed be a tribal entity. In a society dominated by tribal
protectionism and isolationism while striving for hegemony over neighboring tribes, the
army becomes a tribal unit to facilitate operating amongst the various Nigerian tribes.
This has been evident recently in Nigeria when the army threatened to move against
Lagos and Abuja protesters. Spokesperson for the Army, Sagir Musa, stated, “The NA
[Nigerian Army] hereby warns all subversive elements and trouble-makers to desist from
such acts as it remains highly committed to defend the country and her democracy at all
costs” (Ewokor, 2020, para. 7). The protestors were protesting the Special Anti-Robbery
Squad (SARS), a police unit known for debauchery and brutality. (Jones, 2020). The
army seemed to forget that the people exist in a democracy and were exercising their
constitutional rights.
The tribal army was ready to inflict violence and death on the protestors (Jones,
2020). Therefore, the army should not be allowed to enforce domestic policy. According
to Orjinmo (2020), “Nigeria's army has a bloody history quelling civil disobedience”
(para. 10). The army is a lethal hammer, and to the hammer, everything is a nail.

232
Corruption is endemic, pervasive, and is accepted as a social construct.
Corruption then flows to the Nigerian Army as the army is a social institution within the
national structure. This research documented the performance issues of the army.
Command may have a pristine headquarters in Abuja where dignitaries and foreign
soldiers are entertained and impressed by rows of spit and polished soldiers, but the
reality in the Northeast war zone is far different.
Military corruption, specifically in the Nigerian army, takes the form of
inadequate supplies, poor or non-existent logistical support, poor leadership, diversion of
funds, a mechanized force that is not mechanized as units lay in disrepair. Tanks, which
have little use in counterinsurgency operations, are merely 40-ton paperweights. Troops
suffer from inadequate supplies, including basic weapons and ammunition, mercenary
tactics (accepting funds from corporations to protect their assets), and propaganda
designed to enhance army credibility. These actions deny the neorealist theory of combat
balance.
The research indicated that training appeared to be sorely lacking. The Northeast
is undermanned, and Nigerian soldiers are outgunned, outmaneuvered, outled, and their
pay is pilfered right from the battlefield (Kelly, 2020). These conditions form the basis
for systemic organizational (military) corruption.
There may be a reality that the insurgents are better armed and better led by
ISWA leaders, which changes the dynamics of the normative theory to the benefit of the
insurgents (Searcy, 2019). ISWA does not carry the baggage of society. Their soldiers
function on a simple premise; to serve Allah and follow Islamic law and its rules.
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The army abuses civilians, and the troops fire entire villages to remove Boko
Haram (Amnesty International, 2020). Civilians are thought of as the enemy and not an
asset to be protected. For the army, this is the extreme form of tribal social ostracization.
The Nigerian people are the primary source of intelligence in a country without
sophisticated intelligence-gathering methods. When soldiers look at civilians, they do not
see people or humans; they do not see Nigerians; they see an impediment to their job.
In Nigeria, the “social” army mirrors the “social” society. The military of a
democratic nation adopts its culture based on the cultural and societal influence of the
nation. It is impossible for the Nigerian army to adequately address the insurgency using
current conventional military strategy or tactics. The army is culturally and professionally
neutered to perform at a high level.
The army cannot advance counterinsurgency theory or action because leadership
lacks creative thinking and has demonstrated a monolithic thinking regimen. For
example, in 2020, the army decided to create “super camps” in the Northeast (Wolf,
2020). In these super camps, the army has a base from which to operate and offers a safe
haven and a defensive structure.
The population has been encouraged to join the army in the super camps for
protection. This is Vietnam-era thinking. Boko Haram now roams free in the countryside,
attacking villages and towns at will, knowing the army is ensconced in their super camp.
Instead of serving the people of the country, the Nigerian Army operates as a self-serving
entity.
The Nigerian Army does not practice the social and cultural norms and
expectations found in a well-functioning, professional, and successful military. The
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dysfunction of Nigerian society directly and negatively affects the norms of military
behavior. No individual, institution, or population holds the Nigerian military responsible
or accountable—the military acts at will without accountability or repercussion.
The Nigerian Army practices nearly every social ill found in Nigerian society and
noted in this study. This situation then denies the norms of military effectiveness and
denies the normative theory of military performance through illicit and unprofessional
behavior. Each respondent indicated that the army could not break away from its societal
parent and function independently as a socially accountable and professional
organization.
The norms of military behavior are directly affected by societal influence. In
Nigeria, both the injunctive and the descriptive norms become skewed in their application
to military function. I noted the military norms of behavior earlier in this study. This is
the oughtness of behavior, the positive expected behavior of military units and their
members. They reflect a group assessment of approved and disapproved conduct, and it is
the shared belief system of a group. In this regard, norms signify values or the shared
belief system of a group.
Both the injunctive and descriptive norms of military behavior are bastardized by
the actions and culture of the army, which is inculcated by society. The basic principle
that soldiers fight for each other and not one soldier would abandon their comrades in a
firefight is not purely a Western prerogative but exists through discipline, training, and
the innate desire to be with your buddies and support each other (Gaub, 2014).
The warrior ethos provides this idea; that the mission comes first, a soldier never
quits, does not accept defeat, and never leaves a fallen comrade (Shinseki, n.d.). These
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four ethos are derived from the army values of loyalty, duty, respect, honor, selfless
service, integrity, and personal courage (Shinseki, n.d.). These attributes represent the
professional soldier and are not isolated to the American army but are present in every
successful military across the globe.
Every army worth its salt strives to be professional, for professionalism drives
performance. One cannot forget, the origins and structure of the Nigerian Army lay
within the culture, expectations, and “values” of the British Army. Army values drive the
soldier to perform as the organization expects.
To understand Boko Haram and ISWA through this lens. The Salafist soldier
shares a common religion in a specific form, and Political Islam and not public policy
guide them. They consider themselves brothers and soldiers under Allah. They have a
common god, a common belief system, and a common objective. The Salafist answers to
the one, Allah, and would gladly die in his name. The Salafi-Islamists in Nigeria would
give the country to Allah.
The data analysis for RQ1 overwhelmingly concluded that the army of a
democratic nation reflects the parent society. Previous military and academic studies have
indicated that superior material, technology, tactics, and institutions were responsible for
increasing success on the battlefield (Fitzsimmons, 2013). Sun Tzu (2004) wrote that
“Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and
your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity.
Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue”
(p.34).
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When a society is corrupt, and that corruption extends to the military, the military
is poorly sourced and denied material, the military suffers a lack of technology, poor
maintenance, and vehicle availability, poor leadership, monolithic strategy, tactics, and
compromised institutions deny the army success on the Nigerian battlefield. The data
drove the theoretical applications as I assigned meaning to the state of Nigerian society.
The ills of society transfer to the military, and in that light, I assigned the realities
of the Nigerian Army to the neorealist combat balance theory. In 1995, Rosen offered
that society contributes to military power, which is then dependent on military
performance. This specific paradigm falls in line with Nigerian society and its effect on
military performance.
The neorealist combat balance theory indicated that an army that denies soldiers
superior material support hampers success on the battlefield (Fitzsimmons, 2013).
Nigerian social dysfunction induces corruption, which leads to the absence of oversight
caused by civilian/political apathy, tribalism induces political patronage, leading to
corruption in the military. This paradigm induces failure in material support due to the
diversion of monies and resources and validates the military combat balance theory.
The normative theory of military performance has more credence in this study
related to the combat norms of the military based on a performance aspect of the Nigerian
army. Highly trained, motivated, and disciplined troops can adapt, overcome, and
persevere through adversity, including being hampered by the failure to provide material
support. These troops know how to fight and remain motivated when material supplies
are limited or non-existent. This was a component of Fitzsimons’s study. It is the
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normative theory that explains how well a soldier can perform, no matter the size of the
unit.
This starts with the injunctive and descriptive norms of military behavior. Hoare
(2008) provided a structure to explain how small military units can perform successfully
in response to these theories. A singular soldier is taken in the context of their military
culture, which in turn drives military effectiveness. Add an additional soldier who shares
the same culture and the same military effectiveness, and so on. Combining the soldiers
into units who share the same culture and effectiveness produces an interaction or force
multiplier that accounts for success.
This same formula can account for an unsuccessful army based on their military
culture, the military effectiveness of the soldier whose interaction does not lead to a
force-multiplying paradigm, and here is where the Nigerian Army resides. The norms of
military behavior are found in the normative theory of military performance. The six
parameters of Hoare’s (2008) foundation for military effectiveness were explained in the
theoretical framework. The interpretation of data for RQ2 was focused on Hoare’s
parameters of military performance. I viewed these attributes in conjunction with the
normative theory of military performance.
While I did suggest that the neorealist combat balance theory applied to this study
related to the quantity of force and equipment, the normative theory of military
performance demonstrated to be the overriding theory as it dealt with the human quotient
considering the norms of military behavior and how humans perform in combat.
Both research questions were answered by the data collected from the
interviewees. For RQ1: Society affects military performance. In a severely dysfunctional
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society grounded in tribalism, societal issues dominate the military to the point of
performance failure. RQ2; Because of the dysfunction and tribalism found in the
Nigerian army, civilians are abused, killed, and are fodder for both Boko Haram, ISWA,
and the Nigerian army. In addition, civilian support and intelligence gathering are
hampered by army actions.
Theoretical Framework and Findings
The theoretical frameworks tie into the norms of military behavior as society
struggles to maintain homeostasis in functioning. Military behavior and performance are
negatively affected by the abnorms found in society as these abnorms flow into every
institution in the country. Therefore, military performance is causally related to societal
constructs. Fitzsimons’s theory and findings focused on small unit strategies and tactics,
specifically a private military company, or the mercenary.
I utilized Hoare’s (2008) ideas and philosophy on combat performance. I also
used Fitzsimmons's study of mercenary units and their ability to perform in battle. While
the Nigerian army is a far larger monolithic force, the theories and ideas of both Hoare
(2008) and Fitzsimmons (2013) apply to this study. The neorealist combat balance theory
states that an army that fields material superiority with a never-ending supply stream
should win the day. The normative theory applies to the cultural performance of the
soldier.
Counterinsurgency, known as asymmetric warfare, is small unit warfare. No
matter the size of the Nigerian Army, it is the army’s small units that are involved in
battle. It is their interactional competence that requires scrutiny. As noted in Chapter 2,
the Nigerian Army has conducted large-scale operations, but even in those situations, the
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army does not achieve success. Fitzsimmons (2013) identified the Neorealist Combat
Balance Theory in which material superiority determines combat balance or supremacy.
Figure 12
Neorealist Combat Balance Theory.

Combatant Characteristics
 Quantity of Military
Personnel
 Quantity of Military
Equipment
 Quality of Military
Equipment

Material
Combat
Balance

Combatant
Military
Performance

Note: Fitzsimmons, (2013), p. 45.
The Hoare and Fitzsimmons theories can be assigned to a larger organization for
it is the sum of its parts; the team, the squad, the platoon, and finally, the company, a unit
sized from a few dozen to 200 men (US Army, 2021). In the context of operations, it is
the military system that assigns relativity to what is significant and small and how large
and small interact and mesh on the battlefield. The Nigerian military is a large force but
fails in small unit conflicts. They also fail in large unit conflicts of company strength and
higher.
Fitzsimmons (2013) concluded that to ensure combatant military performance, the
military must field both quantity and quality and that every combatant would make full
and optimal use of the material capabilities. Fitzsimmons also noted that the combatants
would have to perform optimally in combat to guarantee a successful outcome, validating
the theory. Fitzsimmons studied mercenary forces, but this, in turn, could be applied to
standing armies. Military operations are based in small unit operations which, affects the
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more expansive combat theater. Combat and army operations depend on small unit
movements and competency in battle.
Nigeria cannot provide proper materials to the forces combating Boko Haram.
Even if Nigeria were to supply the troops with the best materials available and sufficient
quantities, Nigerian soldiers fail to utilize Hoare’s (2008) six positive constructs for
military effectiveness, do not perform optimally, and negate the combat balance theory.
Chapter 2 indicates the insurgent forces may, in many cases, be better equipped than
army units. It is here that adverse societal effects become evident in affecting military
performance. Figure 14 demonstrates society’s negative contribution to the neorealist
combat balance theory. Society’s negative impact on the Nigerian military is apparent.
Figure 14
Effects of social dysfunction in the neorealist theory of combat balance.
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Dysfunction breeds dysfunction in both material superiority and military culture.
Dysfunction, abnormal social and military behaviors, and structures affect the neorealist
balance theory. The normative theory of military performance explains the failure in
culture, combat actions, and soldier competence. Fitzsimmons (2013) demonstrated that
the normative theory explained military performance in his study, while the neorealist
theory did not explain military performance. However, the lack of material support to the
army in the field does deny efficient and substantial performance; this has been
demonstrated in this study with a more significant national force.
A soldier without a weapon, ammunition, food, air support, mechanized ground
units, and armor simply cannot perform on the battlefield. Quality of manpower
determines military performance based on the six norms of military culture. Fitzsimmons
cited Hoare’s (2008) norms of military effectiveness to explain what is required for
optimal functioning.
Hoare (2008) suggested that positive experiences in military effectiveness would
appear like this; an army would exhibit the following positive constructs in performance.
They would exercise creative thinking. Conduct decentralized decision-making.
Encourage personal initiative. Practice the free transmission of accurate military
information—practice and train in technical proficiency. Encourage and promote group
loyalty. Fitzsimmons agreed with Hoare that these positive constructs create a positive
and successful military culture (Fitzsimmons, 2013). Therefore, the normative theory of
military performance suggests:
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Figure 13
Normative Theory of Military Performance.
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Note: Fitzsimmons, (2013, p. 25).
Social dysfunction adversely affects military culture and, therefore, military
effectiveness. As discovered through data analysis, a military cannot overcome the
abnorms found in society as those abnorms become ingrained in the military culture. This
is the foundation for the normative theory of military performance. Based on societal
dysfunction and the cultural traits transferred to the military, a military must impart
mechanisms to address drift or failure in the norms of military effectiveness. Continuous
training, discipline, and practical applications in discipline and competence are mandated
by a successful army to maintain a high functioning level.
Figure 14.
Hoare’s six positive constructs for military effectiveness.
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Note: Hoare, M. (2008). Congo Mercenaries.
Figure 17
Nigerian social and military dysfunction denying success through the Normative Theory
of Military Performance.
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Theoretically, social dysfunction and its supportive theories affect the norms of
military performance and deny both the neorealist theory of combat balance and the
normative theory of military performance. Social dysfunction also bastardizes the
injunctive and descriptive norms of the military environment and skews the moral,
ethical, and expected norms of military behavior. This study presents solid evidence that
society affects military culture and performance and is one feature that denies army
success in Nigeria.
Fitzsimons’s (2013) predicted that if a military unit exercised creative thinking,
conducted decentralized decision making, encouraged personal initiative, practiced the
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free transmission of accurate military information, trained in technical proficiency, and
encouraged and promoted group loyalty would carry out significant tactical innovation,
would have little difficulty in meeting unexpected threats and developments on the
battlefield, would have little trouble adapting to unexpected weapons or tactics by their
adversary, they would learn quickly form their mistakes and take action, and would
utilize very simple but effective tactics (p. 34).
A military unit that did not exercise creative thinking, decentralized decision
making, personal initiative, practiced the free transmission of accurate military
information, trained in technical proficiency, and encouraged and promoted group loyalty
would act in the obverse of a successful professional unit and would have great difficulty
on the battlefield (p. 34).
Limitations of the Study
This study had clear limitations, as noted in Chapter 1. I used senior military
officers and those of high academic standing. This was a limitation in the sample
population. The sample was limited to seven participants due to the sample group's
hyper-homogenous standing, which led to theoretical and knowledge saturation at
interview four. An additional three interviews were done to ensure no new information
was introduced. Data collection was limited to seven participants. This study was limited
to the social effects on military performance; strategic and tactical operations and
operations in the field were not part of data collection or this study other than
demonstrating poor military performance and failure related to societal influence.
The Amnesty International video and the New York Times article documenting
Nigerian Army abuses and killings were limited to Nigeria and this study only. The video
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represented one piece of evidence, and the interviewees were limited to viewing the one
video. Both were standalone documents but offered a representation of Nigeria on nearly
a regular basis (Amnesty International, 2021).
I limited the study to explore only the interaction and effects on military culture
and performance based on a single national democratic society. The impact on military
performance by society is directly applicable to the fight with Boko Haram and ISWA,
therefore limited to the Nigerian theater of operations. This study would not necessarily
correspond to Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Somalian Army.
Recommendations
It is recommended that research be conducted on low performance or third-world
armies to identify performance issues. The vast amount of literature addresses the
militaries of high-power high functioning militaries. Therefore, future research should
focus on militaries of low power, low functionality, and illiterate systemic structures that
may affect military performance.
The modern battlefield, even a conventional battlefield, is far more nuanced than
the older Soviet-era model tank versus tank at the Fulda Gap. Countering insurgencies
adds an entirely new and complex methodology, and little is known how the armies of
low function--low power or post-colonial armies perform. Continuing research is called
for in post-colonial nations fighting insurgencies. The Congo has been unstable for
decades; Nigeria is currently unstable, with Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Sudan, and Somalia
fighting terrorism and insurgents. Africa is tribal, and that dynamic plays into political
and military functioning.
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There is little research on tribalism as applied to military functioning and
operations. The Nigerian Army contingent includes the Fulani, the Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba,
and various smaller tribal representations. It was not suggested in the literature which
tribe, if any, dominated the Army. It could be assumed that since the Hausa-Fulani
represent about 30% of the Nigerian population and are in the Sahel and North, the
Hausa-Fulani might make up most army personnel (CIA, 2020). The Fulani are a
nomadic warrior tribe, one of the fiercest in Africa (Hadithi Africa, 2019). The HausaFulani identity came from the migration of the Fula indigenous peoples into Hausaland in
about the fifteenth century (Bosch, Calafell, & Pérez-Lezaun, et al., 2000).
A path for research lay in understanding the Nigerian Army in far more detail.
Little is known about the dynamics that tribalism brings to the army. Little is also
understood about the religious makeup of the army and whether it is predominantly
Muslim or if friction exists between Muslims and Christian negating proper function.
Research in this area would assist in understanding how the army functions based on a
religious context.
Multiple respondents suggested during data collection that the Nigerian army
operated as a tribe unto itself. This would be a fascinating thread to follow and an
excellent subject for future research. However, this study demonstrated the beginnings of
understanding the role tribalism plays and offers a highly likely causation for army
action. The Nigerian Army operates as a tribe in a land where tribalism dominates; it may
further explain army actions in the field. Nigerian soldiers may trade one tribe for
another, the “other” being the army.

247
Tribalism could exist in a multi-threaded explanation as to the incapability found
within the army. This study explains military performance and effectiveness and why
Boko Haram is often viewed as a better fighting force over a national army. This study
also answers why the army abuses the population to the point of killing and the scorched
earth destruction of Nigerian villages and towns. In these cases, tribalism may be a
motivating factor.
In addition, the army is protective of its structure and reputation. Army
spokespeople continuously deflect criticism and causation of adverse events onto other
aspects of society. Army personnel explains abuses and killings by blaming everyone
from cultists to entire villages for army behavior instead of army units and personnel,
indicating army tribalism in action. No army conducts operations without fault or
sterility. However, propaganda from army personnel would leave one to believe they are
perfect in every aspect of operations. This includes continued army rhetoric on defeating
Boko Haram, and protectionism is a key component of tribal existence.
Finally, I came across a paradigm in the research of Nigeria. Although I did not
use conflict theory, disorganization theory, the structural-functional theory, or any other
social function theory in this study, I studied these theories in detail to assist in
understanding Nigerian society. No matter the social implication of a theoretical concept,
there appeared to be a reality predominating every aspect of Nigerian society.
In Nigeria, and I suspect additional African post-colonial tribal nations, a
theoretical structure can be described as disassociation. In Nigeria, every social construct,
entity, condition, and organization operated as a singular entity seeking political, societal,
and economic hegemony over religious groups, societal groups, and tribes. The tribe
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remained the guiding force in everything Nigeria. It would be conducive to studying the
idea of “divergence” or “dissociation” in a society dominated by tribalism or moved
towards a tribalistic environment.
Societal, religious, political, and economic entities sought to gain power for
hegemony. No singular agency in Nigeria worked together to provide a unified front, a
national consciousness, and any attempt to assist in the homeostasis of Nigerian society.
Implications
Positive Social Change
It is difficult to identify and implement positive social change. This study exposed
the societal effects on military performance of a significant post-colonial African nation.
This study offered insight into why the Nigerian Army cannot defeat a far smaller
insurgent force. If the military could somehow separate itself from societal dysfunction,
which is deeply ingrained, if the army recognized its subservience to a democratic
people, and if the army were to institute reforms designed to protect the people and
ensure success on the battlefield, then positive change could occur.
Identifying the actual problem of failure is a step forward. It is incumbent upon
military leadership to understand the profoundly ingrained issues within the organization
and admit issues exist. It is doubtful this fundamental leadership responsibility will
happen so that the status quo will continue. In addition, this study brought insight into
military performance and explains why the Nigerian military cannot defeat Boko Haram,
ISWA, and why they treat the population as the enemy.
It was not within the scope of this study to discuss the steps required to effect
change to army culture or operations. The army is mired in self-preservation, self-
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aggrandizement, and maintaining political and societal hegemony in the state. The army
cannot change operations or tactics without first changing the theoretical and operational
culture. After researching the Nigerian army over the past three years, it is reasonable to
believe army leadership does not have the intellectual ability to establish new thinking,
new doctrine and readily address the existing structural problems.
However, I will add that starting small, as with a platoon-sized change in culture,
training, discipline, trust, tactical understanding, confidence building, treating soldiers
with respect, which means on-time pay, food rations, plentiful weaponry, and working
equipment, could eventually turn around a company, a brigade, or a division (Shamir,
2000; Henderson, 1985).
However, this must be met with a change to the entirety of the organizational
culture. Ricks (2006) noted that this was the course chosen by the US military in Iraq.
Initially, change came from retraining small units that were actively involved in daily
combat. Units deployed from the U.S.were trained prior to theater deployment, and
change came as a requirement to a changing battlefield. This was not a focused change
limited to frontline units, every component of army operation changed with the emphasis
placed on combat operations.
However, Nigerian army command must first admit they have an issue and a
problem in culture, organizational function, and tactical ability. To admit to problems and
incompetence is not a sign of failure, but to ignore those problems and incompetence is a
failure. Leadership must think creatively. If leadership cannot find their way forward,
then bring military experts into train leadership.
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Leadership involves strategy, and every military has its innate organizational
abilities to fight a war. The Nigerian army could practice the methodology of “relentless
pursuit,” an African bush tactic introduced by Eaben Barlow and Executive Outcomes in
1995. When contact occurs, army units go on the offensive and hunt the insurgents to
ground until destroyed. There are no static lines of combat in an insurgency; the army
should operate “where the enemy is not,” putting the insurgents on defense, unable to
carry out offensive operations, and constantly looking over their collective shoulders.
These ideas require a fighting force of high caliber, imaginative motivation,
doctrine, and training. The needed additional caveat is the unconditional support of the
populace to provide intelligence and support. The Nigerian army has limited intelligence
gathering capabilities as they are not a technology-driven fighting force. To abuse and
kill civilians negates the best and usually only source of intelligence available.
According to O’Brien (2016), “doctrine provides the lingua franca for military
planners and thinkers to discuss the military problems they face effectively” (para. 2).
The Nigerian army should study the doctrinal and cultural changes made by the US,
Britain, France, and a host of international armies fighting insurgencies in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Prior to the drawdown, the US and NATO had great success in the country.
It existed in the paradigm of Western-centric ideology and warfighting doctrine tempered
with tribal and cultural understanding, but Nigerian military leaders understand Africancentric methodology. The Nigerian army should then tailor those learned experiences to
their specific organizational intellect, capabilities, and competencies; to then change
operational and tactical proficiencies for use in Nigeria.
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Military education is crucial and should be housed in an ongoing framework in
culture doctrine, creative thinking, and tactics. The Nigerian people deserve to be treated
with respect and dignity; this is the foundation of counterinsurgency tactics. Win the
people, then use population support to assist in defeating the insurgency.
It simply takes one commander to practice the ideas taken from
counterinsurgency doctrine to make positive social change. The question would remain if
the army could overcome societal influence and strong anthropological narratives
pertaining to tribalism and religion to make the necessary changes. In the end, this study
dealt with a nation’s society and how societal dysfunction might influence military
performance. To discuss operations or tactics is ultimately a non sequitur as the army's
performance is heavily influenced by societal dysfunction.
Conclusion
I initiated this study to understand why the Nigerian army cannot adequately meet
Boko Haram and ISWAP on the battlefield and realize success. In addition, to understand
why Nigerian citizens are abused and killed. One can understand the motivations of the
insurgent groups; however, the army’s mandate through the constitution lay in protecting
every national citizen.
Since 2011, Boko Haram was identified as an emerging threat when the
Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence released their Boko Haram
Emerging Threat report to the U.S. Homeland (King, 2011). According to Kulungu
(2019), the threat posed by Boko Haram (ISWAP) is more crucial today. I interviewed
senior military personnel with leadership, combat experience, and scholarly expertise to
identify failure causation and answer the research questions.
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This study identified the immense societal dysfunction found in Nigeria, with
tribalism the main animating issue. Societal function affects military performance. The
data and analysis revealed that the military operates as a dysfunctional organization with
little hope of defeating the insurgencies. In addition, the Nigerian army is not immune
from international law or the Geneva Conventions in how the army deals with the
Nigerian people, the enemy, and non-combatants.
The international community will not act against these insurgent and terror groups
until they become a threat to the West or if they were found to be responsible for a terror
attack. This is an unfortunate situation as Nigerian civilians, many of whom are in
poverty and destitute, must wait in perpetuity for help. Humanitarian organizations are on
the ground in Nigeria; perhaps the only avenue for the world to know of abuses and
killings at the army's hands. But these groups and their members are in harm’s way,
targets for Boko Haram. Boko Haram and ISWA are local and regional concerns, but an
intervention will eventually have to be made as an emerging threat to the world.
Before 9/11, the Taliban and al-Qa’ida were ignored by the West and were
viewed as a local and regional threat and not considered a threat to the homeland. This
failure cannot be allowed to reimagine with Boko Haram or ISWA providing a haven for
the training of transnational terror groups.
In addressing the dysfunction found in Nigerian society, societal structures must
be dismantled, and the societal system remade or at least enhanced. This is a problematic
situation as money and hegemony among the Nigerian tribes drives the social will.
Overcoming entrenched tribalism will not occur, so the various tribes must come together
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to fight the insurgency. However, this would take a transformational leader and a
willingness to confront the issues throughout Nigeria.
I would expect to have another 11-years of conflict with corresponding deaths and
destruction. However, the conflict may never end. Throw in a potential coup d'état by the
military, and the status quo is continued. In the meantime, this study has provided some
understanding of why the Nigerian army is a failure and why the army will not change. I
noted that throughout history, democracies had shown a prevalence in winning wars. This
success was due to “democracies' superior human capital, civil-military relations, and
cultural background” (Biddle & Long, 2004, p. 541). This is not the case in Nigeria,
which fails in those societal requirements. It is society that must offer the first signs of
change to affect the norms of military behavior.
To add a note of optimism, the experts interviewed for this study to a person
indicated that strong leadership is required in both the civilian political sector and in the
military. However, an army requires a high level of stewardship and direction, not in the
western tradition, but for what would work for the Nigerian army. However, increased
guidance and sharing past experiences from insurgent wars may help Nigeria turn the
corner. Army leadership must be open to assistance. There are few successful
counterinsurgent wars. The British in Malay, NATO and the Americans in Iraq, and the
Pershing initiative in the Philippines. To present a positive experience, I wrote on the
Moro insurgency of 1896, and it can be found in Appendix D.
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the team
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to improving
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Appendix B
Interview Questions
1A. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, do you agree
or disagree that a democratic nation’s (regular) army be used to enforce domestic
policy? Please explain your answer.
1B. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, do you
believe that a nation’s military is a reflection/mirror of the society from which it
sprang from both socially and culturally?
1C. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education. Does the
military of a democratic nation adopt its culture based on the culture and societal
influence of the nation? Please explain.
1D. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, could you
explain how a nation’s military culture is developed? As a young officer and
throughout your career, how were you instructed in morals, values, and ethics in
carrying out military orders?
I will show you a video obtained by Amnesty International (2014,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=GA7SIbvEO64) and referenced by the US State
Department, which shows actions by the Nigerian Civilian Joint Task Force and the
Nigerian Army. I would like your thoughts after the video, and I will ask you questions.
In this video, Nigerian Army members are overseeing the extrajudicial executions of
suspected Boko
Haram members.
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1E. Based on your military training, experience, and advanced education, what do you
believe are the causes (lapses) for incidents like this in which military personnel
participate in torture or extrajudicial killing?
1F. In 2006, US troops in Iraq were killing and abusing Iraqi citizens. Understanding the
moral and ethical drift encountered in Iraq by US troops using conventional
warfare (the reason Petraeus installed population-centric warfare doctrine). Could
you extrapolate (based on the video) using your military training, experience, and
or advanced education that in using conventional war practices, the same
population abuse could be occurring in Nigeria by the Nigerian Army against
civilians?
1G. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education and using
your command experience, education, and training, can you assess the culture,
training, leadership, and military norms of behavior demonstrated in this video?
I would like you to read the following New York Times Report on Nigerian Army abuses
titled “They Told Us They Were Here to Help Us.’ Then Came Slaughter.”
. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/world/africa/nigeria-civilianmassacre.html
1H. I would like to get your opinion after reading this article and based on your
military training, experience, and or advanced education and using your command
experience, education, and training; on the professionalism, internal culture, and
actions demonstrated by the Nigerian Army as shown in this article?
1I. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, use your
command experience, education, and training. Can you explain the social and
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cultural norms and expectations found in a well-functioning, professional, and
successful military?
1J. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, and using
your command experience, education, and training. Do you believe that a 90-day
basic training boot camp is enough to instruct recruits on appropriate discipline,
military culture, expectations, and moral and ethical responsibilities in combat?
Please explain.
1K. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, and using
your command experience, education, and training. Do you believe that if a
nation’s army sprang from an exclusively dysfunctional society, where corruption
is endemic, rampant, and pervasive, where tribalism rules the culture, sectarian
violence is pervasive, political and civil accountability is non-existent and is on
the verge of social and cultural failure; could field a professional and successful
army? Please explain.
1L. In a democratic nation, who is it (group, individual, institution, or population) that
bears the ultimate responsibility and accountability in how a military conducts’
itself in both peacetime operations and wartime operations? Please identify and
explain why?
1M. Nigeria has well-documented issues, both past, and present, of corruption, tribalism,
ethnic conflicts, kidnapping, “godfatherism” (political patronage), media
manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, religious power hegemony, female
subjugation, illiteracy, and economic disparity. Based on your military training,
experience, and advanced education, use your command experience, education,
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and training. Is it possible for a nation’s army to isolate itself from society’s ills,
exclusively acting as an independent institution of success? Please explain.
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Appendix C
Mapping Research Questions with Interview Questions
RQ1--How and 1A. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced
to what extent
education, do you agree or disagree that a democratic
does a nation’s
nation’s (regular) army be used to enforce domestic policy?
military reflect
Please explain your answer.
1B. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced
or mirror the
education, do you believe that a nation’s military is a
society from
reflection/mirror of the society from which it sprang from
which the
both socially and culturally?
military was
1C. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced
derived?
education. Does the military of a democratic nation adopt its
culture based on the culture and societal influence of the
nation? Please explain.
1D. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced
education, could you explain how a nation’s military culture
is developed? As a young officer and throughout your career,
how were you instructed in morals, values, and ethics in
carrying out military orders?
1K. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced
education, and using your command experience, education,
and training. Do you believe that if a nation’s army sprang
from an exclusively dysfunctional society, where corruption
is endemic, rampant, and pervasive, where tribalism rules the
culture, sectarian violence is pervasive, political and civil
accountability is non-existent and is on the verge of social
and cultural failure; could field a professional and successful
army? Please explain.
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RQ2--How and to what extent
can marked societal
dysfunction affect or inhibit
military performance in
Nigeria?

1E. Based on your military training, experience,
and advanced education, what do you believe are
the causes (lapses) for incidents like this in which
military personnel participate in torture or
extrajudicial killing?
1F. In 2006, US troops in Iraq were killing and
abusing Iraqi citizens. Understanding the
moral and ethical drift encountered in Iraq by
US troops using conventional warfare (the
reason Petraeus installed population-centric
warfare doctrine). Could you extrapolate
(based on the video) using your military
training, experience, and or advanced
education that in using conventional war
practices, the same population abuse could be
occurring in Nigeria by the Nigerian Army
against civilians?
1G. Based on your military training, experience, and
or advanced education and using your
command experience, education, and
training, can you assess the culture, training,
leadership, and military norms of behavior
demonstrated in this video?
1H. I would like to get your opinion after reading
this article and based on your military
training, experience, and or advanced
education and using your command
experience, education, and training; on the
professionalism, internal culture, and actions
demonstrated by the Nigerian Army, as
shown in this article?
1I. Based on your military training, experience, and
or advanced education and using your
command experience, education, and
training. Can you explain the social and
cultural norms and expectations found in a
well-functioning, professional, and
successful military?
1J. Based on your military training, experience, and
or advanced education and using your
command experience, education, and
training. Do you believe that a 90-day basic
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training boot camp is enough to instruct
recruits on inappropriate discipline, military
culture, expectations, and moral and ethical
responsibilities in combat? Please explain.
1L. In a democratic nation, who is it (group,
individual, institution, or population) that
bears the ultimate responsibility and
accountability in how a military conducts’
itself in peacetime operations and wartime
operations? Please identify and explain
why?
1M. Nigeria has well-documented issues, both past,
and present, of corruption, tribalism, ethnic
conflicts, kidnapping, “godfatherism”
(political patronage), media manipulation,
citizen apathy, terrorism, religious power
hegemony, female subjugation, illiteracy,
and economic disparity. Based on your
military training, experience, and or
advanced education and using your
command experience, education, and
training. Is it possible for a nation’s army to
isolate itself from society’s ills, exclusively
acting as an independent institution of
success? Please explain.
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Appendix D
The Philippine Moro Insurgency
I have included this description of the Philippine Moro insurgency as an example
of only one of two tremendously successful counterinsurgent campaigns in history. The
other being the British-Malaya counterinsurgent campaign against the Malayan National
Liberation Army, the military wing of the Malayan Communist Party.
The Philippine Moro campaign was not referenced much in contributing to
modern counterinsurgency doctrine; however, there was a common thread to successful
counterinsurgent operations. Army counterinsurgent doctrine is built on historical study,
so the inclusion of the Moro campaign is relevant to the discussion.
The US government claimed the territories of the Philippines after the SpanishAmerican War. The military governance in the Philippines and specifically the Moro
province, which had remained neutral in the Spanish-American war, led to an insurgent
revolt against American “occupation.” The Moro campaign, which lasted from 1899 to
1913, represented the first time the US conducted a counterinsurgency campaign outside
the US and within an Islamic society.
The Bates Agreement, signed in August 1899, allowed for indirect rule over Moro
Mindanao and its neighboring islands (Sulu Archipelago) in the southern Philippines by
the Moro sultans, provided that the Moro’s acknowledge American sovereignty. The
initial plan for the Moro area allowed for each military governor to establish a system of
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governance associated with economic development and educational initiatives to pacify
the Moro population. Initial military operations were meant to support these activities.
However, security threats and violent opposition made this strategy unworkable,
and pacification by nation-building failed. It was left to General John J. Pershing to
implement a disarmament policy to disarm the population and end Moro resistance.
Subsequent military campaigns ended the Moro insurgency so that the civilian
enhancement policy could finally be put into place, and the Moro areas were returned to
civilian control in 1913. Each military governor of the Moro Province and three began
their commands with different strategies for pacifying the Moros. The military
government eventually adopted a strategy that relied on military force, but only after
eight years of military governance focused on civil affairs and economics had failed to
achieve results.
General Leonard Wood (1903-1906) established the initial strategy of the
American military government. Wood’s strategy focused on establishing a system of
governance for the province. Wood believed that one firm military defeat would be
enough to end all resistance, so he approached every act of resistance as if it were the
last. Unfortunately, General Wood had it wrong as there was always one more battle
around the corner until he was confronted with the Battle of Bud Dajo in the spring of
1906.
General Tasker H. Bliss (1906-1909) focused his strategy on the economic and
educational development in the province. Bliss believed that Bud Dajo was the decisive
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battle to end the Moro’s ability to offer martial resistance. He implemented security
operations around the protection of and promotion of economic development. Bliss
withdrew his forces out of contact with much of the population to be less confrontational.
The tactics used by Wood and Bliss failed because neither felt that military intervention
was needed to overcome the resistance. When Bliss returned his forces to the garrison
environment, the Moro leaders were encouraged to ignore and disregard American
military power.
General John J. Pershing (1909-1913) was himself a Moro Datu, given this honor
on his first deployment during the 1899 Philippine insurrection, and was the last military
governor of the Moro province. Pershing was able to end the Moro resistance utilizing
both indirect and direct-action campaigns. The Moros, located in isolated areas, exploited
two weaknesses within the American governing structure. Only those Moros adjacent to
and within proximity to American forces became loyal to the Manila government and
enjoyed the economic benefits.
The second weakness came out of the first; the US failed to address the Moro
leadership in those areas and win them. A third issue concerned the Sultans, or Datu as
they were known. The Datu’s main power behind the resistance, but the Moros could not
sustain a long-drawn-out military campaign; they had neither the men nor arms to do so.
No single Datu held sway over the others to influence policy, and defeating one
Datu did not affect the other tribal members. Each Moro leader had to be conquered
individually, and that never occurred until Pershing initiated his disarmament campaign.
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Pershing arrived in the Moro province seeking to further the region's economic
development and continue the work of improving conditions for the Moros. Pershing
believed that good governance focused on economic and educational development.
However, shortly after his arrival, reality set in when he learned firsthand that security
was nonexistent.
Pershing implemented a host of civil affairs actions along with security changes to
pacify the province. Pershing met regularly with the local leaders to discuss issues, and
he ordered his subordinates to do the same. Pershing ordered the garrisoned troops into
the field to interact with the indigenous peoples and, in some cases cohabitating with
them to build trust. Pershing passed acts that continued to remove exemptions and bring
the Moro province further in line with the administrative system for all the Philippines.
Pershing continued to enhance the educational system.
Pershing also updated the Moro Exchange system and began industrial trading
stations in the interior area. Pershing personally insisted on steps to improve labor
practices by plantation owners, and Pershing was aware of the level of animosity between
the Moros and the Filipinos, admitting that the Moros resented the Filipinos far more than
the Americans.
Pershing integrated more Moro leaders into the provincial government, and Moro
leaders acted as deputy district governors and reinforced American authority even when
acting within their traditional role. During Pershing's tenure, the most significant legal
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and governmental change was the passage of a provincial disarmament law that went into
effect in September 1911.
However, only in 1913 did the violence become so pronounced that it was
reported in the official reports. Violence to that point had been sporadic and low
intensity. 1910 had brought about a redistribution of military forces within the Moro
Province. Two additional battalions of Philippine scouts were added to the Moro
province (Miller, 2009, p. 130).
Pershing utilized the increase to disseminate the troops into the province to man
company-sized stations. In the rest of the Philippines, the scout and military troops were
consolidated into battalion-sized or larger garrisons to cut costs. The extra troop strength
allowed Pershing to establish four additional outposts in the troublesome Lanao district,
assign a battalion to secure Davao, and establish eight new stations along the Cotabato
River Valley ((Miller, 2009). Pershing’s approach can be seen from an excerpt of
instructions given to the Philippine scout companies for their operations: “At regular
intervals of not less than three months, if practicable, detachments will be sent to the
principal localities, including rancherias and villages of influential wild men, to remain
for short periods. During their stay at such places, and, in fact, always, both officers and
enlisted men should use every endeavor to create and maintain friendly relations with the
inhabitants, especially the Moros and wild people, to the end that the latter may be
brought under governmental influence and control” (Miller, 2009, p. 131).
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Pershing recommended a permanent regimental headquarters in Jolo, a brigade
headquarters in the Lake Lanao region, and another regimental headquarters in
Zamboanga. He established several smaller camps at Keithley and Overton. Pershing
increased the number of combat available troops within units that gave him more forces
to interact with the population (Miller, 2009). Pershing’s increased Philippine troop
readiness to a perpetual war footing status. Troop strength was increased from sixty
soldiers in a company to 150. Pershing cut regimental headquarters staff by half, so the
ratio of field troops to support staff was increased. Pershing designed military operations
to augment civil authorities in maintaining order and control and eliminating pirate or
outlaw bands. In 1909 the Subano ethnic group occupied and fortified a position in the
hills not far from Zamboanga.
A constabulary force was sent to investigate and attacked, taking casualties.
Major J. P. Finley, the district governor of Zamboanga, took charge of military troops and
put down the uprising. Finley did not use brute force to put down the revolt, and he
moved slowly to avoid any hostile action (Miller, 2009, p. 135).
Finley believed that if the troops acted in a nonaggressive manner and were
friendly to the Subano people, he could establish trust and confidence between the
indigenous people and the US government. Finley wanted to end the conflict without
bloodshed by convincing the Subano that the US and Philippine governments were
genuinely interested in their welfare.
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Finley’s strategy worked, and the Subano returned to their homes and aided the
American forces in capturing and testifying against the Moro instigators of the rebellion
(Miller, 2009, p. 136). The Subano operation demonstrates Pershing’s overall strategy in
using troop presence to provide security without relying on actual military force to
eliminate resistance.
Throughout 1912, vigorous patrolling by army, scout and constabulary units
carried out disarmament. When patrolling units came across a Moro carrying a weapon,
any weapon, the units attempted to talk the Moro into giving it up. Much of the time,
however, the Moro chose to flee or fight. Pershing made sure that his field soldiers
understood the meaning of a weapon to the Moro. Disarming a Moro meant damage to
his honor, and he would feel the emasculation of having his weapon taken away (Miller,
2009, pp. 142-143).
Aggressive patrolling deterred organized resistance for most of that year. A minor
engagement near Jolo in January of 1912 resulted in no U.S. fatalities, but twenty
attacking Moros were killed when radical Moros engaged a column of four U.S.
companies. The first violent resistance occurred in Jolo in November and December 1911
when 1300 Moros opposed to disarmament occupied the crater of Bud Dajo, scene of the
earlier 1906 battle. Pershing personally led a force of 1,000 Regular Army, Scouts, and
Constabulary troops to deal with the situation (Miller, 2009, pp. 143).
Negotiations by Pershing resulted in all but 300 of the resisters giving up and
returning to their homes. After Pershing received guidance from the Philippine Governor-
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General, Newton W. Gilbert, it was decided that Pershing could neither directly assault
the crater nor use artillery to shell the crater’s defenders to prevent a repeat of the
political fallout accompanied the earlier 1906 Battle of Bud Dajo.
Pershing sealed off the crater and played a waiting game to compel the surrender
of the remaining resisters when their supplies were exhausted. The Moro defenders were
forced to attempt a breakout from the crater, and after several unsuccessful attempts, the
majority surrendered (Miller, 2009, pp. 143-144).
General Pershing practiced indirect action missions in civil affairs actions before
civil affairs had a name. Military force was tempered and judiciously applied, and all-out
battles were few and far between. Heavy troop presence in trouble areas with the troops
eschewing all-out violence and practicing peaceful interaction won the day.
Finally, the Moro leadership and hardcore insurgents took the hilltop at Bud
Bagsak, kidnapping 6,000 to 10,000 local villagers. The unarmed population was
persuaded it was safe to return to their homes, but the core insurgent group refused any
effort at a peaceful resolution. As a result, Pershing ordered a heavy assault against the
insurgents. The Moro leadership was killed with 300 to 500 Moro insurgents (Miller,
2009, pp. 145).
While Pershing worked hard at peaceful cooperation and a means to quell the
insurgent population, he was not hesitant to use overwhelming force when called for. It
may have taken thirteen years, but peace was established by winning the hearts and
minds of the population, proving that providing a reason to trust the political process was
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far better than trusting the insurgents. Pershing engaged the population and built a society
but was not afraid to use force when required. Pershing knew the Moro from a previous
assignment to the province, and he did not want lifelong insurgents and tempered his
policies to prevent future insurrections.

